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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores United States federal public charge policy from its inception,
focusing on the expansion of the public charge test under the Trump administration, which made
it easier for low-income immigrants to be barred from entry into or continued residence in the
country based on their low socioeconomic status. This policy change caused eligible immigrants
to avoid state-funded services such as public benefits en masse out of fear of deportation, family
separation, and other adverse immigration consequences. This kind of avoidance of benefits use
is called a “chilling effect,” and immigrants’ use of community services and means-tested
benefits showed significantly chilling as a result of public charge policy changes.
To help contextualize the findings, a literature review covering the following themes was
conducted: historical inadmissibility policy, changes to the public charge rule during the Clinton
and Trump administrations and how they affected immigrant communities, under-enrollment in
public benefits among eligible immigrants, public charge policy as an example of Social
Reproduction Theory, and the removal of the expanded public charge rule in 2021.
This study analyzed 2015-2019 enrollment records for adult ESL programs from all
California community colleges to determine whether they included evidence of chilling. I found
that public charge changes did not significantly chill participation in community college ESL
program-wide; however, three subcategories of students did display significant chilling in 2016
and 2018. Hispanic ESL students; ESL students of color, more generally; and low-income ESL
students all demonstrated significant chilling in these years, mirroring previous findings that





Statement of the Problem
In October 2018, Donald Trump’s Department of Homeland Security published an
enhanced version of an obscure immigration law called the public charge rule, which dates back
to the 1880s and has the power to exclude or even expel immigrants from the country. Beginning
with his administration’s mere threat of expanding the public charge law in 2017, and continuing
through the adoption of the expanded new rule in 2019, Trump’s expansion of U.S.
inadmissibility policy had wide-ranging and harmful effects on immigrant communities.
The public charge rule is a federal statute that allows immigration officials to put
potential immigrants to the United States (such as people visiting the country, applying for visas,
or seeking a change in status to legal permanent residency or citizenship) to a “public charge
test” in order to determine whether or not they are likely to be dependent on the U.S. government
for their subsistence (Barofsky et al., 2020). In essence, anyone who is determined by
immigration officials to be a likely “public charge,” meaning a foreign-born person with limited
means whose livelihood must be substantially supported by U.S. public monies, is subject to
denial of entry into, or even deportation from, the country.
Prior to Donald Trump’s tenure in the White House, newcomers subject to public
charge-based denials of admittance into the United States were limited to those who were “likely
to become primarily dependent on the government for support” (emphasis my own) and that
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“primary dependence” had definite bounds (Immigrant Legal Resource Center, 2021, p. 3). Per
the Immigrant Legal Resource Center (2021)’s primer on immigrant inadmissibility prior to
Trump’s expansion of the public charge test, “primary dependence” had long been understood to
imply one of two things: either “reliance on public cash assistance” or “long-term
institutionalized care paid for by the government” (p. 3).
Traditionally, public charge policy was only relevant in cases involving foreign-born
people (1) receiving in-cash assistance from the U.S. government (an example is the cash-based
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, also known as “welfare”), or (2)
requiring government-funded institutionalization, such as residence in a nursing home or mental
health institution (Makhlouf & Sandhu, 2020, p. 6). Per Bernstein et al. (2019), Trump’s
expanded rule widened the purview of public charge policy: for the first time, immigrants could
be denied admission into the United States or face deportation if they participated in virtually
any public assistance program, whether it be an in-cash program (a criterion upheld from
previously established federal guidance) or, for the first time, an in-kind benefit (such as relying
on government-subsidized food purchases, health insurance, housing, etc.).
In government literature, these kinds of anti-poverty public assistance programs are often
called “means-tested benefits,” meaning that in order to be eligible to receive the assistance, a
recipient must have very limited means, usually defined as having an income level near or below
the federal poverty line for their household size. Colloquially, we know these benefits as
“safety-net” programs meant to brace low-income households against a fall into abject poverty.
Under President Trump, immigration officers were invited to red-flag applicants who used any of
an expanded array of safety-net programs, such as people receiving federal food aid (e.g., the
3
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), which was formerly known as Food
Stamps); subsidized medical insurance (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare); subsidized housing (e.g.,
Section 8 housing); and more (Fix & Capps, 2017).
Accordingly, it was suddenly easier than ever before for immigrants to be labeled “public
charges” deemed too poor to be legally allowed to stay in the United States. Not only would the
revised policy blacklist immigrants’ use of a wider array of safety-net programs than it had at
any time in the past, but the updated public charge policy would also be applicable to a broader
pool of immigrants. This pool included, as one might expect, undocumented immigrants, but it
also extending to people residing in the United States legally, such as the foreign-born spouses of
U.S. citizens, current green card holders, and people holding U.S. visas for purposes such as
travel, study, or work (Fix & Capps, 2017). As a result of this novel interpretation of “public
charge,” participating in safety-net programs could threaten any members of these groups’ entry
into (or continued residency in) the country (Bernstein et al., 2019, p. 1).
Public charge policy governs who is allowed to enter and stay in the United States, but
the expansion of the public charge test launched a cascade of consequences among immigrant
communities that were unrelated to migration itself. Per Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020),
participants’ disenrollment from or forgone enrollment in government services for which they
are eligible is called a “chilling effect.” Members of immigrant communities—including
noncitizens, permanent legal residents, naturalized citizens, and the U.S.-born children of adult
immigrants—have all demonstrated “chilling” in response to the new, broader legal definition of
“public charge” (Bernstein et al., 2019, p. 1). Although the federal government would not
officially promulgate Trump’s new rule until August 2019, leaked government documents, the
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spread of misinformation, and clamorous media attention to the issue of inadmissibility policy
induced a significant chilling effect among immigrants starting well in advance of the rule’s
adoption (Barofsky et al., 2020, p. 1760). Per Bernstein et al. (2019), one in every seven adult
immigrants in the United States reported chilling starting in 2018, and these chilling effects were
yet more common among low-income immigrant households, including among citizen children
living with immigrant guardians. In a society where 96% of children under six years of age live
with at least one foreign-born parent (Hester et al., 2018, p. 6), this change in policy and its harm
to low-income immigrants struggling to provide for their families cannot be ignored.
Just as chilling effects have been reported among people who would seem, at first glance,
unlikely to be affected by changes in inadmissibility policy (people such as U.S. citizens),
immigrants’ participation in public benefits programs not subject to public charge evaluation has
also chilled in response to this policy change. Participation rates for services that remained
irrelevant to public charge determination, such as nonprofit-led food pantries and education
services for K-12 public school students, declined due to immigrants’ overgeneralized fear of
using any government service at all (Bleich & Fleischhacker, 2019). Not only was chilling
stemming from the new rule reported among low-income immigrant households lately enrolled
in safety-net programs newly subject to the public charge test (programs such as SNAP and
Medicaid), but it also occurred among households not enrolled in these kinds of programs
(Barofsky et al., 2020). Chilling extended even to families who had historically only used
services located within bedrock community institutions (e.g., public schools, clinics, and
nonprofit organizations) and who were never eligible for safety-net services in the first place
(Barofsky et al., 2020). We can see that immigrant families’ misunderstanding and fear of the
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purview of the new public charge test and its potential consequences drove widespread
under-enrollment in myriad government-funded services (Barofsky et al., 2020). Families feared
that their participation in government-funded and other public programs might threaten their path
to legal permanent residency in the United States, or it could even result in deportation or family
separation, and indiscriminate chilling was the result (Bleich & Fleischhacker, 2019).
Bernstein et al. (2019) showed that at least 14% of immigrants declined participating in
safety-net and/or educational services for which they were eligible in the wake of the new rule
and that this chilling affected all types of programs for immigrants; however, as yet, there have
been no studies of the potential chilling of English as a Second Language (ESL) program
participation. Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) reported that education services for low-income
families—for example, healthy cooking and nutrition classes funded by SNAP-Ed
dollars—likely chilled due to concerns about public charge policy. It stands to reason that
participation in public ESL education, which is another government-funded service not subject to
the expanded public charge test, may also show chilling due to overgeneralized avoidance of any
benefits perceived by fearful immigrants to carry a public charge threat.
Due to the lack of analysis of ESL program enrollment rates with an eye toward how
changing inadmissibility policy may have affected immigrant communities before (from Trump’s
election up to the January 2017 leak of executive-branch documents about public charge
expansion), during (from January 2017 until the new rule’s planned promulgation in August
2019), and after the new rule was to take effect (from August 2019 on), it is not yet known
whether ESL programs experienced chilling. This study aims to be the first to find out whether
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participation in ESL programs among adult immigrants may have chilled during the Trump’s
administration’s revamp of public charge-based denials and deportations.
Background and Need for the Study
Knowing if, and to what extent, public charge rule changes leaked in 2017, announced in
2018, and promulgated in 2019 affected ESL enrollment will help researchers, Teaching English
to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) practitioners, and policymakers begin to understand
the effects that federal immigration law changes can have on adult ESL students. This study is
needed because scholarly investigations of the ramifications of the expanded rule are still very
rare. Though scholarship about chilling effects during the Trump administration are as yet
limited, researchers report that the immigration consequences of the new rule took effect quite
swiftly. Researchers posit that, because of the expanded public charge test, “refusals of
[immigration] applications on public charge grounds quadrupled to 13,500” cases in 2018
(Bernstein et al., 2019, p. 3). Evidence-based evaluation of chilling caused by the new rule is
only just beginning.
In particular, no studies about the possible interaction between the public charge rule and
ESL program enrollment have yet been conducted. In 2019, vanguard researchers launched the
first wave of scholarship about the new rule’s impact. These authors acknowledge that, before
publishing their own studies, “evidence on this chilling effect ha[d] largely been based on
anecdotal reports from service providers” (Bernstein et al., 2019, p. 2). Even professional
researchers publishing for well-regarded institutions (in Bernstein et al. (2019)’s case, for
Washington, D.C.’s Urban Institute) who were focused on studying comparatively
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well-documented programs like SNAP and Medicaid struggled to find prior research about
recent chilling upon which to build their new contributions. More is the challenge for TESOL
professionals to find scholarship that links inadmissibility policy and the ESL classroom, as ESL
is not traditionally considered alongside other programs as a “public benefit,” per the legal
definition of that term in the Code of Federal Regulations (Definitions, 2019). This study will
break new ground to shed light onto the relationship between the new rule, its proven chilling
effects on immigrants’ participation in public services, and the possible extension of that chilling
to adult ESL program enrollment.
Professionals in the TESOL, education, and policy fields need to know whether chilling
did occur in regard to ESL programs. Research shows that immigrants with low
English-language proficiency face barriers to achieving financial and physical health (Bleich &
Fleischhacker, 2019), so disenrollment or forgone enrollment in ESL classes has effects that
permeate immigrants’ lives outside of the classroom. It is also crucial to note that, because
chilling effects caused by the new rule were particularly strong in mixed-citizenship status
households with children, reduced participation in public services disproportionately affected
U.S. citizen children living with immigrant relatives (Bernstein et al., 2019).
Continuing to build our knowledge about the effects of expanding the public charge rule
will prime immigrant communities, advocates, educators, and legislators with vital knowledge
about how inadmissibility policy expansions can harm immigrants and all of us who live
alongside them. By documenting these effects through scholarship, today’s researchers can
ensure that future policymakers will not be able to claim that they had no forewarning about how
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policy changes that impede a legal path to citizenship can harm immigrants, U.S. citizens with
immigrant relatives, and the public at large.
My own interest in public charge legislation was catalyzed by my experience working as
a Program Director at 18 Reasons, a San Francisco Bay Area food education nonprofit that
provides SNAP-Ed programming (healthy cooking and nutrition classes for low-income families
called Cooking Matters classes) and grocery donations to low-income households at risk of
hunger and diet-related disease. In the fall of 2018, several of the partner organizations from
whom I received participant referrals, organizations serving low-income families such as
federally qualified health centers, public schools, food pantries, and low-income housing sites,
flagged their concern about our Cooking Matters sign-in sheets. The low-income clients they
were recommending for our program were beginning to shy away from attending classes because
of their fear of having to sign in at the beginning of class. Though I did not have the language to
describe what I was seeing at the time, food-insecure families’ participation in any program they
perceived as carrying a public charge threat, even in a program like ours that was legally
irrelevant to the public charge test, had begun to chill.
Our low-income Cooking Matters participants represented the very group that Barofsky
et al. (2020) reported were most likely to show chilling: low-income families with children. In
my Spanish-language Cooking Matters para Padres and Cooking Matters para Familias classes,
in particular, I heard guardians express their fear of immigration consequences for their families.
Their panic about recent ICE raids in Alameda County, where we lived, burned white-hot; they
were terrified that they would be separated from their children. As a result, participants hesitated
to join our classes, as they did not know that our program was safe for them to use from the
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perspective of public charge threat. Although they needed our help to feed their families well,
parents were chiefly concerned that any action they took to receive services could carry a public
charge risk.
As our students feared leaving any kind of paper trail that would document their use of
services, we stopped recording participants’ names and did away with sign-in sheets altogether;
nevertheless, public charge fears in the community continued to curb our ability to reach families
in need. Just as Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) predicted, expanding public charge criteria (and
doing so in a way that engendered “fear or confusion” about negative immigration consequences
among low-income families, as the Trump administration had done) “hindered trust in seeking
government assistance or even help from non-governmental sources” (p. 508). To many
low-income immigrants considering seeking help from community organizations like ours, the
perceived risk of potential immigration consequences was too high a price of entry. Even among
those families who did join us, this arcane little policy clause became a shockingly common
discussion topic for what purported to be a healthy cooking class. Our classes became a vital
space for resource-sharing among immigrant families concerned about rising anti-immigrant
sentiment in the United States, and participants also looked to our staff and volunteers for help
understanding how to navigate the swiftly flowing river of immigration policy changes that
seemed to be making headlines every day.
Wondering what I could do to educate myself and become a better resource for my
students, I signed up to attend a town hall meeting about the announced expansion of the public
charge test organized by Alameda County Supervisor Wilma Chan in November 2018. There, I
heard representatives of community institutions like our local food bank and trauma hospital, as
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well as county staff working in public health, give anecdotal evidence of the growing chill
among their immigrant clients; and I heard diverse community members of different citizenship
statuses share immigration-related fears for themselves and their families. Healthcare and food
aid service providers collaboratively sponsored the event, and local nonprofits like ours were
quick to put our heads together to develop and disseminate information to our clients in order to
support their continued access to food and to be better able to answer their questions about what
public charge policy changes meant for them.
Our entire sector seemed to be feeling the effects of redefining “public charge.” Bleich
and Fleischhacker (2019) note that, ironically,“during periods when regulatory or budgetary
changes reduce SNAP participation” (such as the period of recent changes to the public charge
rule), the strain on the charitable food sector actually mounts, despite chilling on rates of
participation in federal food aid programs (p. 507). What we were seeing in the community at
that time was borne out in the data: more than one quarter of immigrant parents reported they
stopped using SNAP or other food programs due to immigration-related concerns (Protecting
Immigrant Families, 2021).
The pressure was on for nongovernmental organizations to allay increased food insecurity
among immigrant families. Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) assert that the announced public
charge policy changes placed a greater “burden” on the charitable sector to meet the needs of
their low-income clients, as families wary of the public charge test were less likely to perceive
“the large network of… food pantries, soup kitchens, shelters, food banks, churches and other
faith-based organizations, and food rescue organizations that provide groceries and necessities to
low-income households” as carrying public charge liability (p. 507). The healthcare sector, and
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especially nonprofit and federally qualified health centers, also experience “heightened demand”
(p. 506) during periods of inadmissibility policy reform and chilling, leaving them with a
“disproportionate” burden (p. 507) on their limited resources.
It was certainly true that some families saw 18 Reasons as a “safe” resource for food and
information. The interplay between chilled enrollment in Cooking Matters programs due to
participants’ fear and, on the other hand, the growing share of hunger in our community that our
network of nongovernmental partners was trying to shoulder made for a complex experience at
the intersection of food security and immigration policy. It was a tremendous help that 18
Reasons was just one organization in a larger ecosystem of food assistance and public health
organizations used to collaborating on shared messaging. Being a part of coalitions like the
Alameda County Nutrition Assistance Partners, which brings government agencies and nonprofit
organizations serving food-insecure residents together, helped us “develop, implement, evaluate,
and disseminate best practices” for addressing community concerns about program participation
and access to care, just as Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) hoped that we, as a network of
service providers, would be able to do (p. 507).
Outside of my workplace, in my role as a volunteer Teaching Assistant in a
high-beginning ESL class at Berkeley Adult School, I keenly felt the absence of that kind of
community of practice coming together to address the public charge concerns that students were
raising in class. In the ESL classroom (as in the Cooking Matters classroom), I faced students
urgently seeking reliable information about what community services were “safe” for them to
use. A very diverse group of adult immigrants hailing from twenty different countries on five
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continents peopled our classroom, but they were united in their common desire to protect their
families from adverse immigration consequences.
In contrast to the experience I had as a food aid worker tapped into a broader coalition of
service providers, it seemed to me that, because of our lack of centralized or organized
messaging about public charge, we as TESOL professionals were unprepared to respond to our
students’ concerns. Broadening inadmissibility policy was known to our nutrition assistance
network to drive disenrollment in food aid programs among eligible families, so we knew we
needed to act quickly to respond to the changing needs of our community. On the other hand,
there was no documented scholarship about how changes to public charge policy might affect
ESL program participation, and we as ESL teachers did not act in an organized way to preserve
our students’ access to vital language education. The lack of scholarship about the potential
chilling of ESL program participation among adult immigrants presented a ripe opportunity for
me to contribute to the TESOL field, in the hopes that knowledge of potential chilling effects
will help practitioners, administrators, and policymakers better serve our students during times of
heightened concern about immigration policy.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact that public charge rule changes
under the Trump administration may have had on adult immigrants’ participation in public,
state-funded (i.e., non-credit) or state-subsidized (i.e., credit) ESL classes at community colleges.
Per Bernstein et al. (2019), more than 20% of adults in low-income immigrant families reported
chilling of their use of means-tested benefits, but before the analysis presented in this thesis was
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conducted, it was not yet known whether a similar chilling effect also constrained their
participation in ESL programs.
In order to address the current gap in scholarly knowledge about the public charge rule’s
possible role in deterring adult immigrants’ participation in public ESL programs, this study
analyzed ESL enrollment records from community colleges throughout California to determine
whether there was a correlational relationship between public charge legislation milestones and
ESL disenrollment trends. The 2018 expansion of the public charge test could have prompted a
chilling effect that mirrored immigrants’ forgone participation during this same time period in
other state-funded services (e.g., SNAP, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants, and Children (WIC), Medicaid, health education services in public schools, and more).
Public ESL classes, which are funded by state monies, are not often discussed in research
about immigrants’ use of government services; however, such ESL programs are, indeed, a
state-funded service that millions of adult immigrants in California take advantage of each year
(Bunch et al., 2011). Despite the tendency to overlook ESL programs in studies of immigrants’
use of public services, existing research does offer robust knowledge about how previous
immigration law changes (including changes to the public charge rule) affected immigrants’
enrollment in “traditional” safety-net services (e.g., food aid, subsidized low-income housing).
This thesis built on prior research about how immigration policy changes and limited
English-language proficiency have each exacerbated social inequities experienced by
immigrants, experiences such as child poverty, poor health outcomes, food insecurity, and
under-enrollment in safety-net services. The narrative and data analyses presented here probed
the intersection of immigration policy and adult ESL education, in order to begin to narrow the
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gap in our knowledge about the relationships among immigration policy changes, language
proficiency, ESL enrollment, and social inequality.
Research Questions
1. During recent changes to public charge policy under the Trump administration, did adult
immigrants’ rates of participation in ESL programs at community colleges in California
chill, as did their participation in federal means-tested benefits?
2. Were possible chilling effects in ESL program participation stronger for any specific
demographic subgroup of adult ESL students, especially in subgroups already proven to
show more chilling under the Trump administration (such as Hispanic people, people of
color, and low-income people)?
Theoretical Framework
The positive feedback loop driving disenrollment in ESL classes, lack of English
proficiency, and poverty, a cycle wherein marginalization begets further marginalization, is
illustrative of Social Reproduction Theory (SRT), which was first posited by Karl Marx in 1885.
This thesis used an English translation of Marx’s Das Kapital published in 1996. Per Marx’s
(1996) seminal SRT theory, a person’s “human capital” (i.e., the education or training that they
receive) fuels their ability to gain other types of capital, to access wealth, and to escape or evade
poverty. Increased human capital (one’s education) is particularly linked to increased “social
capital” (one’s access to opportunity), and, ultimately, to increased financial security (Marx,
1996). It follows that, if an adult immigrant disenrolls from their ESL program or forgoes
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enrollment in such a program due to changes in the public charge rule, they are less able to
partake of the social mobility on which our American system prides itself.
Per Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019), the new rule is likely to result in “economic
instability among non-participating eligible individuals and households,” which will “increas[e]
food insecurity and worsen health outcomes” among immigrants to the United States and among
U.S.-born citizen children of immigrants (p. 506). Kaiser (2008) underscored the “very high rates
of food insecurity” among women and mothers potentially eligible for federal nutrition
assistance programs who do not apply for benefits specifically because of their fear of
immigration consequences (p. 1293). “Avoidance of government programs appear[s] to be [a]
barrier” to the thriving of immigrant groups (Kaiser, 2008, p. 1289). Thus, the new rule’s chilling
effect acts as an amplifier of existing hardship, serving to drive the social reproduction of
inequities already disproportionately burdening immigrants and low-income families.
Structural barriers that reduce immigrants’ access to social capital and deter their
participation in English-language education reproduce and perpetuate social inequity. If the
public charge rule did, in fact, act as a structural barrier to immigrants’ accessing
English-language education by reducing their enrollment in public ESL classes, the expanded
new rule can be said to have acted through social reproduction as a tool to disempower
immigrants. All advocates for social justice will be edified to learn whether this was the case;
thus, SRT is the theoretical foundation of this study.
16
Methodology
This study examined enrollment trends in community college ESL programs using
publicly available enrollment records from every community college in California. For a list of
all California community college districts, school names, and district websites, see Appendix A.
Community colleges are supported by public sector funding, and, as a result, non-credit ESL
classes are free, and credit ESL classes are subsidized to keep them relatively affordable. Given
that immigrant families’ use of nonprofit food pantries, WIC benefits, and other services not
subject to the expanded public charge rule was chilled under the Trump administration,
immigrants may also have mistakenly counted ESL programs among the public services they
should avoid in order not to court a public charge threat.
California community colleges are required to make student success metrics available to
the public in order to foster transparency and accountability and to provide data that researchers
interested in community college programs need. The California Community Colleges
Chancellor's Office provides student success metrics to the public via the Cal-PASS Plus
program, which is a statewide clearinghouse of enrollment and other data that can be broken
down by location (i.e., region, district, school) and by many other factors, such as program type
and student ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, age, etc. (California Community Colleges,
2021).
For this study, data sets from the Cal-PASS Plus student success metrics database were
pulled in order to gather anonymized student demographic data and enrollment numbers from
five school years (2015-2019) for all 72 community college districts, representing students
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enrolled in every one of the 116 community colleges in California. All data were sourced via a
student success reporting system called LaunchPad, which is available for free to the public
(California Community Colleges, 2021). This study was not subject to the University of San
Francisco’s Institutional Review Board because it utilized anonymized, publicly available school
records and presented no threat to students whose enrollment was represented in the data set.
In particular, this study analyzed ESL enrollment data to determine whether there were
any drops in ESL enrollment above and beyond observed trends in non-ESL enrollment at
community colleges. In order to isolate chilling effects among adult immigrants, enrollment
records for ESL programs were compared with those for non-ESL programs, with this latter
category being considered a “control group” likely to represent a mostly non-chilled population.
Because ESL programs for adults are a service specifically offered for immigrants and one that is
irrelevant to native English speakers, comparing ESL participation rates versus non-ESL
participation rates gives us an approximation of a model to measure chilling among immigrants.
If the data show a statistically significant difference in enrollment changes among ESL programs
as compared with non-ESL programs, it can be said that ESL program participation was chilled.
Special attention was paid to an exploration of whether any observed chilling may have
correlated with the timing of significant milestones toward the adoption of expanded public
charge policy. These milestones were the November 2016 election of President Donald Trump,
the January 2017 leak of proposed changes to public charge policy, the October 2018 official
announcement of the new rule, and the October 2019 planned promulgation of Trump’s new
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public charge policy. See Appendix B for a table of milestones and dates relevant to the
development and ultimate adoption of the expanded public charge rule.
This study relies on a case study methodology. According to Creswell (2007), case
studies are concerned with bounded systems (often institutional-level cases concerned with
“how” and “why” research questions), which may illustrate a larger pattern of occurrence (p. 73).
Because of the limitations of the present study, the results herein are not intended to be broadly
generalizable, but rather, they may provide information and inspiration to education
professionals and future researchers.
This thesis used the “multiple case study method,” wherein the researcher selects
multiple programs to review, in order to seek the answers to a set of research questions
(Creswell, 2007, p. 74). Again per Creswell (2007), the advantages of this case study approach
include that case studies recognize the “embeddedness” of social truths; they can provide a “step
to action”; they make obscure data (such as ESL attendance records) more publicly accessible
and comprehensible; and they can be undertaken by a single researcher without the need for a
full team. In particular, the idea that the present study might serve to justify potential corrective
action offers strong alignment with the University of San Francisco School of Education’s
mission to “change the world from here.” Perhaps, by informing policymakers, educators, and
advocates, this thesis may inspire the “step to action” that Creswell (2007) invokes. For these
reasons, a case study approach is the most appropriate choice for this thesis.
To prepare the data, combining enrollment data from 114 separate spreadsheets (72
distinct-level sheets of ESL enrollment data and 72 of non-ESL data) and meticulously pruning
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the data set was necessary. This is because the original data set from LaunchPad contained
information irrelevant to the scope of the present study, such as student age, sexual orientation,
and veteran status. The data preserved for analysis in this study included, for both ESL and
non-ESL programs, and per locale by year: overall program enrollment, enrollment per student
ethnicity, and enrollment per socioeconomic status (as determined by eligibility for the federal
Perkins Loan Program for low-income students). For a complete table of raw enrollment data
used in this study, see Appendix C.
From there, the enrollment numbers per locale were normalized across the years above so
that their means were 0 and they had a standard deviation of 1, which produced z-scores that can
be meaningfully statistically compared, because the enrollment z-scores were on the same scale.
This was necessary because the scales of various data differed greatly, for example when
comparing enrollment in a small district with that of a larger district, or when comparing
enrollment specific to ESL programs with the combined total of all non-ESL enrollment, which
represents a much larger student body. Z-scores enabled our analysis to yield meaningful results.
For a complete table of normalized enrollment data, see Appendix D.
Finally, the year-over-year overall difference in enrollment for ESL versus non-ESL
programs was analyzed using the z-scores, and this same analysis was repeated by student
subtype, in order to compare certain demographic categories. Conducting an analysis of overall
enrollment trends for each program type allowed me to look for signs of general chilling of ESL
program participation (answering research question 1). To answer research question two and
surface whether chilling effects were more apparent among students of given subtypes, a
comparable analysis was completed comparing enrollment trends among Hispanic students
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versus non-Hispanic students, students of color versus white students, and low-income students
versus higher-income students. The choice of specific subtypes included in the
demographic-specific analysis was inspired by previous research on means-tested benefits
participation rates showing that Hispanic (e.g., Food Research & Action Center (2020), Haley et
al., (2021)), non-white (e.g., Bernstein et al., (2019), National Immigration Law Center, (2019)),
and/or low-income (e.g., Manatt (2018), Urban Institute (2021)) immigrants were more likely to
show chilling.
To uncover any chilling effects, I repeatedly ran Welch’s t-tests to determine whether
there was a statistically significant difference in overall enrollment changes across ESL programs
and non-ESL programs. Finding a statistically significant difference in ESL program enrollment
distributions versus non-ESL program enrollment distributions across locales would indicate a
meaningful pattern of disenrollment, thus chilling can be said to have occurred for the given
program or student category in the given year. Results of the study will be the subject of Chapter
III, and for a complete table of the results of our statistical analysis (including means of
normalized enrollment change data for ESL and non-ESL programs, standard deviations, t-test p
values, and t-test statistics), see Appendix E.
Limitations of the Study
Only data sets from community colleges in California were analyzed in the course of my
research, so this study may have limited generalizability to other locations’ community college
student populations. Enrollment trends in community colleges throughout California do not
necessarily represent corollary enrollment trends among programs located elsewhere.
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Another limitation of this study is the lack of prior research about whether and how
public charge-related fears impact enrollment in ESL classes. Although numerous scholars have
documented the chilling in government-funded programs like WIC, SNAP, and Medicaid that
occurred as a result of recent public charge policy changes, as of the writing of this thesis, there
have been no studies exploring the relationship between policy changes and ESL enrollment.
There is a wide gap in our collective scholarly knowledge about the intersection of immigration
policy changes and ESL program participation; thus, additional future research about this topic
would benefit TESOL practitioners, community advocates and organizers, immigrant families,
and policymakers.
Additionally, some specifics about this study’s data set potentially limit the validity of my
statistical analysis. First, enrollment data from community college students are all self-reported,
which inherently implies subjectivity on the part of the enrolled. Second, some outdated
terminology may have affected students’ choices about how to describe themselves in their
paperwork. For example, in the student enrollment forms from which these data originate, the
term “Hispanic” was used to describe an ethnic category that researchers and students might
describe as “Latinx” in the parlance of today (although that term is also controversial). This
lexical disconnect between the ever-progressing terms for various identities students are likely to
use in California, which is a relatively progressive state, and the language used on their intake
forms may have muddied the data. Students may have been more to describe themselves in ways
that did not exactly correspond to their own self-identification, or they may have chosen “other,”
or left questions blank when they could not find a label they felt was appropriate.
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Next, the timeline of enrollment data used in this study was necessarily limited by the
onset of the COVID pandemic in the United States in March 2020, as any changes in enrollment
rates during the 2020 school year were likely to have been caused by school closures, fears of
contracting or spreading the disease, and the challenges of pivoting ESL to virtual instruction.
Therefore, no enrollment data from after the 2019 school year were included in this study.
Another time-based limitation of note is that California Community Colleges’ report their
student success metrics per academic year (i.e., data in the set about enrollment in the academic
year “2016” describe enrollment from fall 2016 through spring 2017). As a result, it is not
possible to track more minute enrollment trends that may have unfolded on a semesterly or
monthly basis, as the political climate around issues of immigration were rapidly changing. As a
result, given a certain public charge-related policy milestone (for example, the January 2017 leak
of the plan to expand the public charge test), it is not clear when exactly any changes in
enrollment related to that milestone would be likely to become evident. In our example, it is
uncertain whether program disenrollment related to the January 2017 leak would be more likely
to show up in the enrollment data from academic year 2016 (fall 2016-spring 2017) or those
from academic year 2017 (fall 2017-spring 2018). Further, it is unclear whether the California
Community Colleges’ public enrollment data for a given school year represent the number of
enrollees at the beginning of the semester (i.e., the number of students enrolled in the fall) or the
number of students remaining in the program during the spring semester, and this uncertainty
further affects our ability to directly correlate disenrollment trends with the timing of legislative
milestones.
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Significance of the Study
The primary significance of this study is to determine whether there was a chilling effect
on ESL students enrolled in community colleges throughout California that coincided with
public charge rule changes during the Trump administration. Previous studies of chilling among
immigrants eligible for means-tested benefits, such as SNAP and Medicaid, showed particularly
strong chilling effects in 2018 (Bernstein et. al, 2019), so it may be that ESL classrooms also saw
demonstrable chilling in that year. This study is consequential because there is little existing
research about the relationship between changes in inadmissibility policy and immigrants’
participation in state-funded ESL programs. Although this study is limited in scale, comparing
ESL program enrollment rates among adult immigrants from before and after the public charge
rule changes were announced in October 2018 may be of significance to TESOL professionals,
education and policy researchers, and change-makers such as legislators and funders.
For TESOL professionals, including teachers and administrators, this thesis will serve as
a source of information about how their students’ experience of immigration policy changes can
affect their choice to enroll in English-language classes. Per Bernstein et al. (2019), “providing
families accurate information and guidance” on public charge rule changes “could help mitigate
further chilling effects” among immigrants (p. 13). Because of their ready access to “vulnerable
and hard-to-reach families” who “are afraid of interacting with government authorities,”
informing school staff who interface with immigrant communities about the public charge rule is
key to this mitigation strategy (p. 13). Bernstein et al. (2019) resolutely advocate for “investing
in educating service providers who may interact with immigrant families [about changes to
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immigration policy],” in order to combat student misconceptions and ensure that immigrant
families are able to make informed choices (p. 13). To sum, Bernstein et al. (2019) advocate for
educating educators, which is exactly what this thesis aims to do.
For other researchers, this thesis may galvanize future research about how inadmissibility
policy (or immigration policies more generally) impact educational services like ESL programs.
If more authors were inspired to consider public ESL programs alongside other state-funded
services for immigrants in their research on policy and its effects, the field would quickly come
to know a lot more about how ESL programs fit into the larger ecosystem of services for
immigrants. Finally, funders and policymakers in the immigration and education fields may find
this thesis useful as they determine what new horizons their fields will explore. Decisions made
at this high level have the capacity to drive a structural shift toward equity that could improve
immigrants’ (and especially adult ESL students’) educational experiences and outcomes.
If research in the field continues to leave unanswered questions about how immigration
policy changes affect ESL program enrollment, educators will continue to be unprepared to
address legislative barriers facing their students. Forces that prevent immigrants from thriving in
the United States, such as limited English-language proficiency and under-enrollment in public
benefits, are directly connected with inadmissibility policy changes (Bernstein et al., 2019). The
expansion of the public charge rule is proven to have curtailed low-income immigrants’ use of
public safety-net programs, leaving this already vulnerable segment of our population even more
likely to suffer deleterious health and financial outcomes This study will begin to show how ESL
program participation factors into the equation.
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Chapter I Summary
This introductory chapter provides context for the current study, including discussing the
problem it aims to assuage: the lack of research exploring possible chilling effects in adult ESL
programs correlated with changes to the public charge rule under the Trump administration.
Chapter I also seeks to inform the reader about how the study examined ESL enrollment trends
to answer its guiding research questions. Analysis included an exploration of a possible drop in
enrollment in ESL classes at community colleges throughout California, which would echo
previous findings by scholars studying reduced participation rates in programs such as SNAP,
WIC, and Medicaid during the same period. This study is needed because of a current dearth of
scholarship linking chilling effects to ESL programs for adult immigrants, despite the fact that
immigrants’ enrollment rates in other services provided by our government have been
extensively analyzed to determine rates of chilling.
Taking Social Reproduction Theory as its theoretical underpinning, this thesis will
provide information to TESOL practitioners, administrators, and education policymakers in order
to empower them with knowledge about how changes to immigration policy may challenge their
programs, influence enrollment rates, and affect their student population. Armed with this
knowledge, education professionals and policymakers at any level will be more prepared to
address community concerns as inadmissibility policies change.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The following review of literature explores the intersection of four areas of knowledge:
the history of inadmissibility policy in the United States; how the public charge rule changed
under the Clinton and Trump administrations and how immigrant communities were affected;
how language barriers and fears of negative immigration consequences cause under-enrollment
in safety-net programs among immigrants; the ways that inadmissibility policy perpetuates the
social reproduction of inequality in American society; and how the expanded public charge rule
came to be repealed in 2021.
Situating the Modern Public Charge Rule within its Historical Context
To understand how deep lie the roots of public charge policy in the United States, one
must travel back in time over 160 years to visit the chambers of the 47th United States Congress
and their Immigration Act of 1882. An in-depth analysis of the history of income-based
inadmissibility policy is outside the scope of this thesis, but a familiarity with some of the United
States’ most seminal exclusion policies will ground the reader in helpful context about the
racialized application of such “poor laws” designed to send, in the parlance of the time,
“paupers… back to their places of origin” (Hirsi, 2018). Immigration policy historians Hester et
al. (2018) agree that the Trump administration’s changes to the public charge rule are best
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understood in their historical context. In their view, Trump’s expansion of the public charge rule
“cannot be understood apart from the history of public charge deportations” (p. 1). These
historians also encourage their audience to consider how the legal precedents we set now will
live on in the future, as our own choices “will lay the basis for future deportations” (p. 1), and
our legal legacy will tell the policy historians of tomorrow much about the values of our
immigration system.
Exclusion of certain immigrants based on their race and socioeconomic status was baked
into U.S. immigration policy even from its earliest days. In the 1790 Naturalization Act, one of
the very first pieces of immigration legislation in U.S. history, the federal government proffered
legal and immigration-status privileges to white immigrants, stipulating that only “free white
men” could naturalize as U.S. citizens after immigrating (Phillips, 2021). In effect, this
stipulation prohibited certain immigrants from being citizens on racial grounds, but it also
excluded people of lesser means, because only white men who were “landowners or had some
other wealth” fit into the law’s definition of allowable citizenry (Phillips, 2021).
At the time, northern European and Mexican people were considered “white,” but Irish
and southern European immigrants, among immigrants of other origins, were excluded by the
Naturalization Act as non-whites (Phillips, 2021). To notice how another era’s system of racial
categorization differs from our own—which today, per the 2020 U.S. census, allows the labels
White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (United States Census Bureau, 2021)—underscores the
socially constructed nature of these categories.
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As a result of the Naturalization Act, not only did non-white immigrants suffer prejudice
under the law, but their white counterparts also enjoyed racialized legal benefits, exacerbating
the racial inequities that have always been endemic to United States law. Phillips (2021) quotes
Professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies Rory Ong’s reminder that inadmissibility policy has
never been, and is not today, race-neutral: “When you see people raging about Mexicans or
Asians in particular ways, to me, it’s just part of the rhetoric that’s long been embedded in
everyday U.S. life, how we define ourselves against one another,” says Ong. “It’s a constant.”
Murillo (2017) noted that, when the Trump administration first expressed their interest in
expanding public charge—an income-based exclusion—in 2017, they did so almost immediately
after issuing the so-called “Muslim ban” on the admission of people from six Muslim-majority
countries (an arguably racialized exclusion). From the very inception of American
inadmissibility policy and continuing today, race- and income-based exclusions have often gone
hand-in-hand.
In 1882, the United States Congress passed the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act, which
forbade all immigration of Chinese laborers into the United States and was the first racialized
inadmissibility policy in the country (Phillips, 2021). The earlier Naturalization Act established
racial barriers to ensure that “non-white” immigrants could not become U.S. citizens—in so
doing, excluding them from the voting body—but the Chinese Exclusion Act went so far as to
prohibit the very admission of a certain race of people into this country. The Chinese Exclusion
Act built upon the Page Act of 1875, which had banned any Chinese women from entering the
United States in an “unveiled attempt to stop Chinese from establishing U.S. homes and
families” (Phillips, 2021). Much as members of these families were already barred from
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permanent legal status in the United States, they were now also deportable under the law because
of their ethnicity.
As astute readers might guess, the race-based inadmissibility policy that Congress
promulgated through in the Chinese Exclusion Act was complemented by an income-based
exclusion policy they passed that same year, the Immigration Act of 1882. The Immigration Act
is the most direct legal ancestor of today’s public charge rule because it codified, for the first
time, our government’s practice of blocking immigrants of low socioeconomic status—people
whom the Act referred to as “undesirables”—from entering the United States (Hirsi, 2018). The
Act specifically prohibited the admission of “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,” thus providing our first legal
definition of the term “public charge” in U.S. law (Hester et al., 2018, p. 1).
Even prior to the 1882 ratification of the Immigration Act, officials could be observed
excluding and expelling immigrants based on their perceived socioeconomic unacceptability, but
the Act served to legitimize this practice (Hester et al., 2018). These inadmissibility policies
stemmed from British “poor laws” that the very first colonial émigrés brought with them from
their mother country (Hirsi, 2018). As detailed by Hester et al. (2018) and Hirsi (2018), colonial
and U.S. administrators were particularly keen to deny the “non-white” among the huddled
masses a safe harbor, most especially the many Irish immigrants fleeing their home land at the
time. These authors both present evidence that the Immigration Act in 1882 was enacted in order
to stem the tide of poor Irish immigrants whose fortunes were devastated by the Irish Potato
Famine. Anyone hoping to learn about the effects that recent changes to admission and
deportation regulations have had on today’s immigrant communities would do well to build on
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these scholars’ prior knowledge about the origins and implications of past U.S. inadmissibility
policy.
Public Charge Rule Changes and Chilling under Clinton and Trump
With an understanding of how inadmissibility policy fits into the broader legislative
history underpinning the immigration system of the United States, it is now time to turn our
attention back to the public charge policy of our own era. The recent expansion of the public
charge rule by the Trump administration is part of a larger narrative of redefining “public charge”
in relation to the modern American safety net that began during Clinton-era welfare reform in the
1990s. Prior to the 2018 announcement of the expansion of the public charge test, changes to
public charge statutes had not been proposed since that time, almost thirty years previously
(Hester et al., 2018). Fix and Capps (2017) see a direct connection between Clinton’s and
Trump’s reforms to public charge policy:  “One has to go back to 1996, when the U.S. welfare
reform system was substantially overhauled, to find a policy with such potentially far-reaching
effects on immigrant households [as the expansion of the public charge test],” and Gessen (2020)
concurs that the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRA)
is the “immediate predecessor” to Trump’s public charge policy changes.
The last public charge changes to predate Donald Trump’s presidency were enacted
through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)’s 1999 Field Guidance on
Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds (Department of Homeland Security,
2018, p. 51133), which, per (Gessen, 2020), should be viewed as a corollary of the 1996 PRA.
Passing the PRA is said to be Clinton’s “signature legislative achievement,” and the Act’s name
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is sometimes used synonymously with the term “welfare reform” (Gessen, 2020). In passing the
PRA, Clinton had made good on his “promise to end welfare as we have come to know it”
(Gessen, 2020), but some confusion remained about how exactly immigration officials were
going to apply new safety-net regulations to foreign-born visitors and residents in the United
States. There remained a gap between what Hester et al. (2018) call “statute” or “case law” and
officials’ everyday responsibilities—Hester et al. (2018)’s “customary practice” (p. 8).
One primary function of the 1999 Field Guidance was to specify exactly which benefits
were relevant to the public charge test in the wake of the comprehensive changes the PRA
promulgated in 1996. Prior to receiving specific guidance about which public benefits should
trigger public charge concerns and what kinds of immigration statuses entailed public charge
risk, immigration officers may have applied the public charge rule on a more ad hoc basis. This
discretionary application of the public charge test did not support a systematic and uniform
implementation of policy. Helpfully, the 1999 Field Guidance offered objective, specific test
criteria to support officers’ decision-making, reducing subjectivity and inconsistency in the
application of the rule and offering an updated definition of “public charge.”
In the 1999 guidance, Clinton’s INS confirmed that the government should hew to its
traditional understanding of who was a “public charge,” upholding the “long-established” legal
definition of the term (Hester et al., 2018, p. 7). Starting with the 1882 Immigration Act, the
public charge clause traditionally “applied only to people accommodated at public charitable
institutions” or who were “substantially dependent on public relief for the basic maintenance of
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their lives” (Hester et al. 2018, p. 3), and this standard “remained remarkably constant for more
than 100 years,” prior to Trump’s presidency, that is (p. 8).
While the Clinton administration chose in 1999 to abide by the historical meaning of
“public charge,” the language they used to do so was significantly modernized in comparison
with original public charge statutes, as might be expected. The 1999 Field Guidance preserved
continuity with the traditional legal purview of the public charge test, so it is particularly
interesting to contrast the very different language used in the guidance versus that in the
historical record of public charge policy to describe the same kinds of people. Public charge
policy dates back to an era during which the social norms and vocabulary on display in
contemporary United States law may seem almost unrecognizable to a modern reader. Hester et
al. (2018) inform us that federal legal precedent of the time specified
excludable and deportable categories of immigrants included paupers, persons likely to
become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or contagious disease,
felons, persons convicted of other crimes or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude,
polygamists, anarchists and communists, imbeciles, feebleminded persons, persons with
physical and moral defects which may affect their ability to earn a living, persons
afflicted with tuberculosis, children unaccompanied by their parents, [and] women
coming to the U.S. for immoral purposes [prostitution]. (p. 10)
Obviously, this example of historical inadmissibility policy chastises so-called “public charges,”
but it also goes on to list additional categories of immigrants to be denied entry into the country
for other perceived failings. Though we may find the language and concepts expressed here
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antiquated and alienating through our modern lens, Hester et al. (2018) make it clear that the
Clinton administration’s understanding of “public charge” was, in fact, “consistent with [this]
long-established policy defining public charges as those entirely dependent upon state support”
(p. 10), rather than immigrants involved in safety-net programs to a lesser degree.
Let us now take a look at the language used in the 1999 Field Guidance. The guidance
defined a “public charge” as “an alien who has become primarily dependent on the Government
for subsistence as demonstrated by either “(i) the receipt of public cash assistance for income
maintenance purposes or (ii) institutionalization for long-term care at Government expense”
(Hester et al., 2018, p. 7). It follows that immigrants’ receipt of cash benefits or long-term,
state-funded institutional care should raise a public charge concern, but their receiving other
forms of help (such as food aid, access to low-income housing, and subsidized health insurance)
was irrelevant to the public charge test. Hester et al. (2018) emphasize that the understanding of
a public charge as someone unable to live independent of government assistance (due either to
their significant reliance on cash or institutionalized care provided by the government) is in
alignment with the 1882 Immigration Act’s description of a “person unable to take care of
himself or herself without becoming a public charge” (p. 1). In their view, the 1999 guidance
reinforced the historically “established pattern defin[ing] a public charge as a person who fell
completely dependent on public facilities” (p. 4) (emphasis mine).
Despite its apparent consistency with long-standing inadmissibility policy, research
shows that Clinton’s changes to regulations concerning immigrants’ use of benefits, which
culminated in the publication of the 1999 Field Guidance, caused a significant chilling effect
among low-income immigrants at the time (Makhlouf & Sandhu, 2020). That chilling occurred
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begs the question: if the public charge clause in the 1999 guidance was apparently so aligned
with its historic predecessors, why would the guidance result in chilling? It may have been the
case that increased attention to this relatively arcane area of federal law amplified immigrants’
awareness of public charge-based threats to their path to lawful residence. It is also important to
note that Congress delineated eligibility for means-tested federal benefits based on residents’
immigration status during welfare reform, which was a new addition to safety-net policy. They
created two categories of immigrants: “qualified” residents included lawful permanent residents,
refugees, and asylees; and “unqualified” residents included temporary visitors and
undocumented immigrants (Hester et al., 2018, p. 6). Rules about benefits eligibility differed by
immigration status; they differed in their requiring or not requiring a waiting period of five years’
time before immigrants were able to access benefits; and, finally, they further differed depending
on which was the benefit at hand (Hester et al., 2018). There were a lot of permutations.
Some benefits remained available to all people, regardless of their immigration status,
such as emergency medical care; public health programs; school breakfast and lunch programs;
K-12 public education; WIC; and short-term, non-cash emergency disaster assistance (Hester et
al., 2018, p. 6). Some other benefits became accessible after a period of time, and some remained
inaccessible to immigrants. Immigrants often did not know which combination of factors
rendered a benefit “safe” from public charge risk, and chilling resulted. The expansion and
increased complexity of public charge policy—especially if communicated poorly to immigrant
communities at the time—would have seen many eligible immigrants disenroll from public
benefits. Just as we see today, these immigrants were motivated to sidestep any public charge
threat, as the high stakes of possible deportation would likely have been avoided at all costs.
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Another driver of chilling among immigrants in the late nineties could have been the gap
in time from 1996-1999 when field officers and the immigrant families with whom they liaise
lacked crucial guidance about the proper application of inadmissibility policy. Hester et al.
(2018) remind us that, in 1996, “Congress imposed time limits on access to some means tested
benefits, and restricted eligibility for some lawfully present immigrants,” but that the “necessary
clarif[ication]” of which immigrants and benefits were relevant to public charge would be three
more years in coming (p. 6). As the dust settled on the ratification of the PRA, it stands to reason
that there may have been widespread confusion among immigrant communities during the time
when they lacked guidance from our lawmakers. Even federal employees were not exactly sure
what the PRA spelled for immigration cases until 1999, so members of immigrant communities
with much lesser access to information about federal policy were likely operating based on
incomplete or incorrect information.
As today, there was concern throughout the welfare reform process that chilled
immigrants would decline “emergency and other medical assistance, children’s immunizations,
and [participation in] basic nutrition programs, as well as the treatment of communicable
diseases” due to fears of immigration consequences stemming from changes to the public charge
rule (Makhlouf & Sandhu, 2020, p. 6), potentially causing or exacerbating public health crises
that could affect all people residing in the United States, regardless of their immigration status.
In fact, there is evidence that public charge rule changes made during the 1990s “had a chilling
effect on all immigrants” that prevented eligible participants from enrolling in
government-funded services and seeking healthcare (Zedlewski & Rader, 2005, p. 546).
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President Clinton himself expressed concerns about the fallout for immigrant families
living in the United States in some of his first public comments about his signature welfare
reform legislation. He admitted that passing the PRA required significant compromise and
cross-aisle collaboration, which resulted in several specific addenda to the bill that he did not
support. He anticipated they would cause chilling, especially among working families needing
healthcare. In a speech delivered to members of the media, Clinton (1996) heralded the recent
passage of welfare reform, but he allowed that the bill had its faults:
I am deeply disappointed that the congressional leadership insisted on attaching to this
extraordinarily important bill a provision that will hurt legal immigrants in America,
people who work hard for their families, pay taxes, serve in our military. This provision
has nothing to do with welfare reform. It is simply a budget-saving measure, and it is not
right… These immigrant families with children who fall on hard times through no fault of
their own—for example, because they face the same risks the rest of us do from
accidents, from criminal assaults, from serious illnesses—they should be eligible for
medical and other help when they need it. (p. 1235)
Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) take special care to show that, in addition to the President,
the 1999 Field Guidance’s own authors at the INS were also aware that their new policy would
cause a deleterious chilling effect even as they published it. The INS acknowledged in the text of
the guidance that eligible noncitizens concerned about the public charge rule would likely
“forgo[e] or disenroll from public benefits based on a fear of being deemed a public charge” as a
result of the 1999 rules (Makhlouf & Sandhu, 2020, p. 6). Fear and confusion were significant
drivers of chilling during recent changes to public charge policy, as well (Bleich &
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Fleischhacker, 2019). Such parallels between chilling effects observed in the 1990s and those
catalyzed by the Trump administration’s expansion of public charge policy thirty years later are
apparent throughout scholarship exploring modern inadmissibility policy.
One such parallel between welfare-era policymaking and public charge rule changes
during the Trump administration is the long gap in time between the community’s becoming
aware of impending inadmissibility policy changes (in 1996 under Clinton; in 2017 under
Trump) and the subsequent clarification of what the new policy would look like in practice (in
1999 under Clinton; in 2019 under Trump). This chapter will address important steps in the
development and adoption of the expanded, Trump-era public charge rule, and a complete table
of relevant legislative milestones and dates can be found in Appendix B.
In the case of Trump-era policy changes, the long delay was caused, in part, by a leak of
classified executive branch documents almost as soon as Donald Trump’s presidency began. On
January 23, 2017, just three days after President Trump took office, a document detailing his
administration’s plan to expand the purview of the public charge rule was leaked to media outlets
(Barofsky et al., 2020, p. 1760). The leak came in the form of a draft Executive Order titled
“Protect Taxpayer Resources by Ensuring Our Immigration Laws Promote Accountability and
Responsibility” authored by Andrew Bremberg (2017), then working in the White House as
Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy Council.
According to the leaked draft, the administration planned to break with long-standing
federal guidance and expand the definition of “public charge,” allowing officials to block
immigrants from entering into or, in some cases, remaining in, the country, if they were deemed
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likely to qualify for a broader array of public assistance programs than in the past (National
Immigration Law Center, 2018). Specifically, the memorandum recommended that a person be
declared “inadmissible” and “deportable” on public charge grounds for using virtually any
“public benefits for which eligibility or amount is determined in any way on the basis of income,
resources, or financial aid,” whether these benefits be in-cash or in-kind, which was a novel
stipulation (Bremberg, 2017, p. 3). In essence, the planned action would open up “much wider
grounds for deportation based on benefits receipt,” and factors such as being likely to receive or
actually receiving food assistance, child tax credits, affordable housing support, etc., could both
result in dramatic immigration consequences (Fix & Capps, 2017).
In the immediate aftermath of the leak, Fix and Capps’ (2017) analysis of the leaked
memo demonstrated how unclear the new definition of “public charge” was to readers at the
time. They posited that the memo could reasonably be interpreted to bar immigrants’ admission
into the country and/or adjustment to green card or citizen status if they lacked a high school
degree or did not possess a certain level of material assets. In contrast to previous legal
precedent, the expanded public charge rule would not only preclude immigrants primarily
dependent on the government for their livelihood (as a reminder, historically, that meant only
people receiving hard cash or long-term institutionalized care from the government) from being
accepted into U.S. society, but it would further threaten any low-income immigrant family
already living in the country and receiving in-kind public benefits.
In addition, the draft order made it clear that the administration planned to “activate
dormant policies requiring immigrants’ sponsors to repay benefits received [by their
sponsorees]—a policy that has proved largely unworkable in the past” (Fix & Capps, 2017).
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Immigrants’ sponsors living in the United States would be required to assume financial
responsibility for newcomers, attesting that their own personal wealth was sufficient to allow
them (the sponsors) to reimburse the government for any fund spent providing for the basic
needs of immigrants with limited means (Fix & Capps, 2017). Sponsors would be required to
“reimburse the government for the cost of welfare benefits provided to such aliens,” who, once
in the United States, were eligible for safety-net support (Bremberg, 2017, p. 1). To be eligible
for these benefits, immigrant families must, by definition, be living in poverty, and they must be
authorized by the U.S. government to reside in the country, as “unauthorized immigrants were
ineligible both before and after passage [of Trump’s inadmissibility policy changes] and remain
so today” (Fix & Capps, 2017). In effect, the new policy threatened serious immigration status
consequences for immigrants of relatively low socioeconomic status, even those who were
well-established members of U.S. communities; and the memo further threatened immigrants’
family members and supporters with potentially sobering financial fallout, if they chose to vouch
for their relatives to Uncle Sam.
Per Murillo (2017), this “controversial” policy proposition was predicted to severely
restrict immigration to the United States. Within days of the leak, Fix and Capps (2017), writing
for the Migration Policy Institute, began to sound the alarm that the proposed changes would, in
their opinion, have “far-reaching,” “dramatic,” and “damaging” consequences for current and
potential future legal immigrants and their supporters (Fix & Capps, 2017). Bremberg’s rhetoric
in the document made his zeal to “deny admission” to newcomers very clear; he sought
to“identify and remove, as expeditiously as possible” immigrants of modest means in the United
States (Bremberg, 2017, p. 3).
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Bremberg’s proposed change in inadmissibility policy rested on his claim—which
Murillo (2017) called “dubious”—that noncitizens use a greater share of government-funded
anti-poverty benefits than do citizens. He accused immigrants of demonstrating a lack of
“self-sufficiency,” from which taxpayers must be “protected” (Bremberg, 2017, p. 1). Members
of the media who read the memo upon its release in 2017 found fault with this claim almost
immediately. Fix and Capps (2017) joined Murillo (2017) in her skepticism about Bremberg’s
positioning of newcomers as a drain on government resources, which they called a
“misread[ing]” of the real state of affairs.
Fix and Capps (2017) further emphasize that “immigrants are a small portion of those
using public benefits,” citing the findings of an Associated Press analysis of census data to
determine trends in benefits use per citizenship status in the United States. Per these authors, the
Associated Press reported that “non-citizen immigrants make up only 6.5% of all those
participating in Medicaid,” and “more than 87% of [program] participants are native-born” (Fix
& Capps, 2017). The same pattern was observed in food aid participation: only 8.8% of
participants in nutrition assistance programs were immigrants, with 85% of participants being
native-born Americans (Fix & Capps, 2017). Further findings by the National Academies of
Science complement the Associated Press’s. Per the Academies’ “seminal 2016 study on the
fiscal impacts of immigration,” “immigrants of all ages except for the elderly use fewer public
benefits than the U.S.-born” (Fix & Capps, 2017). Bremberg’s (2017) claim that “households
headed by aliens (legal and illegal) are much more likely than households headed by native-born
citizens to use federal means-tested public benefits” was clearly not factually accurate.
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Murillo (2017) concluded that Bremberg’s proposal “fails to provide any evidence” for
the claim that immigrants demonstrate greater use of public benefits than their native-born
counterparts, and she adds that Bremberg’s insistence that immigrants represent a burden on
taxpayers is “hotly contested,” even among right-leaning policy researchers. It may be that
political conservatives (who generally favor a smaller, more limited government with finite
power to regulate market and labor forces) joined the Migration Policy Institute in finding fault
with the impatient process by which the executive branch was attempting to influence
legislation: “through the backdoor, via regulation, not legislation” (Fix & Capps, 2017). Fix and
Capps (2017) sum up the Institute’s concern about the manner in which Trump’s staff proposed
to change federal inadmissibility policy via the adoption of an Executive Order thusly:
... immigration on balance has served the nation. And by creating new exclusions on legal
immigration and new grounds for deportation of legal immigrants, it would make
systemic changes in the U.S. immigration system. In our view, these are decisions that
should more properly be reserved for Congress. (emphasis the authors’)
Hirsi (2018) also considers the Trump administration’s approach to reinterpreting the public
charge clause as “a backdoor way to restrict certain categories of immigration, particularly
family immigration,” opining “that’s an easy way to achieve your policy goal without having to
go through Congress.” In short, authors of diverse political stripes may have felt that the
proposed rulemaking was an overreach by the executive branch.
The changes described in 2017 did entail significant “systemic” and philosophical
changes to immigration in the United States. In the aftermath of the leak, Fix and Capps (2017)
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argued that the proposed rule changes were “part of a push” to move the United States toward an
immigration system that focuses on immigrants’ skills and wealth, rather than on family
reunification, which had previously anchored the immigration process. Boteach et. al (2018)
agreed that the proposed rule—which earned the nickname the “Trump test” in the media—was
designed to “limit family-unity and diversity-based immigration in ways that are a radical
departure from current immigration law.” These authors writing for the Center for American
Progress assert that the adoption of the leaked Executive Order would “unilaterally and
fundamentally change the U.S. system for legal immigration in ways that would restrict
immigration to the wealthiest and most privileged applicants” (Boteach et al., 2018). Trump’s
expanded public charge test is so harsh in its restrictions of public benefits use that more than
100 million people, about a third of the U.S. populace, would fail if they were put to the Trump
test (Boteach et al., 2018). It seems that American taxpayers, in general, would also be found
lacking in Bremberg’s “self-sufficiency” if measured by the public charge standard.
Bremberg’s revised rule sought to better ensure that applicants for admission to the
United States “do not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their
own capabilities and the resources of their family, sponsor, and private organizations” (Fix &
Capps, 2017). The new rule would shift the perceived “burden” of providing poverty relief to
foreign-born immigrants and their families—including the U.S. citizen children living with
immigrant guardians—away from the government and toward the realm of individual wealth and
the private sector, more generally. Bremberg (2017) equates this proposed state of affairs with
protecting U.S. taxpayers, leaving me to wonder who will “protect” taxpayers from the third of
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Americans receiving assistance that would make them “public charges,” as defined in the draft
order.
Bremberg’s leaked proposal emphasized his spurious claim that immigrants were
disproportionately likely to burden the American safety net “without also including [information
about] their economic contributions” (Fix & Capps, 2017). In so doing, Bremberg elided how
immigration is fundamental to the health of the U.S. economy, apparently disregarding the fact
that “immigrants fill critical… labor market needs” and conveniently ignoring that “many of the
public benefits accessed by immigrants are by those who work full time” (Fix & Capps, 2017).
The full story about benefits use by immigrants and native-born Americans remained to be told.
What is more, according to Bernstein et al. (2019), if Bremberg’s proposed changes to
public charge policy were adopted, the new rule would threaten the prospects of applicants who
might become eligible for non-cash benefits to be able to buy sufficient food and access basic
healthcare in the United States. Programs such as SNAP, which pays for food for people living in
poverty, and Medicaid, which provides health insurance for people living in poverty, would be
newly subject to public charge evaluation. Per Helen Murillo of Lawfare, the leaked public
charge policy proposal was swiftly “met with significant public criticism,” as the expansion of
public charge policy would “discourage even lawful immigrants from seeking [health]care,”
which would “thereby threaten public health… [and] national security” (Murillo, 2017). Almost
immediately, concerns about immigrant families’ lack of access to food and healthcare bloomed
in response to the perceived threat of punitive immigration consequences for poor immigrants.
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The extended lapse of time between the panic-inducing leak in January 2017 and the
intended promulgation of the new rule in August 2019 exacerbated confusion, fear, and
avoidance of benefits participation among immigrant communities (Bleich & Fleischhacker,
2019). In their article “Spreading Fear: The Announcement of the Public Charge Rule Reduced
Enrollment in Child Safety-Net Programs,” Barofsky et al. (2020) presented evidence that the
leaked document stoked rumors and panic among immigrant families. The Food Research &
Action Center (2020) found that immigrant families in their network were “not always familiar
with the term ‘public charge,’ despite expressing fears associated with the rule” (p. 5), a clear
indication of the miasma of confusion surrounding expanded public charge policy. Because the
administration “signal[ed] an intention to substantially expand the safety-net programs covered
by the rule” but “did nothing to provide accurate information or clarify what groups of
noncitizens would be affected,” their leak saddled families and advocates with
“vague...misinformation and an administrative burden,” which proved to be a catalyst for many
immigrant parents’ fears of deportation and family separation (Barofsky et al., 2020, p. 1760).
Fix and Capps (2017) admit to their own confusion about what exactly the draft order
indicated would be included in an expanded public charge test. If they, as policy scholars, could
not parse the implications of the drafted order, one would expect that the general public had a
much harder time understanding the vagaries of the draft. Bremberg’s redefining the terms
“public charge” and “public benefits,” as his draft intended to do, would ricochet throughout
low-income communities, effecting a chill among a much wider variety of federal programs than
just top-line, means-tested benefits such as SNAP and Medicaid. The draft order referred to all
“public benefits for which eligibility or amount is determined in any way on the basis of income,
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resources or financial aid,” (Bremberg, 2017, p. 3), and for Fix and Capps (2017), “though
[finalized] rulemaking might narrow its scope, this definition could include a wide variety of
federal programs, such as school lunches, college financial aid, home heating assistance, and
public health services.” The hefty importance that the drafted order seemed to place on
immigrants’ personal wealth, connections to sponsors with wealth, skills, and education “could
be interpreted to make a high-school degree or better… or having a certain level of assets” a
prerequisite for admission into the country (Fix & Capps, 2017). It is, perhaps, not surprising,
then, that chilling was anticipated to extend well beyond the programs and immigrants directly
affected by the text of the expanded public charge test itself.
In October 2018, twenty-one months after the leak of their planned rule changes, the U.S.
federal government officially announced its intention to expand the public charge rule
(Department of Homeland Security, 2018). The official rule changes echoed the Bremberg
(2017)’s sentiments, but the text was much lengthier, and it made an effort to clarify what exactly
the expansion of the rule entailed. The new public charge rule, in contrast to the old one, would
“restrict the admission [and residence] of certain non-citizens” identified by immigration
officials as potentially at risk of becoming partially dependent on the U.S. government for
subsistence (Makhlouf & Sandhu, 2020, p. 1). In contrast, as Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020)
remind us, only those immigrants judged likely to become “totally dependent on the government
for support” were subject to public charge-based repercussions in the past (p. 6), but the Trump
administration planned to change all that.
Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) offer a succinct overview of the changes to the public
charge rule that the Trump administration proposed in 2018: the new rule would “greatly
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expand” the Clinton administration’s 1999 Field Guidance, which narrowly defined dependence
on government assistance as participation in cash assistance benefits or long-term
institutionalized care (p. 505). For the first time, under Trump’s new rule,
… the definition of dependence include[d] a more expansive list of public benefits and
government assistance programs: specifically, SNAP, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (also known as welfare), Medicaid, Medicare Part D (also known as prescription
drug subsidies), and Section 8 (also known as housing vouchers). (p. 505)
If they had received assistance from a broad suite of government safety-net programs, the
proposed new rule would deny prospective immigrants a path to citizenship or permanent
residency, and the policy would even be applied to existing green card and visa holders (Bleich
& Fleischhacker, 2019).
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is the successor agency to the
now-defunct INS, was the agency that published these proposed changes to the public charge
rule in the Federal Register in 2018. The INS was disbanded during a reorganization of the
federal government in the wake of the September 11 attacks of 2001, and in its place rose the
newly created Department of Homeland Security. In this way, there is a direct through-line
connecting the INS’s 1999 Field Guidance to the DHS’s Proposed Rules on Inadmissibility on
Public Charge Grounds, published on October 10, 2018.
The DHS’s notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register is a complex policy
document, but in essence, it declared the government’s intention to depart from the
long-standing, narrow interpretation of “public charge” as an immigrant “substantially dependent
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on public relief for the basic maintenance of their lives” (Hester et al. 2018, p. 3), and to instead
“[re]define a public charge as an alien who receives one or more public benefits” (Department of
Homeland Security, 2018, p. 51157). Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) argue that this change in
policy “represents a dramatic shift in the way that the public charge statute has been interpreted”
(p. 7), because its function shifted away from surfacing an applicant’s likelihood of being
entirely dependent on government support and toward punishing any use of public benefits by
immigrants, “even in a relatively small amount or for a relatively short duration” (p. 4).
Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) further emphasize that, among low-income families with
children (the group most likely to demonstrate chilling effects) “most (87%) worked in the prior
year or will work the following year,” indicating that their reliance on government benefits to
supplement their budget was, indeed, likely to be temporary (p. 506). Fix and Capps (2017) echo
this finding, citing findings that “immigrants’ use of benefits, which is largely short-term,
promotes their longer term economic and social integration—and thus helps maximize their
contributions to the broader society.” Per the new public charge policy, even working families
who need government support on a temporary basis were subject to immigration consequences.
In the announcement of proposed rule changes, its authors acknowledge that the
expanded public charge rule will likely cause “disenrollment or forgoing enrollment in public
benefits program [sic] by aliens otherwise eligible for these programs” (Department of
Homeland Security, 2018, p. 51270). This unabashed admission of the harm the authors
anticipated would come to immigrant families eligible for safety-net benefits echoes statements
made by the INS in its 1999 Field Guidance, in which those policymakers, too, allowed that they
48
were aware that their changes to the public charge rule would cause chilling. History—and the
DHS, it seems—does have a tendency to repeat itself.
The 2018 proposal included a bulleted list of some of the worsening health and financial
straits that the authors thought would be in store for low-income immigrants because of
anticipated chilling. Per the DHS, rule changes were likely to cause “increased prevalence of
obesity and malnutrition, especially for pregnant or breastfeeding women, infants, or children”;
“reduced prescription adherence”; “increased use of emergency rooms and emergent care as a
method of primary health care due to delayed treatment”; “increased prevalence of
communicable diseases”; “increased rates of poverty and housing instability”; and “reduced
productivity and educational attainment” among otherwise eligible households (Department of
Homeland Security, 2018, p. 51270). Clinton’s INS and Trump’s DHS both admitted that public
charge rule expansions were known to engender chilling effects; they knew their choices would
aggravate the problems that already gave children from low-income backgrounds a harder start
in life: poverty, hunger, health problems, and poor school performance.
The DHS clearly anticipated the negative health and financial outcomes facing
low-income immigrants who would withdraw from services as a result of their rule changes, but
policymakers made no effort to attenuate this harm. Accordingly, the more restrictive new rule
has been called deliberately punitive in nature by Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020), and these same
authors urge us to remember that the families—including the U.S. citizen children—of
noncitizens chilled from accessing public benefits suffer alongside them (p. 9). In reviewing the
DHS’s published list of the likely consequences of chilling among immigrant families, it became
clear to Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) that children from low-income families were particularly
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vulnerable to chilling effects. Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) agree, stating that “citizen
children living with immigrant parents are among the most vulnerable to facing increased food
insecurity and poorer health outcomes as a result of the proposed rule” (p. 506).
Lessons learned about the harm caused to immigrant communities by the 1999
codification of the public charge test seem to have been ignored or overlooked by Trump
administration officials. The DHS “acknowledges and blatantly disregards” (emphasis the
authors’) this problem, apparently without concern for the new rule’s consequences (Makhlouf &
Sandhu, 2020, p. 9). Given all that scholars and policymakers know about chilling effects and the
damage they caused to immigrant communities the last time the public charge rule made
headlines, the Trump administration’s recreation of these same conditions of chilling and fear
seems to Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) to intentionally perpetuate patterns of inequity and
disempowerment among immigrant communities. Continuing to study and document the effects
that public charge policy has on immigrant communities will help ensure that, when future
policymakers push to expand the rule yet again—as they surely will—they will be unable to turn
a blind eye to the ways that past inadmissibility policies have threatened immigrants living in the
United States and all of us who live in community with them.
As we shift our focus toward exploring how immigrant communities were affected by the
expansion of public charge policy during Donald Trump’s presidency, it will be helpful to review
the timing of some of the major milestones toward the government’s adoption of the proposed
changes. The Trump administration’s involvement with public charge policy dawned with the
January 2017 leak of a draft Executive Order about expanding the public charge test. The DHS
announced their intent to expand the public charge rule in October 2018, opening a mandatory
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60-day public commentary period that closed in December 2018. This commentary period is
required when legislators intend to make certain changes to the Federal Register, and its aim is to
offer laypeople the opportunity to improve or object to a draft proposal (The Office of the
Federal Register, n.d.). In those two months, more than 260,000 individuals and organizations
submitted public comments overwhelmingly in opposition to the proposed changes to the public
charge rule, which was reported to be an unusually high level of engagement from the public
(National Immigration Law Center, 2019).
The next year, in August 2019, the government finalized their expanded public charge
policy (often called “the 2019 rule” or “the new rule”) and published it in the Federal Register,
with the enforcement of the new rule set to begin two months later (in October 2019). Updating
the policy consisted of adding four new sections to Part 212 of Title 8 law concerning “Aliens
and Nationality”: sections 20 through 23 on, respectively, the applicability of public charge
inadmissibility, relevant definitions, public charge inadmissibility determination, and exemptions
and waivers for public charge grounds of inadmissibility (Part 212 - Documentary Requirements,
2019). Prior to this addition, the term “public charge” appeared in the code only three times (Part
212 - Documentary Requirements, 2017), and after, it was included 35 times (Part 212 -
Documentary Requirements, 2019).
According to Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) “fewer than one percent of applicants for
admission were denied” using the narrower public charge criteria that preceded the Trump
presidency (p. 6), but that would soon change. In 2018, the DHS estimated that about 382,000
people seeking to adjust their immigration status each year would be subjected to a public charge
review (Bleich & Fleischhacker, 2019, p. 505). As of 2019, the DHS anticipated that their
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expanded public charge rule would “potentially exclud[e] many more non-citizens from
becoming lawful permanent residents” (Makhlouf & Sandhu, 2020, p. 4). Indeed, Reuters
reporters Torbati and Cooke (2019) made the case that revised public charge policy caused a
significant increase in refusals of immigrant visa applications on public charge grounds. In 2015,
before Donald Trump took office, fewer than 900 public charge-based visa denials were issued
by the U.S. government, but after Trump’s expansion of public charge policy went into effect,
“the refusals shot up… nearly 13,500 immigrant visa applications were refused on public charge
grounds” (Torbati & Cooke, 2019).
Under the 2019 rule, immigrants were subject to an expanded public charge test that
counted their use—or perceived likelihood of use—of non-cash and short-term safety-net
benefits against them. According to the Fiscal Policy Institute’s (2018) brief about the new rule,
“Only Wealthy Immigrants Need Apply,” these changes fundamentally altered the government’s
approach to immigration by restricting access to green cards and various types of visas for
immigrants based on their “family income” and their potential and/or past “use of health care,
nutrition, or housing programs” designed to alleviate poverty (p. 1). Researchers from the
Institute further argued that, “since the founding of the country, a family’s wealth was not a
factor in determining their eligibility to immigrate to the United States,” but that, in acting as a
kind of wealth screen for prospective immigrants, the new rule “will create devastating
consequences for immigrant communities” and could even erode “the moral underpinnings of
our country’s laws” (Dyssegaard Kallick et al., 2019, p. 1).
Although public charge policy specifically governs migration of foreign nationals within
the United States, the consequences of expanding the public charge rule have not been limited to
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the arena of admissions decisions. The mere proposal of public charge rule changes caused
nearly 14% of adults in immigrant families (and more than 20% of adults in low-income
immigrant families) to choose not to participate in government benefits programs in 2018
(Bernstein et al., 2019). This withdrawal from entitlement programs is called chilling, and
according to Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020), “the major effect” of the new rule has been “to chill”
immigrants from participating in government services “out of fear of negative immigration
consequences” (p. 1). Furthermore, chilling extends even to enrollment rates in benefits not
subject to the public charge test, such as participation in services provided by nonprofits and in
public schools for students and their families (Bleich & Fleischhacker, 2019). Low-income
immigrants’ misunderstanding and fear of the new rule led to widespread under-enrollment in
means-tested benefits and other programs perceived by immigrants to potentially threaten their
path to legal residency.
Against the backdrop of this dramatic shift in American immigration policy, researchers
began to study whether and to what extent the announced changes to the public charge rule had
begun to affect immigrant communities. Because of the recency of these policy changes, there is,
or course, room for lots of additional research to be conducted, but a few peer-reviewed studies
(e.g., Barofsky, et al. (2020), Bernstein et al. (2019), Bleich & Fleischhacker (2019)) have begun
to be published about chilling. The very first systematic investigation of potential chilling effects
stemming from the planned expansion of the public charge rule was Bernstein et al. (2019)’s,
conducted in December 2018, just two months after the rule change proposal was officially
announced. The May 2019 publication of Bernstein et al. (2019)’s findings was the very first of
its kind. Despite access to a few rich sources of information about the new rule and its
53
consequences, as of the writing of this thesis in December 2021, scholarly knowledge is
relatively thin on the ground.
Nevertheless, we do know some of the sobering consequences that the change in policy
had for low-income immigrants. One in four low-income adults in California reported avoiding
public programs out of fear that participating would negatively impact their own immigration
status or that of a family member (Protect Immigrant Families, 2021). This same study reported
evidence that chilling was associated with adverse health outcomes, including higher food
insecurity and uninsured rates, for immigrant households (Protect Immigrant Families, 2021).
The Migration Policy Institute found that participation in safety-net programs declined far more
rapidly for noncitizens than U.S. citizens during the Trump administration and that the share of
children receiving these benefits fell twice as fast among U.S. citizen children with noncitizen
household members than among children living only with citizens (Protect Immigrant Families,
2021). In particular, SNAP participation among mixed-immigration status households has
dropped dramatically. These families’ participation in SNAP has declined at a rate five times that
of the decrease among citizen-only households (Protect Immigrant Families, 2021).
Besides studying benefits program participation rates, it is also possible to gauge
immigrants’ reactions to public charge policy change via focus groups, surveys, and interviews
about their experiences. Protect Immigrant Families (2021) offers a summation of the Urban
Institute’s findings about these types of qualitative effects among immigrant families. Urban
Institute researchers found that
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… adults in low-income immigrant families had high rates of food insecurity in the past
year (41.4 percent), and were worried about meeting their basic needs in the next month,
including having enough to eat (43.2 percent) and being able to pay rent or a mortgage
(50.8 percent), utility bills (49.1 percent), or medical costs (52.1 percent). Despite
[this]..., more than 1 in 4 adults in low-income immigrant families (27.5 percent) reported
they or a family member avoided non-cash benefits or other help with basic needs
because of green card or other immigration concerns. (p. 2)
While a growing body of studies about the effects of public charge changes has begun to
flesh out our understanding of the grim consequences of the new rule, the researchers we rely on
to provide this information had to contend with a monumental barrier to producing scholarship.
It is likely that the coronavirus pandemic, which hit the United States in March 2020 (mere
months after the expanded public charge rule was officially published) has disrupted researchers’
ability to pursue knowledge about the state of immigrant communities. Because the rule change
produced the highest rates of fear and chilling among low-income noncitizens who are
non-native speakers of English (Barofsky et al., 2020), conducting research about this vulnerable
population is particularly challenging. Among the best potential research subjects are those
immigrants most affected by chilling, but chilled immigrants are also the likeliest to avoid people
perceived as being in positions of authority, such as researchers, program administrators, and
human services workers (Bernstein et al., 2019). Of course, there may also be language barriers
requiring extra resources and diligence to overcome, which is another challenge for academics
interested in chilling effects.
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How Language Barriers and Immigration Fears Fuel Under-enrollment in Benefits
Among all of this evidence to suggest that the new rule is promoting poverty and poor
health among immigrant communities, it is important to remember that access to
English-language learning has the potential to ameliorate the suffering of low-income
immigrants and their families. This is because people with better English skills are more likely to
participate in programs such as SNAP, which are effective in alleviating poverty and hunger
Algert et al. (2006). Kaiser (2008) showed that, among immigrants who were non-native English
speakers, “limited English ability” is a “proven barrier” to participation in such safety-net
services (p. 1291). Cohen (2019) confirmed that immigrants who self-identify as having limited
English proficiency see their English-language skills as a hurdle they struggle to overcome in
order to participate in benefits programs, particularly in SNAP (p. 1647). The research of Algert
et al. (2006) also argued that English-language ability encourages participation in anti-poverty
programs. Their analysis proved that low-income clients with better English-language ability
were more likely to receive the entitlement benefits for which they were eligible; conversely,
they also found that those with limited English-language skills were less likely to receive
benefits (Algert et al., 2006, p. 808).
English-language ability and immigration status both play a role in whether an eligible
household is likely to participate in benefits programs. Kaiser (2008) conducted a study of
women living in low-income immigrant households that likely included a U.S. citizen (either an
adult family member who was a naturalized U.S. citizen and/or a U.S.-born child). Among these
eligible households, foreign-born women were more likely than the native-born women to cite
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reasons related to stigma, and, in particular, worry about potentially endangering their family’s
chances at U.S. citizenship, as their reason for not using SNAP benefits (Kaiser, 2008, p. 1291).
Per Kaiser’s (2008) research, such fears about immigration status changes, deportation, and/or
family separation keep many eligible households from participating in poverty and hunger relief
programs. This is concerning because Kaiser (2008) also found that families with the highest
level of need for nutrition assistance (i.e., with the highest rate of food insecurity) were those
who were most likely to cite worry about losing a path to U.S. citizenship as their reason for not
applying for benefits (p. 1291).
Potential benefits recipients in the immigrant community, especially those who have a
heightened fear of deportation and family separation, need strong English skills to navigate the
social services system and to become informed about the benefits and potential drawbacks of
participating in government-funded programs. If the new rule did, indeed, chill adult immigrants’
participation in public ESL classes, it placed already vulnerable low-income households further
at risk of poor health and financial outcomes and under-enrollment in benefits programs that
could help (Bleich & Fleischhacker, 2019). Chilled immigrants’ path toward English proficiency
may have been obstructed by fears of immigration status consequences. If and how the 2019 rule
affected immigrants’ access to government-funded English language programs remains an open
question. Through studying the intersection of the new rule and the ESL classroom, the
education field will gain insight into how to promote low-income immigrants’ ability to succeed
in the United States via access to English-language learning, even during times of tumult in the
world of immigration policy.
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Interestingly, the DHS staff who wrote the expanded public charge policy insisted on
their views about the importance of English-language proficiency among immigrants in
documents related to their new rule. After the rule’s public commentary period (October
2018-December 2018) ended, the DHS repeatedly addressed concerns from the public about how
language proficiency evaluation during the public charge test could affect our immigration
system. According to the DHS, they had plans to implement evaluation procedures to determine
“evidence of the alien's and proficiency in English” as part of the expanded test, and that English
skills would be “heavily weighted” in regard to test outcomes (Department of Homeland
Security, 2019). Several members of the public who commented in opposition to the rule argued
that such a language proficiency test was “discriminatory” and inconsistent with the United
States’ famously lacking a national language (Department of Homeland Security, 2019). In all,
the back-and-forth between citizen commenters and DHS representatives about English
proficiency as it relates to the proposed changes in inadmissibility policy totaled 19 pages of
discussion (Department of Homeland Security, 2019), so it is clear that language ability was
central to the public’s and the administration’s understanding of “public charge.”
In their commentary, the DHS made a case completely in conflict with Algert et al.,
(2006), Kaiser (2008), and Cohen (2019)’s findings that limited English proficiency makes
immigrants less likely to participate in safety-net programs. The DHS planned to empower
immigration officers enforcing the new rule to cite low English-language proficiency in
immigration case denial decisions, based on their assertion that immigrants with lesser
English-language skills were more likely to become public charges. Per their commentary, the
DHS claimed that “various studies and data support the concept that a person's education and
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skills, including skills in the English language, are correlated to an individual's self-sufficiency
and therefore [is] a positive factor” in immigrants’ public charge test results (Department of
Homeland Security, 2019). This language echoes Bremberg’s (2017) insistence on rooting out
any immigrants lacking in “self-sufficiency” among the body politic, in order to protect
native-born Americans from a perceived drain on their collective resources.
The DHS’s insistence on privileging immigrants with better English-language skills on
the grounds that immigrants with lower English proficiency are more likely to use public
assistance—a claim that would leave Algert et al., (2006), Kaiser (2008), and Cohen (2019)
begging to differ—does not seem to be borne out in the data. In their report of their
comparatively recent findings titled “Food Over Fear: Overcoming Barriers to Connect Latinx
Immigrant Families to Federal Nutrition and Food Programs,” the Food Research & Action
Center (2020) reported that immigrant families who speak non-English languages at home
continue to “ often face language barriers and discrimination when accessing federal nutrition and
food programs” (p. 5). As some commenters from the public argued, the way that the limited
English proficiency of immigrants from countries where English is not spoken and where
English-medium education is not available would be held against them by immigration officials
may have come from motivations more prejudicial than economic.
Public Charge Policy as a Tool of Social Reproduction
As might be expected, some groups of immigrants felt the chilling effects of the 2019
rule more than others, and it is imperative to acknowledge that the new rule and its turbulent
rollout caused disproportionate harm among groups particularly burdened by social inequities.
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For example, in their study of 2018 chilling among immigrants, Bernstein et al. (2019) found that
Hispanic adults were “more than twice as likely as non-Hispanic white adults” to report chilling
effects (p. 2); likewise, chilling effects were also twice as potent among low-income families
with children in the home, as compared with adult-only households (p. 10). Consequently, we
can see that the 2019 rule disproportionately harmed people already at higher risk of suffering
poverty and its ill effects (e.g., members of non-white racial groups in a culture inflected by
white supremacy, the children of low-income immigrants, etc.).
As a consequence of chilling, families already limited in their access to food and
healthcare saw their resources spread even thinner once they forwent the in-kind public benefits
that used to help them make ends meet. This positive feedback loop is a hallmark of Social
Reproduction Theory (SRT), which posits that people with less social capital (such as people
from a non-dominant racial group or people living in poverty) are likely to see their misfortune
reproduced over time and across generations because of structural oppression (Marx, 1996).
Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) echo Marx (1996)’s belief that this kind of replication is not
an effect of chance; it is intentional among those who make the rules. These authors emphasize
that the authors of 2018 proposal from the DHS admitted in the proposal’s text that they knew
their new policy “might lead to disenrollment or forgone enrollment in safety-net programs
among foreign-born noncitizens, as well as [among] U.S. citizens who are members of
mixed-status households” (p. 506), including children. The DHS clearly anticipated that U.S.
citizen children living with immigrant guardians would likely be harmed by the new policy
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alongside their foreign-born household members, but nothing was done to shield these children
from the fallout.
Several scholars have emphasized the massive scale of the number of families and
children vulnerable to these intergenerational chilling effects. Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019)
presented evidence that nearly nine in ten children in the United States living in a family with an
immigrant parent are U.S. citizens (p. 506). These children, if they are living with limited means,
are eligible for the public benefits that their country will continue to provide to their non-chilled
counterparts living in native-born households. Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) frame of the sheer
scope of potential chilling among mixed households thusly:
The Migration Policy Institute estimates that 10 million non-citizens, which is 47% of the
non-citizen population in the United States, will disenroll from or forgo enrollment in
public benefits because of the chilling effects of changes in public charge policy. These
non-citizens reside with 12 million U.S. citizen family members… [and] forgone
enrollment in public benefits by an individual affects the budget of the entire household.
(p. 9)
Artiga and Damico (2018) of the Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that the number of
children living in such mixed-status households at risk of chilling was nearly 20 million. They
reported that California, the state where all of the community colleges studied in the course of
preparing this thesis are located, holds the greatest share of potentially affected children in the
nation. Per their findings, California is home to 23% of children living in the United States with
at least one immigrant parent, and they calculate that over four million children in California live
61
in households at risk of “increase[d] strains” on family resources and “losses in health coverage”
due to “changes to public charge policies intended to reduce use of public programs by
immigrant families, including their citizen children” (Artiga & Damico, 2018, p. 1).
These authors, just like Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) would go on to do, raised the
specter of “intentional” harm to immigrant families, for they find that chilling is no neutral force.
Through social reproduction, chilling harms members of affected immigrant families by
replicating significant barriers facing low-income immigrants among their citizen children,
including under-enrollment in safety-net services, poverty, and poor health. This inequity begins
at birth, as participation in SNAP is linked to significant improvements in birth outcomes; it
continues throughout childhood, as SNAP recipients exhibit better academic learning during
school-aged years; and it even continues into adulthood, as children who grew up with access to
SNAP benefits enjoy better health as adults (Bleich & Fleischhacker, 2019, p. 506). Their
disenrollment from safety-net benefits programs for which they are eligible deprives chilled
children and their families access to services that would help promote their wellbeing, health,
social mobility, and ability to achieve in school and in the workplace. The better life that many
immigrant parents sought out by coming to America is being denied their citizen children via
replicator effects.
Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) joined Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) in highlighting text
from the DHS’s 2018 proposal of rulemaking that conceded the authors’ anticipation of
challenges that would follow their proposal, in this case, an increased poverty rate in the United
States. The proposal text warned of “decrease[d] disposable income and increase[d] poverty” to
come among immigrant families. Barofsky et al. (2020) would tend to agree with their
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assessment because, according to these authors, one primary function of SNAP is to lift families
out of poverty. This made their findings that the 2018 proposal catalyzed a stark decline in SNAP
enrollment among eligible immigrants almost immediately after its announcement all the more
troubling.
Despite the fact that, according to Bleich and Fleischhacker’s (2019) analysis, “SNAP
lifted 3.4 million people out of poverty [in 2017], half of whom were children” (p. 506), these
authors argue that disenrollment from a different entitlement program could potentially wreak
even more havoc among immigrant families. Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) warn that a falloff
in enrollment in state-sponsored health insurance programs like Medicaid, Medicare, and the
Child Health Insurance Program “will increase the uninsured rate and reduce access to care,”
which, in addition to worsening health outcomes, will also increase poverty among immigrants
who have been chilled, “because medical expenses are the largest contributor to increasing the
number of individuals in poverty” (p. 506). Denying families an opportunity to escape poverty
by discouraging their participation in safety-net programs proven to decrease and prevent
poverty, especially among children, is how public charge policy reproduces social inequities
among people who might otherwise have been given a fair shake at a better life.
Chilling caused by the 2019 rule represents social reproduction not only because of its
intergenerational effects, but also because it replicated structural barriers to accessing the
American safety net even among eligible adult populations not subject to the public charge test.
Because of the fear, misinformation, and misunderstanding that clouded the announcement of the
new rule, people who would seem to be invulnerable to the revised public charge test have
nevertheless demonstrated significant chilling. Bernstein et al. (2019) found that, though the
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observed rate of chilling across all adult immigrants was one in seven in 2018, among
households where all foreign-born members were naturalized U.S. citizens, significant chilling
was still present: one in eleven such households reported chilling in 2018 (p. 9). Confusion
appears to have caused “spillover,” extending the chill’s reach and prompting disenrollment
among exempt people (such as refugees and naturalized U.S. citizens, in addition, of course, to
citizen children living in mixed-status households), despite their relative privilege in status
(Bernstein et al., 2019, p. 13). Makhlouf and Sandhu (2020) agree that, among those who were
not subject to a public charge review, “a marked decrease in public benefits enrollment…
attributed to the Trump administration’s proposed and enacted immigration policies” has been
observed (p. 5).
Neither being born a U.S. citizen nor achieving citizenship through naturalization was
enough to protect members of the immigrant community from the chilling effect’s dogged
replication of inequities, which seems to have drawn more established members of immigrant
communities back into a state of limbo regarding their right to persist and thrive in the United
States. In this way, the new rule perpetuated immigrants’ vulnerability to falling between the
cracks during their journey toward citizenship, pursuing them and their children into their lives
as fully fledged citizens. Chilling caused by the new rule stood in for some immigrants’ former
status as noncitizens ineligible for public benefits, and that this chilling encouraged
non-participation among eligible citizens from immigrant backgrounds whose taxes help support
the federal safety net is deeply unjust.
Similarly, just as chilling occurred both among people subject to the public charge test
and those who were not, pervasive chilling effects drove disenrollment both from state-funded
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benefits included in the public charge test—e.g., SNAP and Medicaid—and from services still
absent from the expanded test (Bernstein et al., 2019). Due to “fear, confusion, and
misinformation” (p. 506), Bernstein et al. (2019) reported that the new rule chilled immigrants’
participation in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC), which was never given public charge consideration by the expanded rule (probably
because it is an anti-hunger program offered for the benefit of very young children: babies in
utero and children up to the age of five years old). Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) also found
extensively chilled WIC enrollment among immigrant families, and they further observed
avoidance of participation in services provided by nonprofits, which, as nongovernmental,
charitable programs, remained irrelevant to public charge consideration. These findings suggest
that immigrant families were not quite sure which programs to avoid, so they opted for
non-participation in most or all services available to them. This certainly dovetails with the
anecdotal evidence we at 18 Reasons began to see starting in 2018.
According to Cohen (2019), a 2018 survey of community-based organizations serving
food-insecure immigrant communities found that intensified fears of immigration issues such as
deportation inhibited their clients’ use of public benefits and of services such as food pantries
offered by nonprofits. The present study examines whether enrollment in public ESL programs
(yet another public service not governed by the new rule) also showed this kind of spillover
chilling. Public ESL programs—being perceived by immigrants to be government-funded (as
they often are) and/or subject to the public charge test (they are not)—could show shrunken
enrollment correlated with milestones toward the adoption of the 2019 rule. Indeed, “many
immigrant families are reportedly avoiding interaction with public authorities and dropping out
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of or being reluctant to enroll themselves” in myriad public programs (Bernstein et al., 2019, p.
3), including community services. By eroding immigrants’ trust in public authorities and in
support services provided by the nonprofit sector, the new rule widened existing holes in the
safety net meant to support people residing in the United States and living with poverty.
Chilling was not bound by the limitations of the new rule, but rather, it infiltrated
households of diverse makeup (including all-citizen households), and it also impacted
participation rates among a diverse multitude of services (including benefits not subject to the
public charge test). This chilling certainly had a “major impact on immigrants, their citizen
family members, the providers who serve them, and their state and local communities,” as
Manatt (2018) anticipated it would at the time. Their fear-based disinclination to engage with the
public and nonprofit sectors left some low-income immigrants with nowhere to turn for
much-needed support. Migration scholar Ibrahim Sirkeci (2009) may have anticipated this kind
of confusion in his paper “Transnational Migration and Conflict.” Sirkeci (2009) describes
migration as a “conflict-space” replete with many challenges for immigrants to the United States,
including poor infrastructure among service agencies, fear of persecution, and
miscommunication (p. 8). The DHS’s expanded public charge rule exacerbated these issues,
leaving low-income immigrants struggling anew to find their footing and achieve financial
stability under the Trump administration.
Manatt (2018) provided a data dashboard presenting the relative strength of chilling
effects among immigrant households of different income levels. As the public charge test
specifically sought to root out immigrants who might become eligible for and, in the Trump
administration’s eyes, overly reliant on means-tested benefits, one might predict that the neediest
66
families would be the most affected by chilling. Manatt (2018) showed that this was the case:
“while all noncitizen families may be dissuaded from using benefits regardless of their current
observed income level, lower-income families are most likely to forgo benefits.” Specifically,
they found that immigrant families below 250% of the federal poverty level (FPL) (for reference,
in 2018, the federal poverty level was set at $12,140 for individuals, increasing by some $4,320
for each additional person) showed the strongest signs of chilling (Manatt, 2018).
In total, there were 13.9 million noncitizens residing in the United States in 2018 and
living below 250% FPL. Manatt (2018) calculated that, among all immigrant families, these
noncitizens and their additional 12 million household members living together in low-income
households were significantly more likely to experience chilling than higher-income immigrant
households, including those households who made above 250% FPL but were still eligible for
some benefits. Among these nearly 26 million potentially affected families living below 250%
FPL, “the group at greatest risk is the 7.5 million noncitizens, and the total universe of 14 million
noncitizens and their family members, below 125% FPL” (Manatt, 2018). Inherent to its design,
expanded public charge policy spiked poverty risk with the greatest force among the immigrant
families with the fewest resources, which, again, is an example of the compounding effects of
social reproduction described by Marx (1996).
Finally, if we have paid attention to the history lessons that Hirsi (2018) and Hester et al.
(2018) offered, we might be able to describe another critical way in which chilling stemming
from expanded inadmissibility policy was unequally represented across the immigrant
population: chilling effects have been stronger among non-white immigrants (and among
Hispanic immigrants, in particular). In the same way that Bernstein et al. (2019) found two-fold
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stronger chilling among Hispanic immigrants (as opposed to non-Hispanic white immigrants),
Haley et al., (2021) reported that Hispanic families with noncitizens continued to demonstrate
comparatively high rates of chilling under the Biden administration, and that they
“disproportionately experience hardships” (p. 5) related to poverty.
The National Immigration Law Center (2019), which sued the Trump Administration on
the grounds that its 2019 public charge rule was in violation of Equal Protection under the Fifth
Amendment of The United States Constitution, argued that “because affected immigrants are
overwhelmingly immigrants of color, the rule is… expected to widen racial disparities.” This
latter idea of augmenting existing inequities fits right in with social reproduction theory.
Furthermore, the fact that the new rule hampered non-white immigrants, in particular, shows us
yet another example of inadmissibility policy supposedly focused on income level alone actually
separating immigrants according to racial boundaries.
The 2019 rule was not a race-neutral policy, and in that way, it continued the long legacy
of the racialized enforcement and effects of federal inadmissibility policy. "Used for centuries to
control immigration from Ireland and other European countries,” Hirsi (2018) argued, “the
public charge provision now primarily restricts immigration from Africa, Asia, Latin America
and the Middle East." In his Washington Post op-ed “We Must Abolish the Public Charge Rule,”
immigration attorney Christopher Richardson (2019), a former State Department consular officer
and diplomat, does not mince words: “the public-charge provision has long been a weapon of
racism and classism in the United States,” and in his view, “far from its [being] expan[ded], the
rule should be abolished as a relic of the bygone era from which it came.” As Gessen (2020)
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titled their New Yorker column about the new rule: “Trump’s Immigration Rule Is Cruel and
Racist—But It’s Nothing New.”
What is new is the language that we now have to describe racism in the United States and
the collective reckoning our country has been going through regarding its white supremacist
roots over the past few years. These factors supported the removal of the 2019 rule from the
Federal Register in early 2021 under the nascent Biden administration. Although a federal
investigation of the 2019 rule’s inherently unjust implications was launched via a 2021 Biden
Executive Order and not as a direct result of their lawsuit, the National Immigration Law Center
(2019) made excellent use of rhetoric about our American ideals to call out this racist policy
while Trump was in office:
As indicators of a motivating racial animus, the complaint cites the [Trump]
administration’s acknowledgement that the policy will have a disparate impact on
families of color, President Donald Trump’s own racist statements, and his
administration’s other racially-biased policies… The Trump administration has
deliberately designed this policy to target families of color, which is part of its overall
blueprint to change the face of what we look like as a nation and who is considered
worthy of being an American. It threatens immigrants of color with exclusion and
Americans of color with deprivation or family separation. And it aims to deny
working-class immigrants of color the ability to thrive in the land of opportunity.
Their rhetoric was evocative of the “Great American Melting Pot,” as it was couched in terms of
the opportunity-based patriotism that often plays well among legislators of both political parties.
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This same rhetorical approach would ring throughout the 2021 Executive Order that spelled the
2019 rule’s end. Were it to truly afford equal opportunity to Americans of all colors and all
countries of origin, U.S. federal law would no longer be an agent of the social reproduction of
disparate inequities for people and immigrants of color that it so often is.
Repealing the Expanded Public Charge Rule
In evaluating President Joe Biden’s performance so far against his promised corrective
immigration agenda, Loweree and Reichlin-Melnick (2021) of the American Immigration
Council were gratified that Biden made repealing the 2019 public charge rule a priority for his
first 100 days in office. Shortly after taking office, on February 5, 2021, Biden issued an
Executive Order directing his Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary of Homeland
Security to “address concerns about the current public charge policies’ effect on the integrity of
the Nation’s immigration system and public health” within 60 days of the Order (Exec. Order
No. 14012, 2021). For a list of the legislative milestones important to the removal of the 2019
public charge rule and relevant dates, see Appendix F. The Executive Order was titled
“Restoring Faith in Our Legal Immigration Systems and Strengthening Integration and Inclusion
Efforts for New Americans,” and it is notable that the order began with an invitation to
“celebrate” immigrants’ contributions to U.S. culture, achievements, and economic power (Exec.
Order No. 14012, 2021). In this author’s view, Executive Order 14,012 was clearly intended as a
foil to the Bremberg (2017)’s leaked Executive Order draft that debuted in the earliest days of the
Trump presidency and that so callously elided the many ways that immigration benefits the
United States.
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Executive Order 14,012 promised to the “40 million foreign-born individuals [who] live
in the United States today” that Biden’s administration would reevaluate immigration policies
passed during the previous administration in order to be “consistent with our character as a
Nation of opportunity and of welcome,” as “it is essential to ensure that our laws and policies
encourage full participation by immigrants… in our civic life” (Exec. Order No. 14012, 2021). In
the text of the Order, Biden explained that his motivation in its issuance was to ensure that
“immigration processes and other benefits are delivered effectively and efficiently; and that the
Federal Government eliminates sources of fear and other barriers that prevent immigrants from
accessing government services available to them” (p. 8277). In this way, the Biden
administration clearly signaled its intention to rewind the public charge policy changes that
resulted in dramatic under-enrollment in public benefits and mistrust of government agents
among immigrant communities.
The conclusions of the legislative review ordered by Biden were swift in coming, and
they resounded with disapproval for the expanded public charge test. Per the Secretary of
Homeland Security’s remarks about the results of his department’s review, continuing to defend
the 2019 rule was “neither in the public interest nor an efficient use of limited government
resources” (Renaud, 2021). Tracy Renaud (2021), a senior DHS official, paraphrased their
findings on March 9, 2021 as follows:
The 2019 public charge rule was not in keeping with our nation's values. It penalized
those who access health benefits and other government services available to them [and]...
created confusion and fear that may have prevented immigrants and their families,
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including their children, from accessing critical government services available to them …
for which they may be eligible to keep their families safe and healthy. (p. 1)
On account of these findings by the reviewers, within a month of the Executive Order
14,012’s issuance, the Department of Justice dropped its defense of the Trump-era public charge
rule, leading to the dismissal of all pending immigration cases related to public charge-based
denials and deportations that hinged on temporary, in-kind benefits use (Immigrant Legal
Resource Center, 2021). As a result, U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services also stopped
applying the 2019 rule in their dealings with immigrants, and the enforcement of the expanded
public charge rule can thus be described as having been vacated in its entirety (Immigrant Legal
Resource Center, 2021). Enforcement of the 2019 rule ceased by March 9, 2021, and the only
thing left for the Biden administration to do to fulfill its mandate to reevaluate public charge
policy was officially remove evidence of the 2019 rule from the Federal Register.
On March 15th, 2021, in order to redress the disastrous political and humanitarian
consequences of the expanded public charge test, federal staff charged with reviewing the law
and acting to restore its “integrity” (Exec. Order No. 14012, 2021) simply wiped the offending
legislation from the books (Part 212 - Documentary Requirements, 2021). This straightforward
reversal of statute was consistent with the Department Homeland Security’s announcement from
the previous week, in which they declared that they would be applying public charge
inadmissibility policies consistent with the 1999 Field Guidance once again (Renaud, 2021).
Accordingly, the Trump administration’s additions to Title 8 law governing immigration
(specifically, this was Part 212, Sections 20-23 about the applicability of public charge
inadmissibility, relevant definitions, public charge inadmissibility determination, and exemptions
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and waivers for public charge grounds of inadmissibility, respectively) were eliminated. The
number of mentions of the term “public charge” shrunk back to their Clinton-era number: just
three mentions (as opposed to 35 under Trump) (Part 212 - Documentary Requirements, 2021).
Though the Biden administration’s wholesale rejection of the 2019 rule was encouraging
to advocates for the immigrant community, they felt that the work to address harm among
immigrant families was not yet finished. Biden’s team clearly heeded pleas from community
advocates like Protect Immigrant Family’s (2021) appeal for “swift rulemaking,” (p. 1) but
answering their call for the government to provide effective “communication to immigrants and
their family members that they can feel safe accessing public services” (p. 2) would prove more
challenging. Per Protect Immigrant Families (2021), their constituents were not yet aware and/or
may not have yet fully believed that Trump’s public charge policy “ha[d] permanently ended and
immigrants and their family members can get the care and help they need” (p.2). Despite the
DHS’s commitment to “partner with federal agencies to ensure impacted individuals are aware"
of the change (Renaud, 2021, p. 2), the sheer amplitude of the fear and chaos surrounding the
development of the 2019 rule will be a difficult hurdle to overcome. Media coverage of the 2019
rule’s development and adoption was extensive, but the repeal of that rule seems to have made
far fewer waves, so intentional community outreach will be required to educate chilled
communities. Advocates for immigrant communities, including TESOL practitioners, should be
prepared to mitigate the damage done by the 2019 public charge rule to the best of their ability.
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Chapter II Summary
This review of literature has explored the history of the public charge rule, what changes
to public charge policy under President Clinton and President Trump entailed and how they
created “chilled” immigrant communities, how limited English-language proficiency affects
families’ ability to access safety-net services, the public charge rule as a driver of
intergenerational inequities among immigrant families, and the ultimate removal of the expanded
public charge rule under President Biden. An exploration of these themes provides the reader
with an informed lens through which to consider possible chilling effects among ESL program
participants. Forgone enrollment in public ESL programs promotes worse English-language
proficiency among adult immigrants, which, in turn, reduces benefits enrollment among
immigrant families, making poverty alleviation for these families and their children less likely.
This thesis will address the current gap in the literature about whether immigrants’ chilled use of
community services and means-tested benefits related to public charge rule changes also





This chapter describes the findings of a statistical study of enrollment rates in ESL
programs at community colleges throughout California conducted to surface possible chilling
effects among adult ESL students correlated with recent expansions of inadmissibility policy.
Discussion of the results, including contextualizing the findings and exploring recommendations
inspired by them, appears in Chapter IV.
The present study analyzed community college enrollment records from academic years
2015-2019 to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in enrollment
change among students in ESL programs versus those in non-ESL programs for any year. A
further analysis of enrollment change among specific student subcategories (by ethnicity and by
socioeconomic status) was also undertaken to determine whether chilling was more common
among certain student subgroups (e.g., Hispanic students), as compared with students not in that
category (e.g., combined students of all non-Hispanic ethnicities). Statistically significant
disenrollment trends would indicate chilling for ESL programs.
This study is needed because the field does not yet have any other published information
about whether recent changes to inadmissibility policy under President Donald Trump (which
caused significant chilling of immigrants’ participation both in programs included in the new
public charge test and in programs not included) were correlated with similar declines in
participation in ESL. Despite the fact that public ESL education is a state-sponsored service that
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does not count against immigrants hoping to avoid public charge-based denials, chilling of ESL
participation could mirror chilling observed in programs like K-12 school-based services, which
also declined during the very public commotion about Trump-era public charge policy changes.
In brief, the study showed a trend toward overall student disenrollment from ESL
programs at community colleges for the 2016 and 2018 academic years, but the difference in
overall enrollment between ESL and non-ESL programs was not statistically significant.
In contrast, when comparing enrollment change distributions for students belonging and
not belonging to certain demographic subcategories, and of their use of ESL and non-ESL
programs, statistical analysis showed meaningful dips in enrollment in 2016 and 2018 for
Hispanic ESL students; ESL students of color, more generally; and low-income ESL students. In
2016, chilling was strongest among Hispanic ESL students (p=0.0002), followed by low-income
ESL students (p=0.0032), then all ESL students of color (p=0.0375). In 2018, chilling was again
strongest among Hispanic ESL students (p=0.0005), but ESL students of color showed the
next-strongest effect (p=0.0269), and low-income ESL students followed them (p=0.0466).
Findings: Research Question 1
Question 1: During recent changes to public charge policy under the Trump administration, did
adult immigrants’ rates of participation in ESL programs at community colleges in California
chill, as did their participation in federal means-tested benefits?
Findings: The answer to the first research question is no, there was not a statistically significant
chilling of overall ESL program enrollment under the Trump administration. In the case of
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overall participation rates in ESL versus non-ESL programs, the null hypothesis—that adult
immigrants’ overall use of public ESL classes was not chilled—prevails.
Table 1










T-test P-value T-test Statistic
2016 -0.0410 0.1681 1.2025 0.9932 0.2573 -1.1375
2017 0.0833 -0.0679 1.0232 0.9815 0.3614 0.9156
2018 -0.2184 0.0275 0.9457 1.0240 0.1394 -1.4867
2019 -0.1065 -0.2406 0.9958 0.8153 0.3815 0.8780
Note. Results of the statistical analysis of community college enrollment data for all students per
program type (ESL versus non-ESL). Negative means represent enrollment shrinkage, and
positive means show program growth. These numbers represent the change in enrollment from
the previous academic year to the listed year.
Upon analyzing the z-scores representing year-over-year changes in enrollment, there
was not a statistically significant difference in overall enrollment changes for ESL programs, an
education service specifically for immigrants, as compared with non-ESL programs. Even
though, on average, there was a downward trend in ESL program enrollment for academic years
2016 and 2018 (both were years in which non-ESL programs showed enrollment growth), the
difference was not significant. As we can see in Table 1, no p-value found was less than 0.05,
but the ESL enrollment drop in 2018 showed the strongest trend towards significance
(p=0.1394).
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Findings: Research Question 2
Question 2: Were possible chilling effects in ESL program participation stronger for any specific
demographic subgroup of adult ESL students, especially in subgroups already proven to show
more chilling under the Trump administration (such as Hispanic people, people of color, and
low-income people)?
Findings: The data show that yes, for the years 2016 and 2018, there was a significant difference
(ESL vs. non-ESL) in enrollment change for Hispanic students, students of color, and
low-income students, all of whom were disproportionately unlikely to enroll in ESL during these
years. In contrast, there was not a significant difference in enrollment by program type for
non-Hispanic students, white students, or higher-income students. So, the data indicate a chill of
adult immigrants’ use of public ESL classes for Hispanic, non-white, and low-income students,
respectively. Statistically significant enrollment change was present only for 2016 and 2018 data,
so 2017 and 2019 numbers are not included in this chapter. See Appendix E for a full list of
statistical results for all years.
Enrollment Trend Differences among Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Students
Enrollment trend data for Hispanic and non-Hispanic students are presented in Table 2.
In 2016, there was a statistically significant difference (p=0.0002) in enrollment among Hispanic
ESL students, as compared with Hispanic students’ enrollment in non-ESL programs (see Figure
1). On average, Hispanic enrollment in ESL programs stayed about the same, whereas Hispanic
enrollment in non-ESL programs grew significantly, indicating chilling. There was also a
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statistically significant trend (p=0.0005) toward chilled enrollment among Hispanic ESL students
versus Hispanic students not in ESL programs in 2018 (see Figure 2). On average, Hispanic
students’ enrollment in ESL programs declined in 2018, whereas Hispanic students’ participation
in non-ESL programs actually grew that year. In contrast, there was not a significant difference
in enrollment rates for either year among a composite total of all non-Hispanic students, meaning
that non-Hispanic enrollment was not chilled.
Table 2










T-test P-value T-test Statistic
2016 Hispanic 0.0555 0.6737 1.1163 0.7880 0.0002 -3.8389
2016 Non-Hispanic -0.0822 -0.2620 1.1373 0.9864 0.3127 1.0132
2018 Hispanic -0.1607 0.3693 0.9683 0.7765 0.0005 -3.5980
2018 Non-Hispanic -0.3002 -0.1878 0.9057 0.9185 0.4641 -0.7342
Note. Data from the statistical analysis of community college enrollment rates among Hispanic
and non-Hispanic students in ESL versus non-ESL programs. Negative means represent
enrollment shrinkage, and positive means show program growth. These numbers represent
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Enrollment Trend Differences among Students of Color and White Students
Per statistical results presented in Table 3, there was a statistically significant (p=0.0375)
rate of disenrollment among immigrants of color during the 2016 school year, as compared with
participation among students of color in non-ESL programs at that time (see Figure 3). Being an
ESL student of color had an even stronger effect (p=0.0269) on 2018 disenrollment trends than
in 2016 (see Figure 4). For both of these years, chilling resulted in a decline in participation of
students of color in ESL classes; meanwhile, average participation rates of students of color in
other kinds of programs actually grew in both 2016 and 2018, indicating chilled ESL
participation. Data about white students did not show significant differences in their enrollment
per program type, so their ESL participation rates were not chilled during this time.
Table 3










T-test P-value T-test Statistic
2016 Ss of Color -0.0102 0.3813 1.1356 1.0691 0.0375 -2.1003
2016 White -0.0077 -0.2780 1.1887 0.8754 0.1280 1.5321
2018 Ss of Color -0.2553 0.1105 0.9685 0.9664 0.0269 -2.2373
2018 White -0.1542 -0.1709 0.9611 0.6910 0.9059 0.1184
Note. Enrollment data analysis results for students of color and white students in ESL and
non-ESL community college programs. Negative means represent enrollment shrinkage, and
positive means show program growth. These numbers represent enrollment change from the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Enrollment Trend Differences among Low- and Higher-Income Students
A comparison of enrollment change among low-income students (those who qualified for
the federal Perkins Loan Program) and higher-income students (those who were ineligible) is
presented in Table 4. There was a statistically significant (p=0.0032) drop in enrollment rates
among low-income ESL students in 2016, as compared with low-income students enrolled in
other programs, whose enrollment actually grew that year (see Figure 5). In addition, there was
also a statistically significant (p=0.0466) downtrend in enrollment among low-income ESL
students in 2018, but this latter effect was not as strong as the effect in 2016 (see Figure 6). For
both of these years, higher-income students did not show significant differences in enrollment
trends per program type, meaning that their enrollment data did not exhibit chilling.
Table 4












T-test P-value T-test Statistic
2016 Low-Income -0.2949 0.2140 1.0872 0.9441 0.0032 -2.9987
2016 Higher-Income 0.2138 0.1175 1.1184 1.0845 0.6007 0.5245
2018 Low-Income -0.3147 -0.0311 0.8114 0.8712 0.0466 -2.0074
2018 Higher-Income -0.0859 0.1617 0.8851 1.0859 0.1387 -1.4896
Note. Statistical analysis results showing enrollment change trends among low- and
higher-income students in ESL versus non-ESL programs at community colleges. Negative
means represent enrollment shrinkage, and positive means show program growth. These



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Statistical analysis of enrollment records for ESL and non-ESL programs at California
community colleges during the Trump presidency revealed that there was no significant chilling
of overall student participation among adult immigrants in ESL programs. On the contrary, three
ESL student subgroups did demonstrate statistically significant chilling in 2016 and 2018:
Hispanic ESL students; ESL students of color, more generally; and low-income ESL students.
These types of immigrant language-learners did, indeed, demonstrate chilled participation in
ESL programs for these years.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
Chapter IV presents a discussion of the findings discovered through statistical analysis of
enrollment data for ESL and non-ESL programs in community colleges throughout California,
conclusions that can be drawn from these findings, and recommendations for how the work of
understanding and ameliorating chilling effects among adult immigrants might be continued in
the future. Reading Chapter IV will help this study’s audience contextualize statistical findings in
relation to ideas presented in Chapter II about diverse documented chilling effects observed
among adult immigrants under the Trump Administration, the concept of social reproduction of
inequity via exclusion policies, and the history of the public charge rule from the 1880s onward.
To reflect on the purpose of the present study, readers should consider how understanding
chilling effects among immigrant families (and, in the case of this thesis, adult ESL students
most especially) will empower TESOL practitioners, community advocates, and policymakers
with knowledge about how student populations may react to shifting inadmissibility policy.
Discussion and Conclusions
The present study can tell us four things about chilling effects regarding enrollment
changes in ESL programs at community colleges throughout California: (1) there was not a
significant, program-wide chilling effect on adult immigrants in public ESL programs during the
Trump administration. Despite the lack of significant chilling on overall enrollment numbers, for
the years 2016 and 2018, (2) Hispanic immigrants’ participation in ESL programs was
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significantly chilled, (3) as was participation in ESL programs among immigrants of color, and
(4) as was low-income immigrants’ participation in ESL programs.
This analysis substitutes the category “immigrants” for the word “students” often used
throughout Chapter III (e.g., “Hispanic immigrants” instead of “Hispanic ESL students”) because
this study makes the assumption that adults enrolled in public ESL classes are immigrants
residing in the United States. To call these students “immigrants” does not imply any knowledge
of their residency status; “immigrants” is used here to include people such as lawful permanent
residents, visa holders, and undocumented residents (as does the literature reviewed throughout
Chapter II). It is the author of this study’s opinion that non-immigrants are unlikely to attend
public ESL programs for adults.
These findings mirror the data presented in studies reviewed in Chapter II in at least two
ways: in the timing of chilling, and in the populations showing the most significant chilling. In
terms of timing, researchers such as Barofsky et al. (2020), Bernstein et al. (2019), Sommers et
al. (2020), and Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) all found significant chilling in the year 2018,
likely because the expansion of the public charge rule was announced that year. Even before the
rule was officially announced in October 2018, public charge policy had become a hot topic in
news media throughout the United States that year. This was due, in part, to the highly publicized
60-day public commentary period from October through December 2018. As previously
mentioned, 260,000 individuals and organizations left comments for the DHS about their
reactions and recommendations regarding the new rule, most of them in opposition of the
proposed changes to standing public charge policy (National Immigration Law Center, 2019). It
must be emphasized in the context of the current study’s findings that chilling in 2018 was
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correlated with the timing of the official announcement of the new rule and the public
commentary period that followed, but we cannot infer any kind of causal relationship between
these events and related chilling.
One might wonder why chilling occurred in 2018, well before the rule was set to take
effect in August 2019. As per findings by the American Public Health Association (2018), SNAP
participation rates among immigrants plummeted in 2018 despite the fact that eligibility rules for
SNAP remained unchanged between 2017 and 2018. The Association (2018) argued that the
mere “threat of policy changes, even before changes are enacted, may be causing families to
forego nutrition assistance.” Eligible immigrants’ participation in SNAP had modestly but
steadily increased during the years 2007-2017, and the Association (2018) believed that the
sudden drop in enrollment in 2018 might be explained by immigrants’ exposure to media
coverage of immigration issues.
The “nuanced changes in national immigration rhetoric and increased federal action to
deport and detain immigrants” drove immigrants to avoid SNAP and other benefits programs
starting in 2018 (American Public Health Association, 2018). This concept of a growing
awareness of inadmissibility policy among immigrants was also borne out in a study by
Sommers et. al (2020) about low-income Texans: nearly three out of five low-income Texans had
heard of the public charge rule in 2018, and one in eight had avoided public programs or medical
care because of immigration-related concerns. It seems that Hispanic, non-white, and/or
low-income immigrants in California may have also had this awareness in 2018, as this study
found evidence of chilling among ESL students that aligns with other studies’ findings of
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chilling among immigrants formerly enrolled in SNAP, WIC, Medicaid, and other public
programs.
On the other hand, the present study also found evidence of chilling among adult
immigrants' enrollment in ESL programs in 2016. Though I have not seen other studies that
replicate my findings of significant chilling in that year, I will hazard a guess that chilling among
ESL students was related to the 2016 election of Donald Trump and dawning fears of the family
separations and deportations promised by an impending “crackdown” on immigrants. The
National Immigration Law Center (2019) placed chilling in a broader milieu of “racial animus”
against people of color on the part of the Trump campaign, citing Donald Trump’s own “racist
statements, and his administration’s other racially-biased policies,” so it is possible that the mere
election of President Trump was enough to kick off avoidance of educational and other programs
by immigrants guided, above all, by a desire to keep their heads down and their families intact.
Secondarily, the chilling observed in the present study among Hispanic, non-white, and
low-income immigrants matches analogous chilling documented by researchers such as, in the
case of chilling among Hispanics, the Food Research & Action Center (2020) and Haley et al.,
(2021); of chilling among immigrants of color, Bernstein et al., (2019) and the National
Immigration Law Center, (2019); and of chilling among low-income immigrant families, in
particular, Manatt (2018) and the Urban Institute (2021), etc. As a result, the chilling measured
here is in conversation with scholars such as Hirsi (2018)’s and Hester et. al (2018)’s claims that
income-based inadmissibility policy has often functioned throughout the history of the United
States as a veiled excuse to exclude “undesirable,” “non-white” immigrants.
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These findings not only bolster claims made here and in the literature reviewed over the
course of Chapter II that the expansion of the public charge rule disproportionately impacted
immigrants of color and low-income immigrants (people already unduly vulnerable to the risk of
poverty, hunger, and poor health outcomes), but they also support the idea that the 2019 rule
functioned as a tool of social reproduction of structural barriers and inequities among immigrant
communities. These barriers include under-enrollment in benefits programs among eligible
immigrants; potential lesser achievement of English proficiency due to the avoidance of
English-language education; and reactionary fears of immigration consequences so potent that
immigrants turned away from public assistance, the nonprofit sector, and even their local public
schools for support because of their panic about the Trump administration’s plans and policies.
Recommendations
The most important work to do about the state of inadmissibility policy today is to
address Protect Immigrant Families’ (2021) chief concern that the community they serve has not
been made aware of the repeal of the 2019 rule. Significant chilling persists among immigrants
irrespective of the Biden administration’s expunging the expanded public charge statutes from
the law. This chilling is potentially more harmful than ever before, as it now coincides with
unprecedented personal health risks and public health consequences while we all weather the
COVID-19 pandemic together. Especially because immigrants are particularly likely to be
essential workers and thus instrumental to the labor force who have faced the highest levels of
COVID-related risk, it is our moral obligation to ensure that this community has access to every
benefit for which they are eligible.
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Of course, even if COVID had never brought our world to a grinding halt in 2020, we
should still fulfill our duty to protect the millions of children living with immigrant relatives who
have suffered as a result of the 2019 rule, most of them U.S. citizens. These children share the
birthright of all Americans to rely on our state-funded safety net if and when they need to do so.
Community outreach about the restoration of the 1999 Field Guidance of the kind that Renaud
(2021) invoked in her interdepartmental letter to public sector colleagues is imperative.
Another practical recommendation is for ESL programs and the staff who operate them to
do what Bleich and Fleischhacker (2019) recommended as the extent of chilling began to be
revealed: “identify and disseminat[e] best practices for building and maintaining trust with those
affected” (p. 508). Although these authors were primarily concerned with food access programs
like ours at 18 Reasons, they still advised that all service providers “could help ensure those
[immigrants] lawfully able to participate in federal… programs do" (p. 508). TESOL
practitioners might also do well to heed this advice. Collective resource-sharing,
communications plans, teacher training, and student outreach by our communities of practice
may very well help adult ESL students resist chilling effects or come back to the
English-language programs they have chosen to avoid.
Finally, the results of the present study, as well as the discoveries in the narrative content
of Chapter II about the historical purpose and racist origins of past exclusion policies, and in
addition to findings about chilling effects under the Clinton and Trump administrations and the
measurable harm they visited on immigrant communities—particularly on citizen children from
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low-income immigrant households and their families—it is incumbent on the author of this thesis
to vehemently recommend against future expansions of the public charge test.
As this thesis is the project of one lone graduate student completed during free time
leftover outside of full-time work and attending graduate school, the directions for potential
future research by more experienced and better-resourced scholars are abundant. I encourage
researchers in the education and policy fields to consider ESL programs as a “public benefit”
offered to immigrant communities. Public education, including ESL for adults, should be
considered alongside other programs as vital to immigrants’ ability to thrive, or else why is
education compulsory and free for our children? Access to adult ESL is a basic need for many
immigrant families whose members might enroll in curricula we call “survival English” or “basic
skills English.” These kinds of programs can provide immigrant families with the language skills
they need to interrupt processes of social reproduction that limit their human capital. This could
interrupt the intergenerational effects of under-enrollment in benefits programs and other
setbacks that come along with immigrant parents’ having limited English skills.
Next, I recommend that researchers pursue knowledge about why adult immigrants who
were chilled from participation in ESL programs chose to avoid these classes. The present study
explores correlations between milestones along the Trump administration’s journey to adopting
the 2019 rule and corollary chilling effects among adult ESL students, but it cannot illuminate
the cause of this chilling. Such causal research would likely take the form of an interview- or
survey-based study of chilled and non-chilled ESL students.
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Finally, more robust and sophisticated exploration of the expansive enrollment data set
made available to the public via Cal-PASS Plus might reveal untold insights about adult ESL
students in California and the programs that serve them. There is so much information available
for free in this program. Further data from outside of the Cal-PASS Plus data set may also be
helpful to future researchers. For example, the metric used here to approximate low-income
status was Perkins loan eligibility, but eligibility for that program requires legal residence and the
legal ability to apply for the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Because of this,
people concerned about their legal status, such as low-income undocumented immigrants, may
not be captured as low-income in the enrollment records used here. Similarly, the Cal-PASS Plus
data on credit versus non-credit ESL enrollment data in the overall enrollment data set did not
match with enrollment numbers reported in the ESL-specific program data set (which, in theory,
should be an exact drill-down of the former overall enrollment set). As a result of this
inconsistency, credit versus non-credit ESL program type was not considered in this study’s
statistical analysis, but it would be interesting to learn about the prevalence of chilling effects on
free, non-credit English classes versus paid, credit-eligible English classes if accurate data could
be sourced.
Chapter IV Summary
While overall enrollment in public ESL classes for adults throughout the state of
California did not show significant chilling under the Trump administration, in the years 2016
(the year Donald Trump won the U.S. presidency) and 2018 (the year of the new public charge
rule’s announcement), significant chilling among Hispanic ESL students, ESL students of color,
and low-income ESL students was present. These findings align with diverse scholarship about
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chilling among immigrants in their use of other public programs, such as services offered by
nonprofits and means-tested public benefits.
In response to the learnings I gleaned through preparing this thesis, I strongly recommend
policymakers and anyone who has the power to influence legislation against future expansions of
the public charge rule. In addition, I believe that it is imperative that the current administration
plan, fund, and implement community outreach with the intent of regaining the public’s trust,
especially among members of the immigrant community, and of increasing program participation
rates among people eligible for public benefits. Finally, I offer possible directions for future
research about the cause of chilling among adult ESL students and further analysis of community
college enrollment data sets and other data about ESL programs and their student populations,
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Appendix A: List of California Community College Districts and Schools
District Region Counties Served Colleges in District Website
Allan Hancock Joint 
Community College District (CCD)
South Central San Luis Obispo
Santa Barbara
Ventura
Allan Hancock College www.hancockcollege.edu
Antelope Valley CCD South Central Kern
Los Angeles
Antelope Valley College www.avc.edu
Barstow CCD Inland Empire San Bernardino Barstow College www.barstow.edu
Butte-Glenn CCD Northern Butte
Glenn
Butte College www.butte.edu




Cerritos CCD Southern Los Angeles Cerritos College www.cerritos.edu
Chabot-Las Positas CCD Bay Area Alameda Chabot College
Las Positas College
www.clpccd.org
Chaffey CCD Southern San Bernardino Chaffey College www.chaffey.edu
Citrus CCD Southern Los Angeles Citrus College www.citruscollege.edu




Compton CCD Southern Los Angeles Compton College district.compton.edu




Copper Mountain CCD Southern San Bernardino Copper Mountain College www.cmccd.edu
Desert CCD Southern Riverside
San Bernardino
College of the Desert www.collegeofthedesert.edu
El Camino CCD Southern Los Angeles El Camino College www.elcamino.edu
Feather River CCD Northern Plumas Feather River College www.frc.edu
Foothill-Deanza CCD Bay Area Santa Clara De Anza College
Foothill College
www.fhda.edu
Gavilan CCD Central San Benito
Santa Clara
Gavilan College www.gavilan.edu
Glendale CCD Southern Los Angeles Glendale Community College www.glendale.edu
Grossmont-Cuyamaca CCD Southern San Diego Cuyamaca College
Grossmont College
www.gcccd.edu
Hartnell CCD Bay Area Monterey
San Benito
Hartnell College www.hartnell.edu
Imperial CCD Southern Imperial Imperial Valley College www.imperial.edu






Cerro Coso Community College
Porterville College
www.kccd.edu
Lake Tahoe CCD Central El Dorado Lake Tahoe Community College www.ltcc.edu





Long Beach CCD Southern Los Angeles Long Beach City College www.lbcc.edu



















Marin CCD Bay Area Marin College of Marin www.marin.edu
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Appendix A: List of California Community College Districts and Schools
District Region Counties Served Colleges in District Website
Mendocino-Lake CCD Northern Lake
Mendocino
Mendocino College www.mendocino.edu
Merced CCD Central Fresno
Merced
Merced College www.mccd.edu
Mira Costa CCD Southern San Diego MiraCosta College www.miracosta.edu
Monterey Peninsula CCD Bay Area Monterey Monterey Peninsula College www.mpc.edu
Mt. San Antonio CCD Southern Los Angeles Mt. San Antonio College www.mtsac.edu
Mt. San Jacinto CCD Southern Riverside Mt. San Jacinto College www.msjc.edu
Napa Valley CCD Northern Napa
Sonoma
Napa Valley College www.napavalley.edu





Ohlone CCD Bay Area Alameda Ohlone College www.ohlone.edu
Palo Verde CCD Southern Riverside
San Bernardino
Palo Verde College www.paloverde.edu
Palomar CCD Southern San Diego Palomar College www.palomar.edu
Pasadena Area CCD Southern Los Angeles Pasadena City College www.pasadena.edu





Rancho Santiago CCD Southern Orange Santa Ana College
Santiago Canyon College
www.rsccd.edu




College of the Redwoods www.redwoods.edu
Rio Hondo CCD Southern Los Angeles Rio Hondo College www.riohondo.edu




San Bernardino CCD Southern Riverside
San Bernardino
Crafton Hills College
San Bernardino Valley College
www.sbccd.cc.ca.us
San Diego CCD Southern San Diego San Diego City College
San Diego Mesa College
San Diego Miramar College
www.sdccd.edu
San Francisco CCD Bay Area San Francisco City College of San Francisco www.ccsf.edu





San Joaquin Delta College www.deltacollege.edu
San Jose-Evergreen CCD Bay Area Santa Clara Evergreen Valley College
San Jose City College
www.sjeccd.edu
San Luis Obispo County CCD Southern San Luis Obispo
Monterey
Cuesta College www.cuesta.edu
San Mateo County CCD Bay Area San Mateo Canada College
College of San Mateo
Skyline College
www.smccd.edu
Santa Barbara CCD Southern Santa Barbara Santa Barbara City College www.sbcc.edu
Santa Clarita CCD Southern Los Angeles College of the Canyons www.canyons.edu
Santa Monica CCD Southern Los Angeles Santa Monica College www.smc.edu
Sequoias CCD Central Kings
Tulare
College of the Sequoias www.cos.edu
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District Region Counties Served Colleges in District Website





Siskiyou Joint CCD Northern Siskiyou College of the Siskiyous www.siskiyous.edu
Solano County CCD Northern Solano
Yolo
Solano Community College www.solano.edu
Sonoma County Junior College District Northern Sonoma
Marin
Mendocino
Santa Rosa Junior College www.santarosa.edu
Southern Orange County CCD Southern Orange Irvine Valley College
Saddleback College
www.socccd.edu
Southwestern CCD Southern San Diego Southwestern College www.swccd.edu













Victor Valley CCD Southern Los Angeles
San Bernardino
Victor Valley College www.vvc.edu





West Hills College Coalinga
West Hills College Lemoore
www.westhillscollege.edu
West Kern CCD Southern Kern Taft College www.taftcollege.edu


























APPENDIX B: Timeline of the Development and Adoption of the 2019 Public Charge Rule
Date Action
January 20, 2017 President Donald Trump took office.
January 23, 2017 A draft Executive Order titled “Protecting Taxpayer Resources by
Ensuring Our Immigration Laws Promote Accountability and
Responsibility,” which would require the Department of State
(DoS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish
new regulations for applying an expanded public charge test to
immigrants seeking entry into the United States or adjustment of
status, was leaked to media outlets.
January 3, 2018 The DoS published a revised consular office manual about visa
issuance that included expanded benefits use (e.g., non-cash) in
their public charge test.
September 21, 2018 The Secretary of the DHS announced his department’s forthcoming
change in rulemaking, called Proposed Rule on Inadmissibility to
the U.S., which would expand the public charge test to include use
of non-cash and temporary benefits.
October 10, 2018 The DHS published their revised public charge statute in the
Federal Register, opening a mandatory 60-day public comment
period, after which the new public charge rule would be finalized.
December 10, 2018 The public comment period for the new public charge rule closed;
more than 260,000 comments were submitted by the public, most
in opposition to the new rule.
August 14, 2019 The DHS published updated inadmissibility statutes in the Federal
Register with a planned effective date of 10/15/2019.
October 15, 2019 The date that the new public charge rule was supposed to be
promulgated arrived, but the enforcement of the new rule was
blocked by federal appeals court on 10/11/2019.
January 27, 2020 The U.S. Supreme Court overruled a temporary nationwide
injunction blocking implementation of the rule, clearing the way
for the enforcement of the new rule.
February 24, 2020 The new public charge rule was officially adopted.
Adapted from the Immigrant Legal Resource Center (2021) and Barfosky, et al. (2020)
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Allan Hancock 2015 ESL 3683 3103 580 3434 249 1509 2174
Antelope Valley 2015 ESL 556 257 299 500 56 521 35
Barstow 2015 ESL 105 49 56 80 25 55 50
Butte 2015 ESL 482 254 228 359 123 248 234
Cabrillo 2015 ESL 2592 1201 1391 1538 1054 1719 873
Cerritos 2015 ESL 2457 1772 685 2273 184 1395 1062
Chabot-Las Positas 2015 ESL 1123 408 715 901 222 1006 117
Chaffey 2015 ESL 1884 1220 664 1633 251 1417 467
Citrus 2015 ESL 2273 1423 850 1834 439 1953 320
Coast 2015 ESL 1344 249 1095 1092 252 895 449
Compton 2015 ESL 1496 816 680 1472 24 1192 304
Contra Costa 2015 ESL 1527 426 1101 1052 475 776 751
Copper Mountain 2015 ESL 333 116 217 196 137 39 294
Desert 2015 ESL 2695 2216 479 2478 217 606 2089
El Camino 2015 ESL 1946 987 959 1709 237 1502 444
Feather River 2015 ESL 189 166 23 23 166
Foothill-Deanza 2015 ESL 680 242 438 509 171 188 492
Gavilan 2015 ESL 1161 978 183 1066 95 363 798
Glendale 2015 ESL 5785 1087 4698 2244 3541 2774 3011
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2015 ESL 564 126 438 243 321 342 222
Hartnell 2015 ESL 826 699 127 766 60 508 318
Imperial 2015 ESL 1199 1084 115 1181 18 992 207
Kern 2015 ESL 2253 1541 712 1880 373 1847 406
Lake Tahoe 2015 ESL 670 287 383 348 322 325 345
Lassen 2015 ESL 620 364 256 497 123 176 444
Long Beach 2015 ESL 2269 1455 814 2140 129 975 1294
Los Angeles 2015 ESL 26491 18178 8313 24115 2376 11386 15105
Los Rios 2015 ESL 5109 1377 3732 3628 1481 4553 556
Marin 2015 ESL 2615 1319 1296 2095 520 412 2203
Mendocino-Lake 2015 ESL 1018 540 478 676 342 572 446
Merced 2015 ESL 913 604 309 770 143 579 334
Mira Costa 2015 ESL 2733 1743 990 2205 528 547 2186
Monterey 2015 ESL 1064 382 682 643 421 353 711
Mt. San Antonio 2015 ESL 11230 5101 6129 10444 786 2999 8231
Mt. San Jacinto 2015 ESL 1704 410 1294 1614 90 154 1550
Napa Valley 2015 ESL 725 262 463 509 216 238 487
North Orange 2015 ESL 14240 7185 7055 12966 1274 2992 11248
Ohlone 2015 ESL 556 74 482 460 96 163 393
Palo Verde 2015 ESL 714 544 170 625 89 257 457
Palomar 2015 ESL 4236 2945 1291 3665 571 1105 3131
Pasadena 2015 ESL 4539 2057 2482 4273 266 1110 3429
Peralta 2015 ESL 2523 596 1927 2266 257 1712 811
Rancho Santiago 2015 ESL 29514 20959 8555 26484 3030 6316 23198
Redwoods 2015 ESL 696 339 357 471 225 244 452
Rio Hondo 2015 ESL 460 406 54 21 439
Riverside 2015 ESL 471 266 205 364 107 292 179
San Bernardino 2015 ESL 421 208 213 283 138 244 177
San Diego 2015 ESL 18018 8973 9045 15884 2134 5466 12552
San Francisco 2015 ESL 31204 9861 21343 28754 2450 10535 20669
110
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San Joaquin Delta 2015 ESL 1385 606 779 1121 264 1213 172
San Jose-Evergreen 2015 ESL 1223 367 856 1101 122 820 403
San Luis Obispo 2015 ESL 755 513 242 618 137 279 476
San Mateo 2015 ESL 2329 1144 1185 1897 432 1497 832
Santa Barbara 2015 ESL 4249 3232 1017 3899 350 912 3337
Santa Clarita 2015 ESL 2449 1383 1066 1811 638 1010 1439
Santa Monica 2015 ESL 3525 1709 1816 2814 711 2057 1468
Sequoias 2015 ESL 567 412 155 550 17 72 495
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2015 ESL 1395 348 1047 640 755 748 647
Sierra 2015 ESL 954 286 668 414 540 633 321
Siskiyous 2015 ESL 2029 1158 871 1545 484 763 1266
Solano 2015 ESL 480 135 345 383 97 404 76
Sonoma 2015 ESL 5224 3482 1742 4157 1067 1511 3713
South Orange 2015 ESL 2723 485 2238 1374 1349 769 1954
Southwestern 2015 ESL 1504 782 722 1115 389 1261 243
State Center 2015 ESL 2393 1356 1037 1857 536 1983 410
Ventura 2015 ESL 688 351 337 449 239 397 291
Victor Valley 2015 ESL 891 473 418 732 159 520 371
West Hills 2015 ESL 1442 921 521 1164 278 1129 313
West Kern 2015 ESL 308 210 98 249 59 175 133
West Valley-Mission 2015 ESL 1676 314 1362 1290 386 691 985
Yosemite 2015 ESL 1235 767 468 987 248 386 849
Yuba 2015 ESL 700 356 344 551 149 317 383
Allan Hancock 2015 Non-ESL 20775 10280 10495 12825 7950 15524 5251
Antelope Valley 2015 Non-ESL 17869 8096 9773 13701 4168 15751 2118
Barstow 2015 Non-ESL 5144 1920 3224 3475 1669 4196 948
Butte 2015 Non-ESL 16440 3078 13362 6094 10346 13597 2843
Cabrillo 2015 Non-ESL 15401 5383 10018 7294 8107 9353 6048
Cerritos 2015 Non-ESL 30085 19259 10826 26748 3337 23790 6295
Chabot-Las Positas 2015 Non-ESL 27477 9140 18337 19881 7596 24377 3100
Chaffey 2015 Non-ESL 23992 14429 9563 19640 4352 20166 3826
Citrus 2015 Non-ESL 17055 10246 6809 13853 3202 14564 2491
Coast 2015 Non-ESL 64909 19505 45404 42916 21993 43013 21896
Compton 2015 Non-ESL 10243 5265 4978 9825 418 8857 1386
Contra Costa 2015 Non-ESL 45976 13103 32873 31392 14584 28696 17280
Copper Mountain 2015 Non-ESL 2365 634 1731 1047 1318 1914 451
Desert 2015 Non-ESL 11661 7769 3892 9090 2571 9479 2182
El Camino 2015 Non-ESL 29721 14395 15326 25521 4200 23399 6322
Feather River 2015 Non-ESL 2946 761 2185 1865 1081
Foothill-Deanza 2015 Non-ESL 59182 14451 44731 42847 16335 26260 32922
Gavilan 2015 Non-ESL 8492 4469 4023 5679 2813 4724 3768
Glendale 2015 Non-ESL 21243 6961 14282 11708 9535 15133 6110
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2015 Non-ESL 31979 10462 21517 18268 13711 26091 5888
Hartnell 2015 Non-ESL 15217 8810 6407 11798 3419 8860 6357
Imperial 2015 Non-ESL 8867 7942 925 8645 222 7875 992
Kern 2015 Non-ESL 34587 20894 13693 25388 9199 25692 8895
Lake Tahoe 2015 Non-ESL 5497 1113 4384 2033 3464 2822 2675
Lassen 2015 Non-ESL 4588 1123 3465 2555 2033 3325 1263
Long Beach 2015 Non-ESL 31410 16774 14636 26639 4771 24712 6698
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Los Angeles 2015 Non-ESL 174568 93931 80637 146439 28129 133303 41265
Los Rios 2015 Non-ESL 90471 20744 69727 55453 35018 69838 20633
Marin 2015 Non-ESL 6698 1626 5072 3142 3556 3822 2876
Mendocino-Lake 2015 Non-ESL 4690 1068 3622 1759 2931 3362 1328
Merced 2015 Non-ESL 13900 7560 6340 10285 3615 11207 2693
Mira Costa 2015 Non-ESL 22296 7072 15224 11645 10651 11534 10762
Monterey 2015 Non-ESL 13535 4244 9291 7149 6386 6341 7194
Mt. San Antonio 2015 Non-ESL 49718 28074 21644 44099 5619 27572 22146
Mt. San Jacinto 2015 Non-ESL 19638 8606 11032 13076 6562 15896 3742
Napa Valley 2015 Non-ESL 9042 3207 5835 5959 3083 5681 3361
North Orange 2015 Non-ESL 66298 27303 38995 50714 15584 42425 23873
Ohlone 2015 Non-ESL 15483 3283 12200 11463 4020 6389 9094
Palo Verde 2015 Non-ESL 5542 1802 3740 3283 2259 3136 2406
Palomar 2015 Non-ESL 32665 12219 20446 18748 13917 19884 12781
Pasadena 2015 Non-ESL 36800 16842 19958 33078 3722 24985 11815
Peralta 2015 Non-ESL 36066 7837 28229 28769 7297 25977 10089
Rancho Santiago 2015 Non-ESL 64111 30822 33289 47156 16955 32694 31417
Redwoods 2015 Non-ESL 6173 1005 5168 2445 3728 4810 1363
Rio Hondo 2015 Non-ESL 29840 19921 9919 18985 10855
Riverside 2015 Non-ESL 44298 24816 19482 34730 9568 34466 9832
San Bernardino 2015 Non-ESL 23926 13766 10160 18708 5218 19294 4632
San Diego 2015 Non-ESL 88146 28317 59829 56218 31928 56392 31754
San Francisco 2015 Non-ESL 39385 8480 30905 29194 10191 24143 15242
San Joaquin Delta 2015 Non-ESL 23082 9785 13297 17611 5471 19290 3792
San Jose-Evergreen 2015 Non-ESL 22236 9144 13092 19214 3022 15507 6729
San Luis Obispo 2015 Non-ESL 12034 3411 8623 4840 7194 8285 3749
San Mateo 2015 Non-ESL 30432 9928 20504 22508 7924 18073 12359
Santa Barbara 2015 Non-ESL 25429 8221 17208 14701 10728 14684 10745
Santa Clarita 2015 Non-ESL 27391 11847 15544 17031 10360 14374 13017
Santa Monica 2015 Non-ESL 42927 14163 28764 28922 14005 24501 18426
Sequoias 2015 Non-ESL 13398 8268 5130 9905 3493 11312 2086
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2015 Non-ESL 10665 1459 9206 3180 7485 7244 3421
Sierra 2015 Non-ESL 24202 6201 18001 9950 14252 15650 8552
Siskiyous 2015 Non-ESL 3354 414 2940 1426 1928 1404 1950
Solano 2015 Non-ESL 13438 3377 10061 9152 4286 9909 3529
Sonoma 2015 Non-ESL 32580 8484 24096 13914 18666 18298 14282
South Orange 2015 Non-ESL 49515 10821 38694 23862 25653 22292 27223
Southwestern 2015 Non-ESL 25465 12203 13262 18301 7164 22932 2533
State Center 2015 Non-ESL 45539 23916 21623 33916 11623 34883 10656
Ventura 2015 Non-ESL 40773 19629 21144 25976 14797 26733 14040
Victor Valley 2015 Non-ESL 15560 7216 8344 10757 4803 12772 2788
West Hills 2015 Non-ESL 7181 3965 3216 5380 1801 5373 1808
West Kern 2015 Non-ESL 9642 5308 4334 6562 3080 5668 3974
West Valley-Mission 2015 Non-ESL 26019 5779 20240 17789 8230 12348 13671
Yosemite 2015 Non-ESL 26524 10579 15945 14763 11761 21369 5155
Yuba 2015 Non-ESL 11869 4088 7781 7193 4676 9716 2153
Allan Hancock 2016 ESL 4100 3555 545 3898 202 1448 2652
Antelope Valley 2016 ESL 940 542 398 844 96 629 311
Barstow 2016 ESL 89 51 38 71 18 41 48
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Butte 2016 ESL 633 288 345 407 226 259 374
Cabrillo 2016 ESL 2526 1230 1296 1536 990 1770 756
Cerritos 2016 ESL 2317 1734 583 2239 78 1301 1016
Chabot-Las Positas 2016 ESL 1192 445 747 962 230 1049 143
Chaffey 2016 ESL 1653 1082 571 1441 212 1175 478
Citrus 2016 ESL 2427 1557 870 2016 411 2039 388
Coast 2016 ESL 1449 311 1138 1214 235 928 521
Compton 2016 ESL 1297 760 537 1276 21 1062 235
Contra Costa 2016 ESL 1721 528 1193 1190 531 699 1022
Copper Mountain 2016 ESL 395 140 255 222 173 62 333
Desert 2016 ESL 3316 2718 598 3098 218 729 2587
El Camino 2016 ESL 1796 929 867 1582 214 1413 383
Feather River 2016 ESL 81 62 19 67 14 19 62
Foothill-Deanza 2016 ESL 701 238 463 508 193 199 502
Gavilan 2016 ESL 1188 985 203 1075 113 359 829
Glendale 2016 ESL 6145 1129 5016 2466 3679 3463 2682
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2016 ESL 386 102 284 193 193 209 177
Hartnell 2016 ESL 700 598 102 655 45 435 265
Imperial 2016 ESL 1334 1227 107 1293 41 997 337
Kern 2016 ESL 2418 1664 754 2004 414 1897 521
Lake Tahoe 2016 ESL 634 218 416 284 350 233 401
Lassen 2016 ESL 577 348 229 429 148 136 441
Long Beach 2016 ESL 2264 1617 647 2148 116 734 1530
Los Angeles 2016 ESL 27526 18749 8777 25043 2483 11115 16411
Los Rios 2016 ESL 5262 1535 3727 3823 1439 4658 604
Marin 2016 ESL 2432 1158 1274 1855 577 377 2055
Mendocino-Lake 2016 ESL 1071 584 487 723 348 589 482
Merced 2016 ESL 909 633 276 769 140 540 369
Mira Costa 2016 ESL 2765 1751 1014 2242 523 440 2325
Monterey 2016 ESL 1160 423 737 687 473 387 773
Mt. San Antonio 2016 ESL 22691 11995 10696 21552 1139 3073 19618
Mt. San Jacinto 2016 ESL 2479 543 1936 2410 69 171 2308
Napa Valley 2016 ESL 729 263 466 488 241 220 509
North Orange 2016 ESL 13430 6939 6491 12257 1173 2961 10469
Ohlone 2016 ESL 341 54 287 276 65 135 206
Palo Verde 2016 ESL 792 621 171 707 85 274 518
Palomar 2016 ESL 4792 3299 1493 4045 747 1348 3444
Pasadena 2016 ESL 4704 2233 2471 4414 290 1156 3548
Peralta 2016 ESL 2418 541 1877 2053 365 1612 806
Rancho Santiago 2016 ESL 24811 13686 11125 22557 2254 5817 18994
Redwoods 2016 ESL 652 289 363 426 226 229 423
Rio Hondo 2016 ESL 494 368 126 483 11 74 420
Riverside 2016 ESL 309 128 181 227 82 120 189
San Bernardino 2016 ESL 359 181 178 246 113 214 145
San Diego 2016 ESL 17969 8671 9298 15651 2318 5196 12773
San Francisco 2016 ESL 28657 9281 19376 26369 2288 9330 19327
San Joaquin Delta 2016 ESL 1278 586 692 1058 220 1073 205
San Jose-Evergreen 2016 ESL 1143 392 751 1012 131 710 433
San Luis Obispo 2016 ESL 1306 869 437 1002 304 450 856
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San Mateo 2016 ESL 2167 1039 1128 1744 423 1344 823
Santa Barbara 2016 ESL 1580 418 1162 1462 118 564 1016
Santa Clarita 2016 ESL 1873 1079 794 1434 439 501 1372
Santa Monica 2016 ESL 3348 1632 1716 2642 706 1905 1443
Sequoias 2016 ESL 692 498 194 656 36 111 581
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2016 ESL 1441 359 1082 673 768 691 750
Sierra 2016 ESL 863 282 581 414 449 596 267
Siskiyous 2016 ESL 1916 1194 722 1483 433 638 1278
Solano 2016 ESL 371 109 262 293 78 311 60
Sonoma 2016 ESL 5910 3900 2010 4692 1218 2073 3837
South Orange 2016 ESL 3828 963 2865 2273 1555 1023 2805
Southwestern 2016 ESL 712 437 275 605 107 455 257
State Center 2016 ESL 2347 1456 891 1912 435 1976 371
Ventura 2016 ESL 667 326 341 419 248 359 308
Victor Valley 2016 ESL 989 522 467 810 179 572 417
West Hills 2016 ESL 655 416 239 518 137 416 239
West Kern 2016 ESL 308 215 93 251 57 168 140
West Valley-Mission 2016 ESL 1568 361 1207 1222 346 650 918
Yosemite 2016 ESL 1390 806 584 1043 347 489 901
Yuba 2016 ESL 795 369 426 625 170 367 428
Allan Hancock 2016 Non-ESL 19944 9821 10123 12245 7699 14883 5061
Antelope Valley 2016 Non-ESL 17465 8455 9010 13525 3940 15383 2082
Barstow 2016 Non-ESL 4796 1937 2859 3270 1526 3876 920
Butte 2016 Non-ESL 15979 3460 12519 6290 9689 13053 2926
Cabrillo 2016 Non-ESL 14833 5456 9377 7308 7525 8918 5915
Cerritos 2016 Non-ESL 30003 20105 9898 28024 1979 23460 6543
Chabot-Las Positas 2016 Non-ESL 28771 9741 19030 21175 7596 25553 3218
Chaffey 2016 Non-ESL 26261 16343 9918 21839 4422 21929 4332
Citrus 2016 Non-ESL 17968 10966 7002 14847 3121 15129 2839
Coast 2016 Non-ESL 66098 20126 45972 44158 21940 44595 21503
Compton 2016 Non-ESL 9786 5357 4429 9383 403 8670 1116
Contra Costa 2016 Non-ESL 47172 14163 33009 32753 14419 29335 17837
Copper Mountain 2016 Non-ESL 2511 735 1776 1238 1273 2017 494
Desert 2016 Non-ESL 12463 8400 4063 9776 2687 10082 2381
El Camino 2016 Non-ESL 29222 14738 14484 25290 3932 23609 5613
Feather River 2016 Non-ESL 3257 912 2345 1706 1551 2051 1206
Foothill-Deanza 2016 Non-ESL 58945 14635 44310 42760 16185 26505 32440
Gavilan 2016 Non-ESL 10591 5181 5410 6768 3823 5249 5342
Glendale 2016 Non-ESL 21792 7231 14561 12047 9745 15709 6083
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2016 Non-ESL 31822 10562 21260 18103 13719 25875 5947
Hartnell 2016 Non-ESL 16095 9230 6865 12219 3876 9127 6968
Imperial 2016 Non-ESL 9003 8132 871 8660 343 7981 1022
Kern 2016 Non-ESL 35879 22181 13698 26714 9165 26027 9852
Lake Tahoe 2016 Non-ESL 5468 1210 4258 2200 3268 2902 2566
Lassen 2016 Non-ESL 4118 1040 3078 2307 1811 2986 1132
Long Beach 2016 Non-ESL 31676 17592 14084 27108 4568 24581 7095
Los Angeles 2016 Non-ESL 176506 96622 79884 148253 28253 134879 41627
Los Rios 2016 Non-ESL 93111 21940 71171 58356 34755 70414 22697
Marin 2016 Non-ESL 6475 1690 4785 3088 3387 3474 3001
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Mendocino-Lake 2016 Non-ESL 4726 1165 3561 1811 2915 3346 1380
Merced 2016 Non-ESL 14484 8099 6385 10884 3600 11531 2953
Mira Costa 2016 Non-ESL 22645 7601 15044 12203 10442 12158 10487
Monterey 2016 Non-ESL 12579 4240 8339 7085 5494 6213 6366
Mt. San Antonio 2016 Non-ESL 39946 22093 17853 35074 4872 27796 12150
Mt. San Jacinto 2016 Non-ESL 20519 9381 11138 13934 6585 16511 4008
Napa Valley 2016 Non-ESL 8929 3305 5624 5964 2965 5523 3406
North Orange 2016 Non-ESL 66206 28162 38044 51328 14878 42533 23673
Ohlone 2016 Non-ESL 14889 3238 11651 11605 3284 6358 8531
Palo Verde 2016 Non-ESL 6858 2178 4680 3879 2979 3823 3035
Palomar 2016 Non-ESL 30994 12206 18788 18365 12629 19331 11663
Pasadena 2016 Non-ESL 36738 17242 19496 31235 5503 25282 11456
Peralta 2016 Non-ESL 35374 7983 27391 28508 6866 26410 8964
Rancho Santiago 2016 Non-ESL 67535 30110 37425 52212 15323 32365 35170
Redwoods 2016 Non-ESL 6701 1178 5523 2711 3990 4840 1861
Rio Hondo 2016 Non-ESL 29164 20136 9028 26018 3146 19031 10133
Riverside 2016 Non-ESL 46055 26735 19320 36306 9749 35627 10428
San Bernardino 2016 Non-ESL 24167 14141 10026 19001 5166 19549 4618
San Diego 2016 Non-ESL 88762 29187 59575 56840 31922 56131 32631
San Francisco 2016 Non-ESL 37131 8533 28598 27757 9374 22974 14157
San Joaquin Delta 2016 Non-ESL 23123 10147 12976 17701 5422 19235 3888
San Jose-Evergreen 2016 Non-ESL 21733 9194 12539 19051 2682 15116 6617
San Luis Obispo 2016 Non-ESL 11574 3150 8424 4572 7002 8251 3323
San Mateo 2016 Non-ESL 28981 9611 19370 21721 7260 16636 12345
Santa Barbara 2016 Non-ESL 22675 7694 14981 13474 9201 16732 5943
Santa Clarita 2016 Non-ESL 27834 12803 15031 17860 9974 15366 12468
Santa Monica 2016 Non-ESL 43168 14567 28601 29003 14165 24805 18363
Sequoias 2016 Non-ESL 13810 8780 5030 10430 3380 11612 2198
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2016 Non-ESL 10889 1588 9301 3363 7526 7076 3813
Sierra 2016 Non-ESL 24126 6237 17889 10107 14019 15299 8827
Siskiyous 2016 Non-ESL 3385 466 2919 1504 1881 1403 1982
Solano 2016 Non-ESL 13192 3564 9628 9150 4042 9931 3261
Sonoma 2016 Non-ESL 32607 8530 24077 14496 18111 17675 14932
South Orange 2016 Non-ESL 49237 10823 38414 23861 25376 22783 26454
Southwestern 2016 Non-ESL 26102 16648 9454 22785 3317 22184 3918
State Center 2016 Non-ESL 44920 24442 20478 33964 10956 35197 9723
Ventura 2016 Non-ESL 41332 20286 21046 26394 14938 27236 14096
Victor Valley 2016 Non-ESL 15574 7642 7932 11086 4488 12856 2718
West Hills 2016 Non-ESL 8382 4946 3436 6407 1975 6252 2130
West Kern 2016 Non-ESL 8981 5025 3956 6308 2673 5274 3707
West Valley-Mission 2016 Non-ESL 26648 6152 20496 18816 7832 12321 14327
Yosemite 2016 Non-ESL 26698 11271 15427 15073 11625 22961 3737
Yuba 2016 Non-ESL 12478 4568 7910 7773 4705 10010 2468
Allan Hancock 2017 ESL 4101 3530 571 3766 335 1485 2616
Antelope Valley 2017 ESL 640 425 215 577 63 285 355
Barstow 2017 ESL 39 21 18 20 19
Butte 2017 ESL 642 285 357 389 253 264 378
Cabrillo 2017 ESL 2483 1244 1239 1525 958 1694 789
Cerritos 2017 ESL 2457 1910 547 2407 50 1349 1108
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Chabot-Las Positas 2017 ESL 1325 489 836 1067 258 1137 188
Chaffey 2017 ESL 1696 1044 652 1454 242 1213 483
Citrus 2017 ESL 2048 1239 809 1702 346 1609 439
Coast 2017 ESL 2153 420 1733 1613 540 1168 985
Compton 2017 ESL 1234 750 484 1218 16 1022 212
Contra Costa 2017 ESL 1378 418 960 950 428 593 785
Copper Mountain 2017 ESL 364 132 232 222 142 62 302
Desert 2017 ESL 3556 2898 658 3309 247 874 2682
El Camino 2017 ESL 2039 1067 972 1793 246 1531 508
Feather River 2017 ESL 18
Foothill-Deanza 2017 ESL 694 212 482 518 176 167 527
Gavilan 2017 ESL 1461 1252 209 1341 120 380 1081
Glendale 2017 ESL 6656 1154 5502 2540 4116 2774 3882
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2017 ESL 456 129 327 246 210 218 238
Hartnell 2017 ESL 532 459 73 497 35 353 179
Imperial 2017 ESL 1476 1377 99 1433 43 1029 447
Kern 2017 ESL 2557 1785 772 2148 409 2015 542
Lake Tahoe 2017 ESL 550 176 374 225 325 156 394
Lassen 2017 ESL 248 103 145 156 92 93 155
Long Beach 2017 ESL 2260 1574 686 2140 120 632 1628
Los Angeles 2017 ESL 28081 19382 8699 25580 2501 10005 18076
Los Rios 2017 ESL 5040 1523 3517 3595 1445 4417 623
Marin 2017 ESL 2605 1233 1372 2015 590 353 2252
Mendocino-Lake 2017 ESL 815 478 337 573 242 347 468
Merced 2017 ESL 1204 879 325 1073 131 638 566
Mira Costa 2017 ESL 3182 2002 1180 2617 565 496 2686
Monterey 2017 ESL 1117 422 695 675 442 336 781
Mt. San Antonio 2017 ESL 24972 12311 12661 23647 1325 3352 21620
Mt. San Jacinto 2017 ESL 2352 382 1970 2280 72 143 2209
Napa Valley 2017 ESL 648 240 408 453 195 212 436
North Orange 2017 ESL 12360 6357 6003 11245 1115 2736 9624
Ohlone 2017 ESL 430 77 353 351 79 163 267
Palo Verde 2017 ESL 877 698 179 778 99 302 575
Palomar 2017 ESL 5425 3315 2110 4482 943 1648 3777
Pasadena 2017 ESL 5218 2231 2987 4805 413 1392 3826
Peralta 2017 ESL 1853 419 1434 1612 241 1421 432
Rancho Santiago 2017 ESL 22851 9650 13201 21265 1586 5510 17341
Redwoods 2017 ESL 674 234 440 388 286 282 392
Rio Hondo 2017 ESL 836 666 170 755 81 296 540
Riverside 2017 ESL 310 148 162 237 73 151 159
San Bernardino 2017 ESL 620 333 287 455 165 433 187
San Diego 2017 ESL 17105 8267 8838 14911 2194 4881 12224
San Francisco 2017 ESL 26831 8823 18008 24647 2184 7130 19701
San Joaquin Delta 2017 ESL 1260 574 686 1022 238 1033 227
San Jose-Evergreen 2017 ESL 1066 314 752 951 115 667 399
San Luis Obispo 2017 ESL 1233 868 365 992 241 437 796
San Mateo 2017 ESL 1972 936 1036 1567 405 1129 843
Santa Barbara 2017 ESL 1485 366 1119 1369 116 545 940
Santa Clarita 2017 ESL 1496 842 654 1166 330 391 1105
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Santa Monica 2017 ESL 3017 1379 1638 2368 649 1723 1294
Sequoias 2017 ESL 794 547 247 761 33 122 672
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2017 ESL 1334 361 973 655 679 652 682
Sierra 2017 ESL 856 313 543 470 386 563 293
Siskiyous 2017 ESL 2855 2188 667 2423 432 621 2234
Solano 2017 ESL 396 101 295 284 112 273 123
Sonoma 2017 ESL 5937 3858 2079 4753 1184 2299 3638
South Orange 2017 ESL 5312 1670 3642 3353 1959 989 4323
Southwestern 2017 ESL 706 407 299 633 73 429 277
State Center 2017 ESL 2384 1493 891 1935 449 1909 475
Ventura 2017 ESL 724 353 371 488 236 365 359
Victor Valley 2017 ESL 1585 968 617 1324 261 1132 453
West Hills 2017 ESL 588 414 174 492 96 388 200
West Kern 2017 ESL 184 88 96 124 60 137 47
West Valley-Mission 2017 ESL 1607 312 1295 1226 381 576 1031
Yosemite 2017 ESL 1660 954 706 1258 402 519 1141
Yuba 2017 ESL 854 437 417 666 188 409 445
Allan Hancock 2017 Non-ESL 17474 9072 8402 11208 6266 13625 3849
Antelope Valley 2017 Non-ESL 17320 8795 8525 13593 3727 15237 2083
Barstow 2017 Non-ESL 5051 1787 3264 4110 941
Butte 2017 Non-ESL 15354 3745 11609 6474 8880 12334 3020
Cabrillo 2017 Non-ESL 14532 5409 9123 7288 7244 8550 5982
Cerritos 2017 Non-ESL 29731 20180 9551 28178 1553 22555 7176
Chabot-Las Positas 2017 Non-ESL 28931 9960 18971 21558 7373 25745 3186
Chaffey 2017 Non-ESL 27206 17218 9988 22939 4267 22223 4983
Citrus 2017 Non-ESL 18121 10988 7133 15108 3013 15187 2934
Coast 2017 Non-ESL 63646 19875 43771 42757 20889 42721 20925
Compton 2017 Non-ESL 10040 5703 4337 9635 405 8804 1236
Contra Costa 2017 Non-ESL 46013 14270 31743 32403 13610 28292 17721
Copper Mountain 2017 Non-ESL 2474 771 1703 1251 1223 1976 498
Desert 2017 Non-ESL 12560 8688 3872 10011 2549 10461 2099
El Camino 2017 Non-ESL 29892 15330 14562 25947 3945 23800 6092
Feather River 2017 Non-ESL 2666
Foothill-Deanza 2017 Non-ESL 59951 15195 44756 43505 16446 26097 33854
Gavilan 2017 Non-ESL 7818 4379 3439 5441 2377 4530 3288
Glendale 2017 Non-ESL 20836 7034 13802 11451 9385 14994 5842
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2017 Non-ESL 32147 10893 21254 18556 13591 25975 6172
Hartnell 2017 Non-ESL 16077 9798 6279 12267 3810 9646 6431
Imperial 2017 Non-ESL 9123 8166 957 8706 417 8131 992
Kern 2017 Non-ESL 36505 22369 14136 27471 9034 27718 8787
Lake Tahoe 2017 Non-ESL 4897 1131 3766 2063 2834 2575 2322
Lassen 2017 Non-ESL 3877 1142 2735 2283 1594 2955 922
Long Beach 2017 Non-ESL 32440 18604 13836 27878 4562 25096 7344
Los Angeles 2017 Non-ESL 174830 97117 77713 147795 27035 132605 42225
Los Rios 2017 Non-ESL 90946 22610 68336 58027 32919 68526 22420
Marin 2017 Non-ESL 6293 1794 4499 3033 3260 3308 2985
Mendocino-Lake 2017 Non-ESL 4988 1364 3624 2076 2912 3496 1492
Merced 2017 Non-ESL 14801 8381 6420 11133 3668 11644 3157
Mira Costa 2017 Non-ESL 22037 7475 14562 12047 9990 12034 10003
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Monterey 2017 Non-ESL 14059 4709 9350 8471 5588 6358 7701
Mt. San Antonio 2017 Non-ESL 40269 22383 17886 35614 4655 27800 12469
Mt. San Jacinto 2017 Non-ESL 20990 10043 10947 14676 6314 16467 4523
Napa Valley 2017 Non-ESL 8733 3304 5429 5966 2767 5302 3431
North Orange 2017 Non-ESL 65907 28070 37837 51769 14138 41475 24432
Ohlone 2017 Non-ESL 14563 3267 11296 11389 3174 6314 8249
Palo Verde 2017 Non-ESL 6118 2193 3925 3638 2480 3942 2176
Palomar 2017 Non-ESL 31137 12763 18374 18919 12218 19498 11639
Pasadena 2017 Non-ESL 37530 17998 19532 31614 5916 25891 11639
Peralta 2017 Non-ESL 31985 6766 25219 25711 6274 25208 6777
Rancho Santiago 2017 Non-ESL 68503 29714 38789 54701 13802 32350 36153
Redwoods 2017 Non-ESL 6673 1282 5391 2807 3866 4856 1817
Rio Hondo 2017 Non-ESL 28803 20465 8338 25806 2997 18721 10082
Riverside 2017 Non-ESL 48357 28722 19635 38259 10098 36984 11373
San Bernardino 2017 Non-ESL 24677 14607 10070 19667 5010 19908 4769
San Diego 2017 Non-ESL 88891 30090 58801 57475 31416 57043 31848
San Francisco 2017 Non-ESL 35421 8518 26903 26761 8660 21984 13437
San Joaquin Delta 2017 Non-ESL 22710 10020 12690 17618 5092 18684 4026
San Jose-Evergreen 2017 Non-ESL 21626 9260 12366 19016 2610 14478 7148
San Luis Obispo 2017 Non-ESL 11589 3146 8443 4608 6981 7791 3798
San Mateo 2017 Non-ESL 27965 9334 18631 21182 6783 15695 12270
Santa Barbara 2017 Non-ESL 21468 7338 14130 12798 8670 16138 5330
Santa Clarita 2017 Non-ESL 29223 13296 15927 19277 9946 16254 12969
Santa Monica 2017 Non-ESL 43056 15029 28027 29009 14047 25712 17344
Sequoias 2017 Non-ESL 14124 9246 4878 10810 3314 11822 2302
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2017 Non-ESL 10876 1687 9189 3488 7388 7139 3737
Sierra 2017 Non-ESL 23430 6026 17404 9994 13436 14594 8836
Siskiyous 2017 Non-ESL 3402 500 2902 1442 1960 1433 1969
Solano 2017 Non-ESL 12601 3587 9014 8881 3720 9406 3195
Sonoma 2017 Non-ESL 31033 8434 22599 14944 16089 16541 14492
South Orange 2017 Non-ESL 51270 11425 39845 25306 25964 23582 27688
Southwestern 2017 Non-ESL 26033 17030 9003 23222 2811 22676 3357
State Center 2017 Non-ESL 47832 26391 21441 35878 11954 36021 11811
Ventura 2017 Non-ESL 41299 20666 20633 26826 14473 27028 14271
Victor Valley 2017 Non-ESL 14988 7631 7357 10722 4266 12294 2694
West Hills 2017 Non-ESL 9159 5588 3571 7123 2036 6773 2386
West Kern 2017 Non-ESL 11850 6611 5239 8154 3696 6519 5331
West Valley-Mission 2017 Non-ESL 24272 5730 18542 17143 7129 11019 13253
Yosemite 2017 Non-ESL 27099 11949 15150 15558 11541 23317 3782
Yuba 2017 Non-ESL 12565 4893 7672 8041 4524 9742 2823
Allan Hancock 2018 ESL 4323 3715 608 3927 396 1429 2894
Antelope Valley 2018 ESL 613 389 224 557 56 260 353
Barstow 2018 ESL 36 22 14 26 10 17 19
Butte 2018 ESL 563 226 337 316 247 246 317
Cabrillo 2018 ESL 2328 1194 1134 1442 886 1515 813
Cerritos 2018 ESL 2451 1864 587 2394 57 1256 1195
Chabot-Las Positas 2018 ESL 1062 364 698 852 210 903 159
Chaffey 2018 ESL 1192 721 471 1028 164 764 428
Citrus 2018 ESL 1423 830 593 1203 220 1070 353
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Coast 2018 ESL 2201 440 1761 1747 454 1180 1021
Compton 2018 ESL 1065 683 382 1050 15 842 223
Contra Costa 2018 ESL 1348 425 923 943 405 597 751
Copper Mountain 2018 ESL 388 155 233 237 151 64 324
Desert 2018 ESL 3232 2608 624 2999 233 860 2372
El Camino 2018 ESL 1910 1006 904 1703 207 1443 467
Feather River 2018 ESL
Foothill-Deanza 2018 ESL 878 290 588 646 232 137 741
Gavilan 2018 ESL 1600 1275 325 1433 167 377 1223
Glendale 2018 ESL 6237 1025 5212 2258 3979 2503 3734
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2018 ESL 446 114 332 236 210 202 244
Hartnell 2018 ESL 399 344 55 370 29 231 168
Imperial 2018 ESL 1535 1451 84 1509 26 1104 431
Kern 2018 ESL 2740 1899 841 2265 475 2191 549
Lake Tahoe 2018 ESL 596 172 424 246 350 167 429
Lassen 2018 ESL 150 27 123 55 95 75 75
Long Beach 2018 ESL 2483 1710 773 2302 181 655 1828
Los Angeles 2018 ESL 25891 17321 8570 23275 2616 7847 18044
Los Rios 2018 ESL 5114 1521 3593 3681 1433 4375 739
Marin 2018 ESL 2360 1184 1176 1805 555 211 2149
Mendocino-Lake 2018 ESL 851 553 298 646 205 368 483
Merced 2018 ESL 1654 1284 370 1516 138 565 1089
Mira Costa 2018 ESL 2587 1633 954 2154 433 237 2350
Monterey 2018 ESL 1158 465 693 729 429 347 811
Mt. San Antonio 2018 ESL 28552 15162 13390 27236 1316 3180 25372
Mt. San Jacinto 2018 ESL 2514 399 2115 2437 77 176 2338
Napa Valley 2018 ESL 608 220 388 429 179 195 413
North Orange 2018 ESL 11471 5775 5696 10401 1070 2796 8675
Ohlone 2018 ESL 443 73 370 368 75 152 291
Palo Verde 2018 ESL 783 646 137 703 80 270 513
Palomar 2018 ESL 5614 3525 2089 4547 1067 1941 3673
Pasadena 2018 ESL 4448 1749 2699 4100 348 1175 3273
Peralta 2018 ESL 2004 435 1569 1603 401 1483 521
Rancho Santiago 2018 ESL 24908 17500 7408 22491 2417 5957 18951
Redwoods 2018 ESL 698 259 439 392 306 310 388
Rio Hondo 2018 ESL 758 583 175 688 70 217 541
Riverside 2018 ESL 348 156 192 245 103 165 183
San Bernardino 2018 ESL 563 289 274 419 144 332 231
San Diego 2018 ESL 16336 7746 8590 14197 2139 4607 11729
San Francisco 2018 ESL 29186 9629 19557 26612 2574 8761 20425
San Joaquin Delta 2018 ESL 965 432 533 762 203 778 187
San Jose-Evergreen 2018 ESL 1720 533 1187 1531 189 731 989
San Luis Obispo 2018 ESL 985 667 318 761 224 347 638
San Mateo 2018 ESL 1510 632 878 1145 365 833 677
Santa Barbara 2018 ESL 1313 329 984 1214 99 509 804
Santa Clarita 2018 ESL 1568 842 726 1187 381 450 1118
Santa Monica 2018 ESL 2789 1187 1602 2125 664 1453 1336
Sequoias 2018 ESL 729 556 173 684 45 146 583
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2018 ESL 1358 362 996 658 700 579 779
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Sierra 2018 ESL 503 207 296 298 205 237 266
Siskiyous 2018 ESL 3060 2690 370 2857 203 373 2687
Solano 2018 ESL 338 83 255 243 95 233 105
Sonoma 2018 ESL 5477 3598 1879 4424 1053 1941 3536
South Orange 2018 ESL 5681 1739 3942 3645 2036 937 4744
Southwestern 2018 ESL 893 596 297 781 112 349 544
State Center 2018 ESL 2052 1249 803 1672 380 1469 583
Ventura 2018 ESL 806 441 365 570 236 351 455
Victor Valley 2018 ESL 1654 1033 621 1373 281 1193 461
West Hills 2018 ESL 475 351 124 401 74 306 169
West Kern 2018 ESL 171 99 72 121 50 122 49
West Valley-Mission 2018 ESL 1221 295 926 986 235 410 811
Yosemite 2018 ESL 2384 1333 1051 1823 561 1107 1277
Yuba 2018 ESL 577 329 248 477 100 226 351
Allan Hancock 2018 Non-ESL 15951 8704 7247 10582 5369 12678 3273
Antelope Valley 2018 Non-ESL 17651 9302 8349 14095 3556 15480 2171
Barstow 2018 Non-ESL 4686 1781 2905 3271 1415 3868 818
Butte 2018 Non-ESL 15004 3918 11086 6506 8498 11671 3333
Cabrillo 2018 Non-ESL 14648 5707 8941 7628 7020 8460 6188
Cerritos 2018 Non-ESL 30127 20693 9434 28752 1375 22528 7599
Chabot-Las Positas 2018 Non-ESL 29042 10228 18814 22072 6970 25640 3402
Chaffey 2018 Non-ESL 28750 18624 10126 24419 4331 23260 5490
Citrus 2018 Non-ESL 18758 11547 7211 15841 2917 16215 2543
Coast 2018 Non-ESL 63207 20393 42814 43192 20015 42448 20759
Compton 2018 Non-ESL 10038 5774 4264 9612 426 8792 1246
Contra Costa 2018 Non-ESL 44885 14395 30490 31743 13142 28609 16276
Copper Mountain 2018 Non-ESL 2601 861 1740 1397 1204 2062 539
Desert 2018 Non-ESL 13274 9377 3897 10764 2510 11230 2044
El Camino 2018 Non-ESL 30010 15545 14465 25986 4024 23784 6226
Feather River 2018 Non-ESL
Foothill-Deanza 2018 Non-ESL 58262 14801 43461 42282 15980 24573 33689
Gavilan 2018 Non-ESL 7803 4369 3434 5452 2351 4476 3327
Glendale 2018 Non-ESL 19949 6538 13411 10701 9248 14284 5665
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2018 Non-ESL 31656 11009 20647 18582 13074 25379 6277
Hartnell 2018 Non-ESL 16911 9891 7020 12575 4336 9743 7168
Imperial 2018 Non-ESL 9341 8420 921 8904 437 8274 1067
Kern 2018 Non-ESL 37556 22322 15234 28153 9403 29074 8482
Lake Tahoe 2018 Non-ESL 5947 1374 4573 2769 3178 2847 3100
Lassen 2018 Non-ESL 4294 1428 2866 2754 1540 3351 943
Long Beach 2018 Non-ESL 32016 18540 13476 27604 4412 24803 7213
Los Angeles 2018 Non-ESL 173604 94741 78863 146400 27204 124332 49272
Los Rios 2018 Non-ESL 90789 23665 67124 58671 32118 66788 24001
Marin 2018 Non-ESL 6179 1814 4365 3035 3144 3191 2988
Mendocino-Lake 2018 Non-ESL 4761 1327 3434 1959 2802 3318 1443
Merced 2018 Non-ESL 15263 8559 6704 11926 3337 11538 3725
Mira Costa 2018 Non-ESL 21974 7842 14132 12408 9566 12060 9914
Monterey 2018 Non-ESL 11623 4509 7114 6977 4646 6151 5472
Mt. San Antonio 2018 Non-ESL 40345 23267 17078 35813 4532 28314 12031
Mt. San Jacinto 2018 Non-ESL 21327 10440 10887 15229 6098 16550 4777
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Napa Valley 2018 Non-ESL 8387 3342 5045 5831 2556 5132 3255
North Orange 2018 Non-ESL 63231 27263 35968 50516 12715 39496 23735
Ohlone 2018 Non-ESL 13249 3054 10195 10647 2602 5897 7352
Palo Verde 2018 Non-ESL 6475 2369 4106 3908 2567 4132 2343
Palomar 2018 Non-ESL 30526 12842 17684 18748 11778 19497 11029
Pasadena 2018 Non-ESL 37003 17992 19011 31188 5815 26512 10491
Peralta 2018 Non-ESL 29940 7150 22790 23993 5947 23786 6154
Rancho Santiago 2018 Non-ESL 64852 33028 31824 49980 14872 33386 31466
Redwoods 2018 Non-ESL 6193 1297 4896 2746 3447 4638 1555
Rio Hondo 2018 Non-ESL 29875 20777 9098 27125 2750 19219 10656
Riverside 2018 Non-ESL 49533 30061 19472 39600 9933 37956 11577
San Bernardino 2018 Non-ESL 26572 16022 10550 21374 5198 21221 5351
San Diego 2018 Non-ESL 87241 29682 57559 56576 30665 55221 32020
San Francisco 2018 Non-ESL 39071 9246 29825 28878 10193 22651 16420
San Joaquin Delta 2018 Non-ESL 22617 10452 12165 17837 4780 18486 4131
San Jose-Evergreen 2018 Non-ESL 22763 10069 12694 20213 2550 14703 8060
San Luis Obispo 2018 Non-ESL 12054 3399 8655 4902 7152 7841 4213
San Mateo 2018 Non-ESL 27404 9119 18285 20888 6516 15039 12365
Santa Barbara 2018 Non-ESL 20512 7154 13358 12341 8171 15502 5010
Santa Clarita 2018 Non-ESL 29564 13712 15852 20058 9506 15989 13575
Santa Monica 2018 Non-ESL 42250 14917 27333 28595 13655 25587 16663
Sequoias 2018 Non-ESL 14271 9657 4614 11122 3149 11979 2292
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2018 Non-ESL 12246 2069 10177 4101 8145 7391 4855
Sierra 2018 Non-ESL 24255 6300 17955 10614 13641 15035 9220
Siskiyous 2018 Non-ESL 3291 485 2806 1316 1975 1625 1666
Solano 2018 Non-ESL 12338 3637 8701 8834 3504 9200 3138
Sonoma 2018 Non-ESL 32419 8997 23422 16457 15962 16850 15569
South Orange 2018 Non-ESL 50038 11289 38749 24999 25039 23125 26913
Southwestern 2018 Non-ESL 26213 17250 8963 22917 3296 20836 5377
State Center 2018 Non-ESL 49971 28593 21378 38153 11818 37361 12610
Ventura 2018 Non-ESL 41185 21007 20178 26942 14243 26799 14386
Victor Valley 2018 Non-ESL 14857 7880 6977 10844 4013 12095 2762
West Hills 2018 Non-ESL 9048 5811 3237 7196 1852 6799 2249
West Kern 2018 Non-ESL 11745 6796 4949 8254 3491 6657 5088
West Valley-Mission 2018 Non-ESL 23406 5713 17693 16689 6717 10317 13089
Yosemite 2018 Non-ESL 26334 12100 14234 15447 10887 22335 3999
Yuba 2018 Non-ESL 11500 4615 6885 7418 4082 9439 2061
Allan Hancock 2019 ESL 3761 3146 615 3409 352 1185 2576
Antelope Valley 2019 ESL 614 428 186 555 59 240 374
Barstow 2019 ESL 57 36 21 44 13 22 35
Butte 2019 ESL 710 241 469 447 263 248 462
Cabrillo 2019 ESL 3881 1980 1901 2428 1453 2484 1397
Cerritos 2019 ESL 2302 1720 582 2163 139 1072 1230
Chabot-Las Positas 2019 ESL 1118 383 735 914 204 925 193
Chaffey 2019 ESL 948 543 405 828 120 529 419
Citrus 2019 ESL 1364 757 607 1153 211 930 434
Coast 2019 ESL 2707 494 2213 2219 488 976 1731
Compton 2019 ESL 653 403 250 638 15 531 122
Contra Costa 2019 ESL 1389 450 939 957 432 602 787
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Copper Mountain 2019 ESL 354 146 208 219 135 125 229
Desert 2019 ESL 3014 2473 541 2838 176 687 2327
El Camino 2019 ESL 1528 800 728 1344 184 1085 443
Feather River 2019 ESL 11
Foothill-Deanza 2019 ESL 2343 785 1558 1767 576 430 1913
Gavilan 2019 ESL 1443 1127 316 1298 145 225 1218
Glendale 2019 ESL 5996 1027 4969 2158 3838 2673 3323
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2019 ESL 538 170 368 304 234 228 310
Hartnell 2019 ESL 627 555 72 596 31 253 374
Imperial 2019 ESL 1351 1277 74 1319 32 1033 318
Kern 2019 ESL 2226 1611 615 1907 319 1610 616
Lake Tahoe 2019 ESL 664 188 476 276 388 187 477
Lassen 2019 ESL 150 35 115 72 78 95 55
Long Beach 2019 ESL 2401 1631 770 2207 194 609 1792
Los Angeles 2019 ESL 23246 15747 7499 20558 2688 5535 17711
Los Rios 2019 ESL 3531 903 2628 2413 1118 2934 597
Marin 2019 ESL 2400 1283 1117 1883 517 228 2172
Mendocino-Lake 2019 ESL 998 618 380 742 256 481 517
Merced 2019 ESL 1623 1327 296 1524 99 435 1188
Mira Costa 2019 ESL 2669 1654 1015 2195 474 246 2423
Monterey 2019 ESL 1073 419 654 656 417 330 743
Mt. San Antonio 2019 ESL 30442 14720 15722 29127 1315 3738 26704
Mt. San Jacinto 2019 ESL 2384 324 2060 2279 105 157 2227
Napa Valley 2019 ESL 709 241 468 518 191 257 452
North Orange 2019 ESL 10020 5272 4748 9156 864 2448 7572
Ohlone 2019 ESL 464 80 384 371 93 147 317
Palo Verde 2019 ESL 335 199 136 265 70 236 99
Palomar 2019 ESL 5804 3592 2212 4614 1190 2096 3708
Pasadena 2019 ESL 3665 1280 2385 3355 310 695 2970
Peralta 2019 ESL 2160 573 1587 1777 383 1398 762
Rancho Santiago 2019 ESL 19608 13737 5871 17630 1978 4389 15219
Redwoods 2019 ESL 738 264 474 424 314 365 373
Rio Hondo 2019 ESL 764 577 187 710 54 172 592
Riverside 2019 ESL 500 226 274 352 148 227 273
San Bernardino 2019 ESL 569 319 250 453 116 266 303
San Diego 2019 ESL 14946 7353 7593 13121 1825 4101 10845
San Francisco 2019 ESL 26236 8894 17342 24091 2145 6657 19579
San Joaquin Delta 2019 ESL 661 307 354 534 127 502 159
San Jose-Evergreen 2019 ESL 2032 597 1435 1820 212 818 1214
San Luis Obispo 2019 ESL 1059 666 393 759 300 331 728
San Mateo 2019 ESL 899 320 579 683 216 434 465
Santa Barbara 2019 ESL 1315 333 982 1219 96 512 803
Santa Clarita 2019 ESL 1695 934 761 1274 421 468 1227
Santa Monica 2019 ESL 1763 500 1263 1191 572 577 1186
Sequoias 2019 ESL 651 534 117 612 39 126 525
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2019 ESL 1060 267 793 573 487 489 571
Sierra 2019 ESL 336 123 213 207 129 100 236
Siskiyous 2019 ESL 2349 2261 88 2317 32 75 2274
Solano 2019 ESL 275 91 184 204 71 176 99
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Sonoma 2019 ESL 4878 3304 1574 4005 873 1711 3167
South Orange 2019 ESL 5850 1494 4356 3956 1894 990 4860
Southwestern 2019 ESL 1280 824 456 1094 186 449 831
State Center 2019 ESL 1605 990 615 1326 279 1003 602
Ventura 2019 ESL 901 483 418 627 274 369 532
Victor Valley 2019 ESL 1444 899 545 1219 225 1016 428
West Hills 2019 ESL 653 505 148 579 74 339 314
West Kern 2019 ESL 126 63 63 96 30 80 46
West Valley-Mission 2019 ESL 1203 218 985 985 218 271 932
Yosemite 2019 ESL 2618 1496 1122 2006 612 1006 1612
Yuba 2019 ESL 706 433 273 622 84 246 460
Allan Hancock 2019 Non-ESL 14545 8389 6156 10222 4323 11877 2668
Antelope Valley 2019 Non-ESL 17674 9754 7920 14455 3219 15542 2132
Barstow 2019 Non-ESL 4693 1921 2772 3396 1297 3882 811
Butte 2019 Non-ESL 14345 3865 10480 6441 7904 11008 3337
Cabrillo 2019 Non-ESL 12070 4884 7186 6415 5655 7044 5026
Cerritos 2019 Non-ESL 30150 20429 9721 27625 2525 22109 8041
Chabot-Las Positas 2019 Non-ESL 28485 10255 18230 21976 6509 25249 3236
Chaffey 2019 Non-ESL 28706 18777 9929 24517 4189 23377 5329
Citrus 2019 Non-ESL 18293 11641 6652 15656 2637 15266 3027
Coast 2019 Non-ESL 61391 20358 41033 42551 18840 40858 20533
Compton 2019 Non-ESL 9467 5501 3966 9039 428 8276 1191
Contra Costa 2019 Non-ESL 44583 14857 29726 32034 12549 27394 17189
Copper Mountain 2019 Non-ESL 2264 836 1428 1284 980 1915 349
Desert 2019 Non-ESL 13556 9731 3825 11156 2400 11655 1901
El Camino 2019 Non-ESL 29739 15565 14174 25928 3811 23114 6625
Feather River 2019 Non-ESL 3330
Foothill-Deanza 2019 Non-ESL 53577 13739 39838 39284 14293 22690 30887
Gavilan 2019 Non-ESL 8390 4643 3747 5935 2455 4655 3735
Glendale 2019 Non-ESL 18759 5972 12787 9838 8921 13473 5286
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2019 Non-ESL 30140 10642 19498 17850 12290 24054 6086
Hartnell 2019 Non-ESL 16764 10004 6760 12576 4188 9624 7140
Imperial 2019 Non-ESL 9385 8539 846 8958 427 8421 964
Kern 2019 Non-ESL 39307 24210 15097 30140 9167 30908 8399
Lake Tahoe 2019 Non-ESL 6498 1608 4890 3121 3377 3091 3407
Lassen 2019 Non-ESL 4706 1624 3082 3070 1636 3800 906
Long Beach 2019 Non-ESL 32232 18815 13417 27855 4377 24881 7351
Los Angeles 2019 Non-ESL 167499 93102 74397 141502 25997 123168 44331
Los Rios 2019 Non-ESL 91327 25251 66076 59978 31349 67432 23895
Marin 2019 Non-ESL 5953 1833 4120 2989 2964 3047 2906
Mendocino-Lake 2019 Non-ESL 4579 1343 3236 1961 2618 3119 1460
Merced 2019 Non-ESL 15176 8127 7049 12069 3107 11656 3520
Mira Costa 2019 Non-ESL 20761 7688 13073 12016 8745 11428 9333
Monterey 2019 Non-ESL 11223 4696 6527 7185 4038 6297 4926
Mt. San Antonio 2019 Non-ESL 38902 22801 16101 34708 4194 26825 12077
Mt. San Jacinto 2019 Non-ESL 21569 10774 10795 15669 5900 16603 4966
Napa Valley 2019 Non-ESL 7468 3013 4455 5182 2286 4486 2982
North Orange 2019 Non-ESL 61963 26308 35655 50127 11836 37889 24074
Ohlone 2019 Non-ESL 13831 3283 10548 10931 2900 5668 8163
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Palo Verde 2019 Non-ESL 6215 2278 3937 3764 2451 3901 2314
Palomar 2019 Non-ESL 29722 12956 16766 18757 10965 19010 10712
Pasadena 2019 Non-ESL 36665 17791 18874 31059 5606 26609 10056
Peralta 2019 Non-ESL 28257 7087 21170 22703 5554 22691 5566
Rancho Santiago 2019 Non-ESL 69928 36160 33768 54624 15304 34701 35227
Redwoods 2019 Non-ESL 6236 1366 4870 2777 3459 4645 1591
Rio Hondo 2019 Non-ESL 29957 20902 9055 27266 2691 19541 10416
Riverside 2019 Non-ESL 50210 30949 19261 40537 9673 38448 11762
San Bernardino 2019 Non-ESL 26809 16356 10453 21639 5170 21278 5531
San Diego 2019 Non-ESL 84333 28891 55442 55024 29309 52630 31703
San Francisco 2019 Non-ESL 41003 9854 31149 30818 10185 23769 17234
San Joaquin Delta 2019 Non-ESL 22912 10818 12094 18355 4557 18618 4294
San Jose-Evergreen 2019 Non-ESL 22659 9606 13053 20586 2073 14601 8058
San Luis Obispo 2019 Non-ESL 12376 3601 8775 5247 7129 7853 4523
San Mateo 2019 Non-ESL 26409 8940 17469 20278 6131 14440 11969
Santa Barbara 2019 Non-ESL 19727 6968 12759 12034 7693 14941 4786
Santa Clarita 2019 Non-ESL 31315 14492 16823 21452 9863 15950 15365
Santa Monica 2019 Non-ESL 41869 15103 26766 28892 12977 25674 16195
Sequoias 2019 Non-ESL 14400 9789 4611 11283 3117 12022 2378
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2019 Non-ESL 9685 1597 8088 3294 6391 7298 2387
Sierra 2019 Non-ESL 24183 6356 17827 10808 13375 14897 9286
Siskiyous 2019 Non-ESL 2940 425 2515 1104 1836 1735 1205
Solano 2019 Non-ESL 12273 3783 8490 8918 3355 9104 3169
Sonoma 2019 Non-ESL 31547 9163 22384 16967 14580 16351 15196
South Orange 2019 Non-ESL 49039 11092 37947 25211 23828 22310 26729
Southwestern 2019 Non-ESL 26492 16975 9517 22692 3800 20423 6069
State Center 2019 Non-ESL 49814 28774 21040 38388 11426 38453 11361
Ventura 2019 Non-ESL 40480 21089 19391 26977 13503 26433 14047
Victor Valley 2019 Non-ESL 14625 8004 6621 10899 3726 11847 2778
West Hills 2019 Non-ESL 9717 6299 3418 7818 1899 7111 2606
West Kern 2019 Non-ESL 11547 6821 4726 8232 3315 6513 5034
West Valley-Mission 2019 Non-ESL 23611 5880 17731 17238 6373 10226 13385
Yosemite 2019 Non-ESL 26737 12594 14143 15932 10805 21584 5153
Yuba 2019 Non-ESL 11113 4552 6561 7318 3795 9180 1933
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Allan Hancock 2015 ESL -0.3009 -0.2605 -0.3859 -0.1862 -0.7938 0.8058 -0.9405 0.4198 -0.3649
Antelope Valley 2015 ESL -0.5772 -1.5701 0.6054 -0.5988 -0.4001 0.9372 -2.0153 0.1705 -0.7722
Barstow 2015 ESL 1.2206 0.6470 1.6425 0.8351 1.5512 1.6123 0.7341 0.7071 0.7071
Butte 2015 ESL -1.5901 -0.1569 -1.5624 -0.6197 -1.8352 0.2828 -1.5876 1.2122 -1.4462
Cabrillo 2015 ESL -0.3669 -0.6539 0.0000 -0.5252 -0.0399 -0.2864 -0.4040 -0.3233 -0.3491
Cerritos 2015 ESL 0.8959 -0.3530 1.9411 -0.0949 1.3351 0.9958 -0.7466 1.3839 0.4593
Chabot-Las Positas 2015 ESL -0.5040 -0.1158 -0.7638 -0.5860 -0.1410 0.0566 -1.4858 -1.8794 0.6544
Chaffey 2015 ESL 1.2034 1.2071 1.1601 1.2167 1.1104 1.2424 0.5906 0.9758 1.2167
Citrus 2015 ESL 0.9315 0.9197 0.9511 0.8381 1.2409 1.0252 -1.1614 0.6211 0.9419
Coast 2015 ESL -1.0607 -1.5491 -0.9712 -0.9523 -1.0652 -0.5380 -0.8881 -0.2747 -1.1006
Compton 2015 ESL 1.0342 0.8423 1.2332 1.0865 1.4193 0.9571 1.4045 0.4005 1.0984
Contra Costa 2015 ESL 0.1791 -0.6468 0.7401 0.0150 0.5564 1.4750 -0.7702 -0.8500 0.5415
Copper Mountain 2015 ESL -1.3884 -1.6846 -0.4394 -1.7482 -0.3360 -1.1637 0.0890
Desert 2015 ESL -0.7922 -0.7596 -0.9054 -0.8715 0.2708 -0.4348 -0.9878 -0.2323 -0.8088
El Camino 2015 ESL 0.6322 0.4978 0.8532 0.6047 0.8677 0.6497 -0.2697 -1.2434 0.7257
Feather River 2015 ESL 1.6543 0.7071 0.7071 0.7071 0.7071
Foothill-Deanza 2015 ESL -0.7082 -0.6244 -0.7443 -0.6919 -0.7560 -0.4953 -0.7436 -0.6610 -0.7143
Gavilan 2015 ESL -1.2303 -1.1320 -1.0757 -1.2326 -0.8637 0.5568 -1.3231 0.3641 -1.2985
Glendale 2015 ESL -0.3296 0.3990 -0.5595 -0.2353 -0.3368 0.1647 -0.5675 -1.6460 -0.1629
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2015 ESL 1.2593 -0.2882 1.7402 -0.2509 1.9539 2.0108 -0.5019 2.0221 0.2166
Hartnell 2015 ESL 1.1279 1.2251 0.6256 1.0914 1.4486 1.4549 0.2578 -1.2677 1.2425
Imperial 2015 ESL -0.2615 -0.3387 1.3451 -0.2240 -1.1400 0.2620 -1.6688 0.1334 -0.4174
Kern 2015 ESL 0.0615 -0.0156 0.2266 0.0489 0.1164 0.2834 -1.6805 0.5765 -0.0082
Lake Tahoe 2015 ESL 0.6434 1.8861 -0.8699 1.7432 -0.9536 1.8439 -1.2703 0.6911 0.5089
Lassen 2015 ESL 1.3638 1.3205 1.4621 1.4335 0.7502 1.7174 1.2731 1.4995
Long Beach 2015 ESL -0.8364 -1.7456 0.9369 -0.8595 -0.7036 1.9013 -1.6323 1.8323 -1.4173
Los Angeles 2015 ESL 0.3970 0.4670 0.1086 0.4528 -1.4329 1.0228 -1.7346 0.9549 0.3047
Los Rios 2015 ESL 0.5975 0.3463 0.7361 0.5586 0.7204 0.6608 -1.0271 0.6120 0.5934
Marin 2015 ESL 1.2835 0.6047 0.6763 1.5503 -0.9685 1.2464 0.4443 1.0553 1.2416
Mendocino-Lake 2015 ESL 0.0372 -0.5103 0.5180 -0.3163 0.5858 0.4189 -0.9899 0.7428 -0.0018
Merced 2015 ESL -0.9509 -1.0762 0.2503 -1.0037 0.7706 0.5442 -1.1003 -0.5900 -0.9616
Mira Costa 2015 ESL -0.1686 0.1209 -0.6395 -0.3165 0.4401 1.2576 -1.2921 0.8839 -0.3237
Monterey 2015 ESL -0.0683 -0.3841 0.2084 -0.1568 0.0578 0.4254 -0.5994 -0.0535 -0.0688
Mt. San Antonio 2015 ESL -1.6100 -1.5416 -1.6259 -1.6037 -1.7464 -0.0380 -1.6892 -0.4254 -1.6174
Mt. San Jacinto 2015 ESL -1.9694 0.1749 -1.9935 -1.9654 0.6173 -0.2728 -1.9895 -1.6426 -1.9730
Napa Valley 2015 ESL 0.8681 0.8863 0.8121 0.8671 0.6680 0.7503 0.8353 0.6455 0.8729
North Orange 2015 ESL 1.1632 1.1161 1.2010 1.1668 1.1177 0.8608 1.2165 1.4093 1.1489
Ohlone 2015 ESL 1.2972 -0.0564 1.4684 1.3358 0.9804 1.1153 1.1913 1.5555 1.2194
Palo Verde 2015 ESL 0.3479 0.2901 0.6523 0.3312 0.6047 0.2281 0.3690 0.0604 0.3599
Palomar 2015 ESL -1.6643 -1.7343 -1.5248 -1.6788 -1.5439 -1.4845 -1.7741 1.0362 -1.6587
Pasadena 2015 ESL 0.3331 0.5760 -0.1184 0.4206 -1.0126 0.2740 0.3630 0.0701 0.3479
Peralta 2015 ESL 0.8563 0.2716 1.1217 1.1774 -1.1507 1.5949 0.1871 -0.5362 0.9334
Rancho Santiago 2015 ESL 1.5859 1.5615 -0.0205 1.5416 1.6160 1.1043 1.6915 1.2354 1.5947
Redwoods 2015 ESL 0.4224 1.5652 -1.1495 1.5350 -0.9981 -0.9334 1.1411 1.3908 -0.0492
Rio Hondo 2015 ESL -1.3379 -1.0728 -1.7947 -1.4281 -1.0095 -1.3611 -1.2768
Riverside 2015 ESL 0.6013 1.2372 -0.2238 0.7248 0.0881 1.5206 -0.6015 0.6228 0.5870
San Bernardino 2015 ESL -0.8547 -0.9230 -0.7092 -0.9944 0.1902 -0.4198 -0.7079 -1.1334 -0.8007
San Diego 2015 ESL 0.7782 0.9206 0.6318 0.8214 0.3844 1.0526 0.6498 0.6424 0.7876
San Francisco 2015 ESL 1.3457 1.0641 1.4390 1.4147 0.7215 1.3150 1.2228 0.3600 1.4175
San Joaquin Delta 2015 ESL 1.1044 0.9981 1.1784 1.0821 1.1391 1.1792 -0.7879 1.0003 1.1082
San Jose-Evergreen 2015 ESL -0.7008 -0.8011 -0.6582 -0.6774 -0.9090 0.9730 -0.9032 -0.0603 -0.8281
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San Luis Obispo 2015 ESL -1.4730 -1.4356 -1.3340 -1.3244 -1.4568 -0.8948 -1.6764 -1.2455 -1.4964
San Mateo 2015 ESL 1.0922 1.1205 1.0510 1.1334 0.8558 1.1819 0.8193 1.2885 1.0307
Santa Barbara 2015 ESL 2.0292 2.0401 -0.1648 2.0295 2.0236 2.0203 2.0302 1.7487 2.0349
Santa Clarita 2015 ESL 1.8947 1.8537 1.9119 1.8778 1.9057 2.0122 1.4431 1.4575 1.8956
Santa Monica 2015 ESL 1.0378 1.0122 1.0899 1.0361 1.0390 1.0101 1.1221 0.9041 1.0480
Sequoias 2015 ESL -1.3646 -1.8905 -0.0861 -1.2409 -1.7700 -1.7772 -1.0025 0.1195 -1.4073
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2015 ESL 0.6974 0.4496 0.7737 0.3007 0.8335 1.2230 -0.2000 1.6958 0.6518
Sierra 2015 ESL 1.1268 0.7310 1.2572 0.6533 1.3579 1.0376 0.6442 0.9526 1.0834
Siskiyous 2015 ESL -0.5018 -1.0820 1.2002 -0.8579 1.0354 1.1318 -1.0423 -0.4476 -0.4951
Solano 2015 ESL 1.5146 1.6800 1.4033 1.6364 0.5988 1.5610 -0.7855 -0.2622 1.6201
Sonoma 2015 ESL -0.3565 -0.2243 -0.5353 -0.5467 0.1158 -1.3563 0.7163 -0.9042 -0.2011
South Orange 2015 ESL -1.6382 -1.6880 -1.5171 -1.6016 -1.5700 -1.9486 -1.5719 -1.1681 -1.4642
Southwestern 2015 ESL 1.3757 0.6549 1.8869 0.9189 1.9340 2.0259 -0.9135 1.4468 1.3372
State Center 2015 ESL 0.8082 0.4800 1.1911 0.6406 1.2469 0.8361 -0.8892 -0.4720 0.8651
Ventura 2015 ESL -0.9010 -0.7651 -1.0585 -0.8935 -0.4840 1.6630 -1.1436 1.1640 -0.9808
Victor Valley 2015 ESL -0.7981 -0.8922 -0.5588 -0.8060 -0.7442 -0.7573 -1.1205 -1.3073 -0.7765
West Hills 2015 ESL 1.9344 1.8127 1.9685 1.8802 1.9509 1.9321 1.1786 -0.4547 1.9470
West Kern 2015 ESL 1.1879 1.2164 0.8702 1.2317 0.7428 1.0775 1.2043 0.7071 -0.7071
West Valley-Mission 2015 ESL 1.1493 0.4863 1.2627 1.1927 1.0648 1.1184 0.6965 0.8247 1.3051
Yosemite 2015 ESL -1.1793 -1.0671 -1.2923 -1.1009 -1.3999 -1.0625 -1.1790 -0.7367 -1.2123
Yuba 2015 ESL -0.1658 -0.5131 0.0954 -0.5688 0.4522 0.2562 -0.8476 -0.3139 -0.1378
Allan Hancock 2015 Non-ESL 1.3219 1.5000 1.2435 1.4881 1.1865 1.3664 1.2597 1.5333 1.3100
Antelope Valley 2015 Non-ESL 1.2258 -1.2870 1.6205 -0.6222 1.1855 1.3574 -0.0445 1.8403 -0.2123
Barstow 2015 Non-ESL 1.3728 0.4996 1.0854 1.3096 1.2530 1.4893 0.9960 0.7071 0.7071
Butte 2015 Non-ESL 1.2962 -1.7631 1.4540 -1.5076 1.3521 1.2602 -1.1081 0.3508 1.2471
Cabrillo 2015 Non-ESL 1.0343 0.0566 1.1794 0.3204 1.2291 1.1998 0.6579 1.3602 1.0089
Cerritos 2015 Non-ESL -0.1677 -1.8482 1.6999 -1.7093 1.4472 1.4777 -1.3114 1.6273 -0.4477
Chabot-Las Positas 2015 Non-ESL -1.7962 -1.8179 -0.6443 -1.8372 0.9306 -1.6216 -1.2226 1.6022 -1.8915
Chaffey 2015 Non-ESL -1.7376 -1.6820 -1.3323 -1.6925 0.5345 -1.7887 -1.5964 -1.0551 -1.7490
Citrus 2015 Non-ESL -1.5933 -1.6922 -0.2585 -1.7570 1.0367 -0.4522 -0.8289 0.4146 -1.7391
Coast 2015 Non-ESL 0.7227 -1.3011 0.9031 0.0612 0.9640 0.4633 1.1355 0.9316 0.6743
Compton 2015 Non-ESL 0.6458 0.0218 1.1664 1.0834 0.1725 0.5476 1.3914 -0.3642 1.1069
Contra Costa 2015 Non-ESL 0.4812 -1.8296 1.0176 -1.3513 1.0992 0.5469 0.2038 -1.0538 0.5843
Copper Mountain 2015 Non-ESL -0.2164 -1.6843 0.5973 -1.7801 0.9901 -0.5918 0.1071
Desert 2015 Non-ESL -1.3861 -1.3490 -0.3299 -1.3064 0.4943 -1.3464 0.2943 1.2837 -1.3799
El Camino 2015 Non-ESL 0.2454 -1.3146 1.8990 -0.8099 1.2033 0.0966 0.0636 0.9479 -0.0124
Feather River 2015 Non-ESL -0.0658 -0.7071 -0.7071 -0.7071 -0.7071
Foothill-Deanza 2015 Non-ESL 0.6593 0.1059 0.7829 0.6300 0.7009 0.8082 0.4011 1.0111 0.5156
Gavilan 2015 Non-ESL 0.0120 -0.3765 0.1640 -0.3643 0.2925 0.1276 -0.0308 1.2915 -0.0693
Glendale 2015 Non-ESL 0.7845 0.6259 0.8978 0.8101 0.7073 0.6690 1.1072 1.3805 0.4951
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2015 Non-ESL 0.6422 -0.2998 0.8802 0.3518 0.7778 0.7462 -1.3464 -0.6906 0.9389
Hartnell 2015 Non-ESL -1.6639 -1.6575 -0.6027 -1.7541 -1.5159 -1.6167 -1.2240 0.8402 -1.6447
Imperial 2015 Non-ESL -0.8565 -0.9285 -0.0422 -0.6383 -1.8398 -0.8638 -0.5887 1.7077 -1.0332
Kern 2015 Non-ESL -1.3245 -1.2847 -1.0871 -1.2883 0.3790 -1.1236 0.2631 1.3129 -1.3246
Lake Tahoe 2015 Non-ESL -0.4193 -1.0112 -0.1105 -1.0155 1.1691 -0.2873 -0.4572 -0.6140 -0.4128
Lassen 2015 Non-ESL 0.9742 -0.7392 1.6922 -0.1784 1.6582 0.0643 1.4444 0.5854
Long Beach 2015 Non-ESL -1.2992 -1.6310 1.7235 -1.5169 1.6540 -0.6427 -1.8743 0.9614 -1.2483
Los Angeles 2015 Non-ESL 0.5537 -0.4756 0.9470 0.4120 0.9396 0.8437 -0.7617 1.1076 0.3741
Los Rios 2015 Non-ESL -0.4215 -1.3224 0.7589 -1.7933 1.1511 0.9876 -1.6105 -0.3703 -0.4048
Marin 2015 Non-ESL 1.4737 -1.6223 1.5292 1.6011 1.3838 1.6504 -1.5407 1.5485 1.4382
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Mendocino-Lake 2015 Non-ESL 0.1311 -1.5566 0.7417 -1.4003 0.6899 0.4942 -1.0270 1.3388 0.0567
Merced 2015 Non-ESL -1.6881 -1.7607 -0.9737 -1.4438 0.7700 -1.5879 -1.4117 -0.6865 -1.7478
Mira Costa 2015 Non-ESL 0.6475 -1.4247 1.0216 -1.1270 1.0545 -0.3118 1.1849 0.9746 0.5910
Monterey 2015 Non-ESL 0.9318 -1.2008 1.0621 -0.3073 1.3432 0.9426 0.9138 1.2294 0.9211
Mt. San Antonio 2015 Non-ESL 1.1119 1.1785 1.0029 0.9871 1.8191 -0.4341 1.2610 0.7980 1.0767
Mt. San Jacinto 2015 Non-ESL -1.7506 -1.6437 0.6578 -1.5663 0.8967 -1.8704 -1.4902 1.1521 -1.7166
Napa Valley 2015 Non-ESL 0.9884 -0.0303 1.1518 0.7130 1.1745 1.1265 0.6074 1.4112 0.9567
North Orange 2015 Non-ESL 0.9284 0.0937 1.2593 0.0338 1.2441 0.9911 0.1595 0.5468 0.9554
Ohlone 2015 Non-ESL 1.3497 0.2357 1.4216 0.6031 1.7623 0.9970 1.2575 1.1468 1.2773
Palo Verde 2015 Non-ESL -1.6294 -1.6679 -1.0872 -1.4743 -1.0700 -1.6340 0.0163 1.0204 -1.6463
Palomar 2015 Non-ESL 1.5725 -1.2118 1.5325 0.0040 1.4836 1.0956 1.7422 0.9273 1.6502
Pasadena 2015 Non-ESL -0.1458 -1.6475 1.4105 1.9737 -1.9654 -1.4005 1.0884 0.8929 -1.2313
Peralta 2015 Non-ESL 1.2284 1.0868 1.2136 1.1871 1.3649 0.8502 1.5385 0.2709 1.3169
Rancho Santiago 2015 Non-ESL -0.3239 -0.3235 -0.1457 -0.8860 1.4919 -0.1657 -0.3266 1.1144 -0.4095
Redwoods 2015 Non-ESL -0.6013 -1.8027 0.2155 -1.8990 0.3828 0.6775 -1.3276 0.3411 -0.6590
Rio Hondo 2015 Non-ESL 0.6729 -1.2039 1.2427 -0.0823 0.9455 0.6646 -0.0173
Riverside 2015 Non-ESL -1.5687 -1.5817 0.1154 -1.4741 -0.2371 -1.5252 -1.6213 0.8169 -1.5203
San Bernardino 2015 Non-ESL -1.1257 -1.1978 -0.4705 -1.1514 0.7473 -1.1924 -0.9761 1.3982 -1.1372
San Diego 2015 Non-ESL 0.5235 -0.7602 0.7597 0.2889 0.7248 0.6021 0.0615 1.5446 0.3979
San Francisco 2015 Non-ESL 0.6266 -0.8792 0.9914 0.4132 0.8170 1.2167 -0.0441 1.4412 0.2545
San Joaquin Delta 2015 Non-ESL -0.0533 -0.9953 1.4553 -0.6046 1.0526 0.7363 -1.0551 1.2300 -0.3453
San Jose-Evergreen 2015 Non-ESL 0.1666 -0.9808 1.1216 -0.6009 1.4831 1.5568 -1.0217 1.4336 -0.7418
San Luis Obispo 2015 Non-ESL 0.0265 0.0105 0.0511 -0.3281 0.9965 1.2899 -0.5657 1.9506 -0.5576
San Mateo 2015 Non-ESL 1.4178 1.4413 1.4073 1.3960 1.4440 1.5575 0.6073 1.0339 1.4350
Santa Barbara 2015 Non-ESL 1.6435 1.6235 1.6475 1.7169 1.5600 -0.6722 1.9868 1.4503 1.6685
Santa Clarita 2015 Non-ESL -1.2518 -1.5853 -0.3264 -1.3928 1.1280 -1.8273 -0.5177 0.4151 -1.2597
Santa Monica 2015 Non-ESL 0.6464 -1.7454 1.0801 -0.0245 0.6170 -1.5438 1.1365 1.1316 -0.5402
Sequoias 2015 Non-ESL -1.6292 -1.5457 1.3491 -1.5365 1.2889 -1.6118 -1.6426 1.3793 -1.6061
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2015 Non-ESL 0.0381 -1.0329 0.2862 -0.9344 0.4156 0.0964 0.0278 1.4976 0.0233
Sierra 2015 Non-ESL 0.6650 -0.3378 0.8887 -0.9825 1.1371 1.5594 -1.4368 1.4236 0.1638
Siskiyous 2015 Non-ESL 0.5968 -1.2962 0.8772 0.4719 0.4704 -0.9453 0.7704 -0.9393 0.6319
Solano 2015 Non-ESL 1.4227 -1.4705 1.4571 0.8664 1.2866 1.1672 1.9262 1.1885 1.4443
Sonoma 2015 Non-ESL 0.7562 -0.8937 0.8640 -1.2681 1.1328 1.4632 -0.4846 1.8471 0.4489
South Orange 2015 Non-ESL -0.1252 -1.0767 0.1907 -1.0062 0.6595 -0.8946 0.6619 -0.5013 -0.0103
Southwestern 2015 Non-ESL -1.7962 -2.0034 1.9774 -2.0102 1.9681 1.1824 -1.3781 -0.0291 -1.6767
State Center 2015 Non-ESL -1.0700 -1.2806 1.0718 -1.1605 0.4240 -1.1299 -0.4553 1.3845 -1.1181
Ventura 2015 Non-ESL 0.0136 -1.7155 0.9508 -1.3657 0.7068 0.0870 -0.1122 1.3464 -0.3708
Victor Valley 2015 Non-ESL 0.9517 -1.2586 1.4754 -0.6306 1.4099 0.8057 1.1605 1.4022 0.8377
West Hills 2015 Non-ESL -1.5509 -1.6424 -0.3390 -1.6254 -0.2451 -1.8166 -0.6973 1.1385 -1.5658
West Kern 2015 Non-ESL -0.8403 -1.0373 -0.4217 -1.0612 -0.2354 -0.7682 -0.8898 0.7071 0.7071
West Valley-Mission 2015 Non-ESL 0.9958 -0.2452 1.1041 0.4807 1.2963 1.2041 0.4784 1.0717 0.9660
Yosemite 2015 Non-ESL -0.5902 -1.5052 1.3351 -1.2236 0.9878 -0.9732 0.8997 1.3659 -1.0800
Yuba 2015 Non-ESL 0.2430 -1.6077 0.8511 -0.9568 0.8716 0.5358 -0.1402 1.1917 0.1629
Allan Hancock 2016 ESL 0.5777 0.6488 -1.3988 0.8125 -1.4560 0.5149 0.5012 1.2593 0.4995
Antelope Valley 2016 ESL 1.9319 1.5089 1.6570 1.9287 1.9417 1.5218 0.1117 1.7050 1.8951
Barstow 2016 ESL 0.6730 0.7786 0.4981 0.4593 0.4201 0.6585 0.6118 -0.7071 -0.7071
Butte 2016 ESL 0.3567 1.2351 -0.0327 0.4490 0.1441 0.5456 0.0568 0.6061 0.2670
Cabrillo 2016 ESL -0.4817 -0.5641 -0.3549 -0.5304 -0.3592 -0.1358 -0.8186 -0.8494 -0.4358
Cerritos 2016 ESL -1.0387 -0.8625 -0.2307 -0.4406 -0.5730 0.4665 -1.0532 0.4897 -1.2312
Chabot-Las Positas 2016 ESL 0.2520 0.6875 -0.1628 0.2389 0.2819 0.5606 -0.7258 -0.2449 0.3650
Chaffey 2016 ESL 0.6533 0.7575 0.3599 0.6825 0.4735 0.6261 0.9619 1.0262 0.6092
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Citrus 2016 ESL 1.2421 1.2943 1.0941 1.3065 0.9860 1.1837 -0.3212 1.1315 1.2435
Coast 2016 ESL -0.9380 -0.8790 -0.9165 -0.8019 -1.1991 -0.3377 -0.8100 -0.9665 -0.9296
Compton 2016 ESL 0.6332 0.6325 0.6216 0.4624 0.6852 0.6537 0.4636 -0.4895 0.4779
Contra Costa 2016 ESL 1.4429 0.6510 1.6092 1.1419 1.7702 0.4699 1.6710 -0.7083 1.6802
Copper Mountain 2016 ESL 1.3016 0.0118 1.6053 0.0000 1.6802 -0.4097 1.0812
Desert 2016 ESL 0.6576 0.6967 0.4848 0.6767 0.2988 0.2227 0.9189 0.5014 0.6613
El Camino 2016 ESL 0.2340 0.2643 0.1677 0.2346 0.2169 0.4184 -1.6602 0.5247 0.2066
Feather River 2016 ESL 0.2430 -0.7071 -0.7071 -0.7071 -0.7071
Foothill-Deanza 2016 ESL -0.6792 -0.6416 -0.6937 -0.6937 -0.6327 -0.4027 -0.7272 -0.8066 -0.6608
Gavilan 2016 ESL -1.0709 -1.0766 -0.7456 -1.1717 -0.2696 0.5075 -1.1613 -1.4709 -1.0052
Glendale 2016 ESL 0.3153 0.6863 0.1747 0.9748 -0.0068 1.6044 -1.2779 0.1027 0.3249
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2016 ESL -1.4633 -1.1906 -1.2375 -1.4459 -0.7402 -0.5241 -1.4768 -0.3535 -1.6627
Hartnell 2016 ESL 0.3435 0.4225 0.0463 0.3489 0.2414 0.7630 -0.2361 -0.3488 0.3740
Imperial 2016 ESL 0.2134 0.1667 0.8446 0.1785 1.0450 0.2802 -0.1863 -0.0100 0.3003
Kern 2016 ESL 0.3485 0.2954 0.4558 0.3106 0.5087 0.3640 -0.3050 0.5035 0.3251
Lake Tahoe 2016 ESL -0.0215 0.3460 -0.2919 0.2149 -0.2540 0.4283 -0.4334 1.6414 -0.3825
Lassen 2016 ESL 1.1723 1.2211 1.0414 1.0906 1.6027 0.6739 1.2573
Long Beach 2016 ESL -0.8833 0.1007 -1.5079 -0.7503 -1.0532 0.2540 -0.5836 0.4113 -0.7213
Los Angeles 2016 ESL 0.8169 0.7572 0.9577 0.8139 -0.6064 0.9302 -0.6099 0.8711 0.7958
Los Rios 2016 ESL 0.7309 0.7228 0.7293 0.7795 0.5626 0.7534 -0.2568 0.7834 0.7233
Marin 2016 ESL -0.4185 -1.1548 0.4963 -0.6754 0.9242 0.8425 -1.7475 0.9311 -0.7450
Mendocino-Lake 2016 ESL 0.3333 -0.0292 0.6054 0.0855 0.6663 0.5386 -0.3154 0.7428 0.2903
Merced 2016 ESL -0.9629 -0.9827 -0.2826 -1.0066 0.6708 0.2993 -1.0052 -0.5192 -0.9771
Mira Costa 2016 ESL -0.0173 0.1731 -0.3561 -0.1080 0.3327 0.5031 -0.4529 0.8176 -0.1471
Monterey 2016 ESL 0.7868 0.3718 1.0789 0.5004 1.1187 0.9711 0.4883 1.3919 0.6977
Mt. San Antonio 2016 ESL 0.0039 0.2022 -0.2350 0.0067 -0.0847 0.0751 -0.0031 -0.2850 0.0089
Mt. San Jacinto 2016 ESL 0.6367 1.7975 0.1395 0.6684 -0.9382 0.9920 0.6016 0.3417 0.6479
Napa Valley 2016 ESL 0.9221 0.9182 0.8789 0.4783 1.6223 0.1020 1.2577 1.6137 0.7981
North Orange 2016 ESL 0.8060 0.8905 0.7242 0.8211 0.6569 0.7851 0.8019 0.5808 0.8153
Ohlone 2016 ESL -1.5731 -1.7475 -1.4584 -1.5615 -1.4838 -1.2565 -1.4608 -1.5555 -1.5418
Palo Verde 2016 ESL 0.6286 0.6040 0.6779 0.6422 0.3455 0.4782 0.6463 1.2932 0.5889
Palomar 2016 ESL -0.7183 -0.1701 -0.9989 -0.6304 -0.8089 -0.8396 -0.4483 0.7348 -0.7285
Pasadena 2016 ESL 0.5559 0.9347 -0.1546 0.6180 -0.5611 0.4305 0.6230 0.5646 0.5548
Peralta 2016 ESL 0.5112 -0.1358 0.8711 0.4543 0.2888 0.8306 0.1690 -1.7295 0.9923
Rancho Santiago 2016 ESL 0.3365 -0.3213 0.8290 0.3512 0.1982 0.5164 0.2785 0.6605 0.3259
Redwoods 2016 ESL -0.4626 0.5241 -1.0222 0.4179 -0.9736 -1.2334 0.6521 -0.1987 -1.2304
Rio Hondo 2016 ESL -1.1480 -1.3626 -0.4873 -1.5986 -1.4828 -0.9055 -1.2122 -0.6571 -1.1878
Riverside 2016 ESL -1.0222 -1.1563 -0.6976 -0.9971 -0.8556 -1.2181 -0.4321 -0.3114 -1.0761
San Bernardino 2016 ESL -1.4806 -1.3666 -1.5803 -1.4109 -1.1069 -0.7601 -1.1832 -1.0515 -1.5129
San Diego 2016 ESL 0.7608 0.7050 0.8081 0.7293 0.9897 0.7410 0.7616 1.0399 0.7388
San Francisco 2016 ESL 0.3934 0.3298 0.4130 0.4100 0.2368 0.7104 -0.4540 0.1794 0.4061
San Joaquin Delta 2016 ESL 0.7558 0.8451 0.6867 0.8285 0.4248 0.7320 0.0740 0.7128 0.7556
San Jose-Evergreen 2016 ESL -0.8713 -0.5932 -0.9554 -0.8857 -0.7019 -0.7440 -0.8340 -1.2976 -0.7616
San Luis Obispo 2016 ESL 1.2876 1.1609 1.3432 1.2291 1.1086 1.2552 1.1823 1.2797 1.2485
San Mateo 2016 ESL 0.8469 0.8425 0.8501 0.8559 0.7758 0.8662 0.7697 0.9345 0.8162
Santa Barbara 2016 ESL -0.2400 -0.3504 1.4459 -0.2391 -0.2499 -0.1756 -0.2500 0.5971 -0.3036
Santa Clarita 2016 ESL 0.2273 0.3887 -0.0154 0.3139 0.0268 -0.2200 0.9490 0.9717 0.1617
Santa Monica 2016 ESL 0.8254 0.8785 0.7034 0.8126 0.9619 0.7904 0.9533 0.9041 0.8166
Sequoias 2016 ESL 0.1955 -0.3297 0.5640 0.1785 0.2478 -0.1838 0.3071 -0.5976 0.2328
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2016 ESL 0.9399 0.6711 1.0198 0.9480 0.9261 0.7593 0.9446 0.4988 0.9426
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Sierra 2016 ESL 0.7687 0.6763 0.7874 0.6533 0.8004 0.8881 -0.5284 -1.7691 0.8438
Siskiyous 2016 ESL -0.7051 -1.0249 0.7567 -0.9661 0.7873 0.7161 -1.0221 -1.5217 -0.6776
Solano 2016 ESL 0.2381 0.4667 0.1554 0.3883 -0.4050 0.5723 -1.5037 -0.3605 0.2946
Sonoma 2016 ESL 1.1123 1.1784 0.9040 1.0546 1.1977 0.6620 1.1369 1.2925 1.0130
South Orange 2016 ESL -0.8092 -0.7000 -0.8213 -0.7888 -0.7856 0.7985 -0.9042 1.8355 -1.0470
Southwestern 2016 ESL -1.0295 -1.0720 -0.7311 -1.1624 -0.4598 -0.3303 -0.8602 -0.4545 -1.1165
State Center 2016 ESL 0.7130 0.8409 0.5153 0.7930 0.4557 0.8246 -1.1873 0.1923 0.7259
Ventura 2016 ESL -1.1156 -1.1476 -0.9476 -1.2238 0.1383 -0.6775 -0.9748 0.4733 -1.0947
Victor Valley 2016 ESL -0.5534 -0.7147 -0.1854 -0.5765 -0.4183 -0.6139 0.0249 -0.0114 -0.5724
West Hills 2016 ESL -0.3361 -0.5868 0.0477 -0.4661 0.1511 -0.3626 -0.0644 -0.7370 -0.3133
West Kern 2016 ESL 1.1879 1.2843 0.6754 1.2568 0.6367 0.9352 1.3472 -0.7071 0.7071
West Valley-Mission 2016 ESL 0.6913 1.2930 0.4562 0.7388 0.6035 0.9093 -0.2067 0.9185 0.5506
Yosemite 2016 ESL -0.8987 -0.9337 -0.8508 -0.9676 -0.6673 -0.7134 -0.9977 -0.9802 -0.8796
Yuba 2016 ESL 0.8083 -0.2252 1.2130 0.5388 0.8871 0.8760 0.1879 1.8048 0.6325
Allan Hancock 2016 Non-ESL 1.0170 0.9065 1.0541 0.9275 1.0422 0.9530 1.0984 0.8000 1.0272
Antelope Valley 2016 Non-ESL -0.7928 -0.8161 0.6124 -0.9240 0.7410 -0.6663 -1.1125 0.3034 -0.9377
Barstow 2016 Non-ESL -0.0691 0.7221 -0.2659 -1.0128 0.5728 -0.4454 0.6679 -0.7071 -0.7071
Butte 2016 Non-ESL 0.8333 -0.5942 0.7975 -0.6167 0.8046 0.8406 -0.8400 1.2279 0.6694
Cabrillo 2016 Non-ESL 0.6063 0.3291 0.6224 0.3545 0.6526 0.7066 0.3795 1.1256 0.5761
Cerritos 2016 Non-ESL -0.4119 -0.1771 -0.0941 0.1995 -0.3619 0.9616 -0.9865 0.7667 -0.5230
Chabot-Las Positas 2016 Non-ESL 0.4677 -0.4060 1.1216 -0.3483 0.9306 0.5967 -0.3587 0.5191 0.3284
Chaffey 2016 Non-ESL -0.5118 -0.5805 0.2782 -0.5865 0.7862 -0.3384 -0.8212 -0.6896 -0.5025
Citrus 2016 Non-ESL -0.0161 -0.2574 0.4233 -0.3544 0.7766 0.1719 -0.2666 0.7247 -0.2027
Coast 2016 Non-ESL 1.1647 0.3834 1.1147 1.5566 0.9370 1.3516 0.7367 0.9943 1.2006
Compton 2016 Non-ESL 0.3036 0.1552 0.4107 -0.3846 -1.1209 0.3940 -0.5286 -0.8195 -0.4202
Contra Costa 2016 Non-ESL 1.3925 -0.1608 1.0947 1.4745 0.9578 1.2354 1.1204 -0.9563 1.4061
Copper Mountain 2016 Non-ESL 0.7038 -0.5323 0.8344 -0.1121 0.7273 0.7988 0.5918
Desert 2016 Non-ESL -0.5436 -0.6900 1.6969 -0.6576 1.4215 -0.7526 1.5230 0.8793 -0.5775
El Camino 2016 Non-ESL -1.2788 -0.6232 -0.2839 -1.6316 0.1563 0.4841 -1.5461 0.6438 -1.5376
Feather River 2016 Non-ESL 0.8988 0.7071 0.7071 0.7071 0.7071
Foothill-Deanza 2016 Non-ESL 0.5878 0.3862 0.6271 0.5874 0.5838 0.9347 0.0894 0.7894 0.5010
Gavilan 2016 Non-ESL 1.9524 1.9345 1.9269 1.8540 1.8328 1.9224 1.9603 1.0640 1.9600
Glendale 2016 Non-ESL 1.1766 1.0545 1.2535 1.1526 1.2080 1.1977 1.0263 0.6945 1.3270
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2016 Non-ESL 0.5389 -0.0428 0.6731 0.0666 0.7858 0.6109 -0.9786 0.7131 0.4581
Hartnell 2016 Non-ESL -0.2074 -0.7970 0.8201 -0.3183 -0.0982 -0.8592 0.5025 0.7700 -0.2920
Imperial 2016 Non-ESL -0.6246 -0.5752 -0.8018 -0.6102 -0.4571 -0.6678 -0.0865 0.6292 -0.6711
Kern 2016 Non-ESL -0.6903 -0.4332 -1.0799 -0.6763 0.2404 -0.9924 1.7414 0.6806 -0.6900
Lake Tahoe 2016 Non-ESL -0.4708 -0.5017 -0.4307 -0.6760 0.2995 0.1648 -0.7263 -1.0745 -0.4529
Lassen 2016 Non-ESL -0.5173 -1.1107 0.3052 -1.0156 0.6352 -1.0259 0.7851
Long Beach 2016 Non-ESL -0.8105 -0.7371 0.5121 -0.7587 0.2015 -1.0053 -0.3078 0.9614 -0.8925
Los Angeles 2016 Non-ESL 0.9390 1.0617 0.7499 0.8868 1.0358 1.1059 -0.6410 0.8558 0.9375
Los Rios 2016 Non-ESL 1.7050 -0.7144 1.2863 -0.0137 1.0251 1.3722 0.0495 -0.3570 1.7513
Marin 2016 Non-ESL 0.7357 -0.8436 0.7708 0.5759 0.7360 0.5543 0.9074 0.6685 0.7379
Mendocino-Lake 2016 Non-ESL 0.2665 -0.8587 0.5615 -0.9842 0.6373 0.4222 -0.3149 0.6804 0.2365
Merced 2016 Non-ESL -0.6034 -0.2755 -0.8113 -0.6968 0.7236 -0.2334 -0.7179 -0.9669 -0.5420
Mira Costa 2016 Non-ESL 0.9514 0.4031 0.8626 0.6879 0.8524 0.9683 0.8212 0.9622 0.9452
Monterey 2016 Non-ESL 0.2295 -1.2197 0.3978 -0.4202 0.5127 -0.3387 0.2695 0.9234 0.2117
Mt. San Antonio 2016 Non-ESL -0.6249 -0.8200 -0.3902 -0.6756 0.3064 -0.1444 -0.6512 0.7124 -0.6582
Mt. San Jacinto 2016 Non-ESL -0.4711 -0.7084 1.1028 -0.7483 0.9438 0.4724 -0.9353 0.9759 -0.5457
Napa Valley 2016 Non-ESL 0.8311 0.7113 0.8116 0.7274 0.8744 0.8211 0.8218 0.7917 0.8299
North Orange 2016 Non-ESL 0.8903 1.1364 0.7055 0.8330 0.8473 1.0406 -0.2567 0.9518 0.8832
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Ohlone 2016 Non-ESL 0.5949 -0.1547 0.6675 0.9880 0.2176 0.8996 0.3070 0.2917 0.5839
Palo Verde 2016 Non-ESL 1.0993 -0.2179 1.8051 0.2069 1.8574 -0.2151 1.9356 1.2945 1.0658
Palomar 2016 Non-ESL 0.2530 -1.2457 0.4977 -1.8421 0.5236 0.1706 0.2847 1.0506 0.1056
Pasadena 2016 Non-ESL -0.3073 -0.7942 0.5008 -0.3989 0.2373 -0.9771 0.6666 0.7448 -1.2130
Peralta 2016 Non-ESL 1.0476 1.3641 0.9672 1.1003 0.8449 1.0501 0.9328 1.1901 1.0055
Rancho Santiago 2016 Non-ESL 0.4788 -0.6058 0.9192 0.3996 0.3341 -0.4789 0.6886 0.6982 0.4528
Redwoods 2016 Non-ESL 1.3113 -0.4623 1.3633 -0.1014 1.2549 0.9125 1.2907 1.2506 1.4848
Rio Hondo 2016 Non-ESL 0.0021 -0.6532 0.2783 -0.2817 1.0670 0.0513 -0.0207 0.7498 -0.8713
Riverside 2016 Non-ESL -0.8432 -0.7863 -0.9529 -0.8470 0.2195 -0.8325 -0.8436 0.9111 -0.8663
San Bernardino 2016 Non-ESL -0.9570 -0.9002 -1.1041 -0.9573 0.4480 -0.9280 -1.0059 1.1522 -0.9658
San Diego 2016 Non-ESL 0.6534 0.2364 0.6984 0.5636 0.7224 0.5376 1.1929 0.8545 0.6083
San Francisco 2016 Non-ESL -0.4491 -0.7835 -0.2794 -0.6288 -0.0812 0.1820 -0.8200 0.8264 -0.6329
San Joaquin Delta 2016 Non-ESL 0.0168 -0.4894 0.7693 -0.5151 0.9631 0.6083 -0.7638 1.0522 -0.2393
San Jose-Evergreen 2016 Non-ESL -0.8854 -0.8545 -0.2042 -0.8500 0.4167 0.7399 -1.1937 0.7954 -1.0756
San Luis Obispo 2016 Non-ESL -1.1551 -1.0819 -1.2462 -0.9304 -0.2273 1.1330 -1.4610 0.1577 -1.0780
San Mateo 2016 Non-ESL 0.6704 0.7518 0.6437 0.6669 0.6743 0.6582 0.5750 -0.0937 0.7693
Santa Barbara 2016 Non-ESL 0.5298 0.6376 0.4996 0.5652 0.4942 1.4146 -0.0329 0.8166 0.4843
Santa Clarita 2016 Non-ESL -0.9364 -0.6105 -1.1485 -0.9091 0.4354 -0.3546 -1.0565 0.1766 -0.9387
Santa Monica 2016 Non-ESL 0.9243 -0.6355 0.9329 0.4167 0.7917 -0.9461 1.0833 0.8837 0.7043
Sequoias 2016 Non-ESL -0.6664 -0.7698 0.9312 -0.6957 0.7334 -0.6637 -0.6597 0.9149 -0.7005
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2016 Non-ESL 0.2587 -0.4132 0.3934 -0.3691 0.4655 -1.3988 0.4198 0.0165 0.2601
Sierra 2016 Non-ESL 0.4544 -0.0388 0.5341 -0.6676 0.7741 0.6933 -0.4289 0.7489 0.2000
Siskiyous 2016 Non-ESL 0.7591 -0.0557 0.7678 1.0253 0.0050 -0.9517 0.8647 1.9591 0.7004
Solano 2016 Non-ESL 0.9829 -0.4209 0.8607 0.8535 0.8118 1.2185 0.1733 1.1307 0.9663
Sonoma 2016 Non-ESL 0.7758 -0.7571 0.8518 -0.8420 0.9062 0.8167 0.3721 0.3669 0.7953
South Orange 2016 Non-ESL -0.4262 -1.0685 -0.1734 -1.0071 0.4892 0.0551 -0.8057 -1.3779 -0.1238
Southwestern 2016 Non-ESL 0.0908 0.1577 -0.1652 0.2676 -0.2914 0.5182 -0.3931 1.2100 -0.1072
State Center 2016 Non-ESL -1.3463 -1.0540 -1.0606 -1.1391 -0.9432 -0.9462 -1.3678 0.4856 -1.2877
Ventura 2016 Non-ESL 0.8148 -0.5916 0.8587 -0.6900 0.8234 1.1722 0.0916 0.5368 0.8113
Victor Valley 2016 Non-ESL 0.9863 -0.4091 0.8773 0.1261 0.7363 1.0069 -0.5030 0.6317 0.9721
West Hills 2016 Non-ESL -0.2285 -0.4296 0.5933 -0.4011 0.7027 -0.3836 0.0660 0.4269 -0.2366
West Kern 2016 Non-ESL -1.3828 -1.3998 -1.1678 -1.3512 -1.2528 -1.4758 -1.2884 -0.7071 -0.7071
West Valley-Mission 2016 Non-ESL 1.3798 1.8739 1.2730 1.7742 0.8833 1.1803 1.6741 0.9716 1.4166
Yosemite 2016 Non-ESL 0.0937 -0.7312 0.7567 -0.7512 0.7820 0.9498 -1.0465 0.8703 -0.2642
Yuba 2016 Non-ESL 1.0150 0.1911 1.0280 0.8078 0.9215 1.1796 0.6932 0.8896 1.0095
Allan Hancock 2017 ESL 0.5798 0.5985 -0.6464 0.5284 0.4180 0.6914 0.3926 0.1166 0.6129
Antelope Valley 2017 ESL -0.0283 0.2449 -0.2868 -0.0331 0.0098 -0.3401 0.4508 0.4128 -0.1604
Barstow 2017 ESL -1.0381 -1.1954 -0.7736 -0.7721 -1.1623
Butte 2017 ESL 0.4727 1.1123 0.1242 0.0482 0.6630 0.6651 0.1037 0.2020 0.3894
Cabrillo 2017 ESL -0.5565 -0.5207 -0.5678 -0.5588 -0.5189 -0.3602 -0.7016 0.7617 -0.5955
Cerritos 2017 ESL 0.8959 1.4970 -0.9972 1.2677 -1.0770 0.7368 -0.4400 -0.5323 1.0986
Chabot-Las Positas 2017 ESL 1.7091 1.6427 1.5087 1.6588 1.7620 1.5920 0.5894 0.1844 1.3973
Chaffey 2017 ESL 0.7557 0.6337 1.0568 0.7187 0.9634 0.7229 1.1306 0.6477 0.7605
Citrus 2017 ESL 0.4779 0.4054 0.6579 0.4984 0.3944 0.3909 0.3089 0.8253 0.4624
Coast 2017 ESL -0.1155 0.2990 -0.1607 -0.3102 1.2044 1.1184 -0.3070 -0.2136 -0.1087
Compton 2017 ESL 0.5062 0.5951 0.3949 0.2777 -0.5383 0.5604 0.1500 1.2905 0.2520
Contra Costa 2017 ESL -0.7915 -0.7486 -0.5921 -0.8180 -0.4624 -0.9137 -0.4639 -0.6658 -0.4611
Copper Mountain 2017 ESL -0.0434 -0.5537 0.3677 0.0000 -0.0560 -0.4097 0.2926
Desert 2017 ESL 1.2179 1.2189 1.1858 1.2036 1.1110 0.9978 1.2826 1.0149 1.2219
El Camino 2017 ESL 0.8791 0.8199 0.9501 0.8495 1.1224 0.7250 1.1891 1.6458 0.7963
Feather River 2017 ESL -0.5802
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Foothill-Deanza 2017 ESL -0.6888 -0.7535 -0.6552 -0.6754 -0.7280 -0.6721 -0.6862 -0.6610 -0.6923
Gavilan 2017 ESL 0.5414 1.0345 -0.6465 0.6281 -0.0385 0.7663 0.1540 0.8884 0.4980
Glendale 2017 ESL 1.2307 0.8574 1.2967 1.3782 1.0383 0.1647 1.3132 0.9021 1.2108
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2017 ESL -0.3926 -0.1755 -0.4060 -0.1792 -0.3824 -0.3526 -0.1553 -0.5798 -0.1033
Hartnell 2017 ESL -0.7025 -0.6821 -0.6256 -0.7079 -0.5633 -0.0142 -1.0375 -0.8082 -0.5851
Imperial 2017 ESL 0.7131 0.6968 0.3441 0.6815 1.2350 0.3966 1.0682 0.9459 0.6029
Kern 2017 ESL 0.5904 0.6014 0.5541 0.6146 0.4609 0.5543 -0.0538 0.5327 0.5937
Lake Tahoe 2017 ESL -1.5730 -0.5915 -1.0275 -1.1940 -0.8787 -0.7566 -0.5380 -0.5183 -1.5015
Lassen 2017 ESL -0.2923 -0.3014 -0.2675 -0.2857 -0.3069 -0.4478 -0.2567
Long Beach 2017 ESL -0.9208 -0.3894 -0.9369 -0.8595 -0.9456 -0.4431 -0.1481 -0.3045 -0.3788
Los Angeles 2017 ESL 1.0421 1.0788 0.8150 1.0228 -0.4673 0.5508 0.8240 0.8322 1.0583
Los Rios 2017 ESL 0.5373 0.6942 0.4428 0.5213 0.5852 0.5408 0.0481 -0.0857 0.5822
Marin 2017 ESL 1.1905 -0.3351 1.2981 0.8084 1.3559 0.5655 1.1699 0.6414 1.2416
Mendocino-Lake 2017 ESL -1.0967 -1.1883 -0.8515 -1.1968 -0.7557 -1.1651 -0.5777 -1.2734 -1.0159
Merced 2017 ESL -0.0812 -0.1892 0.5087 -0.1127 0.3714 0.9147 -0.4697 -0.9441 -0.0429
Mira Costa 2017 ESL 1.9543 1.8129 1.6036 2.0050 1.2344 0.8980 1.7269 1.0164 1.9873
Monterey 2017 ESL 0.4038 0.3534 0.4142 0.3212 0.4862 0.1525 0.6287 0.5086 0.3832
Mt. San Antonio 2017 ESL 0.3252 0.2822 0.3635 0.3104 0.7908 0.5016 0.2933 -0.3758 0.3346
Mt. San Jacinto 2017 ESL 0.2096 -0.1667 0.2525 0.2382 -0.7160 -1.0912 0.2632 0.8709 0.1730
Napa Valley 2017 ESL -0.1709 0.1858 -0.4116 -0.1697 -0.1336 -0.1861 -0.1440 0.0000 -0.1896
North Orange 2017 ESL 0.3341 0.3567 0.3118 0.3276 0.3923 0.2354 0.3520 -0.1143 0.3552
Ohlone 2017 ESL -0.3849 0.1973 -0.4678 -0.3805 -0.3709 1.1153 -0.5957 0.1637 -0.4810
Palo Verde 2017 ESL 0.9344 0.9178 0.8825 0.9115 1.2525 0.8903 0.9055 0.6406 0.9419
Palomar 2017 ESL 0.3587 -0.0994 0.6075 0.5752 0.0097 -0.0434 0.9622 0.6971 0.3172
Pasadena 2017 ESL 1.2499 0.9306 1.5424 1.1653 1.7524 1.2336 1.2304 1.3558 1.2424
Peralta 2017 ESL -1.3461 -1.0393 -1.3488 -1.0428 -1.3639 -0.6293 -1.1809 0.1512 -1.2536
Rancho Santiago 2017 ESL -0.1841 -1.3661 1.5152 -0.0405 -1.0222 0.1547 -0.2771 0.1989 -0.1959
Redwoods 2017 ESL -0.0201 -0.6212 0.6119 -0.5255 0.4929 -0.1733 0.1293
Rio Hondo 2017 ESL 0.7625 0.9101 0.3117 0.4428 1.0864 1.2835 0.0675 1.5957 0.5796
Riverside 2017 ESL -1.0122 -0.8094 -1.0728 -0.8714 -1.1953 -0.7245 -0.9404 -0.5190 -1.0435
San Bernardino 2017 ESL 1.1542 1.1311 1.1323 0.9419 1.5911 1.7245 -0.5594 0.5872 1.2115
San Diego 2017 ESL 0.4546 0.4165 0.4875 0.4370 0.5818 0.3775 0.4837 0.3606 0.4612
San Francisco 2017 ESL -0.2893 -0.2501 -0.3005 -0.3155 -0.0743 -0.3936 0.0133 -0.6622 -0.2391
San Joaquin Delta 2017 ESL 0.6972 0.7533 0.6528 0.6836 0.7170 0.6042 0.6486 0.9644 0.6666
San Jose-Evergreen 2017 ESL -1.0353 -1.2418 -0.9526 -1.0285 -1.0701 -1.4152 -0.9125 -0.9357 -1.0379
San Luis Obispo 2017 ESL 0.9219 1.1536 0.3547 1.1626 0.1408 1.0918 0.7310 0.8896 0.9021
San Mateo 2017 ESL 0.5516 0.5698 0.5258 0.5350 0.6159 0.4226 0.8800 0.1180 0.6606
Santa Barbara 2017 ESL -0.3208 -0.3946 0.9682 -0.3257 -0.2695 -0.2955 -0.3247 -0.1939 -0.3282
Santa Clarita 2017 ESL -0.8641 -0.7534 -1.0073 -0.7979 -1.0024 -0.7024 -1.0203 -0.1121 -0.9101
Santa Monica 2017 ESL 0.4282 0.4391 0.4019 0.4567 0.0823 0.5272 -0.0529 0.6894 0.4035
Sequoias 2017 ESL 1.4686 0.5596 1.4475 1.5846 -0.0708 0.2656 1.6929 0.5976 1.4756
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2017 ESL 0.3760 0.7114 0.2532 0.5949 0.2921 0.4420 0.1889 0.0499 0.3824
Sierra 2017 ESL 0.7411 1.0998 0.5822 1.2190 0.4145 0.7546 0.0362 0.5897 0.7142
Siskiyous 2017 ESL 0.9839 0.5517 0.5929 0.6736 0.7824 0.6596 0.5868 -0.5371 0.9992
Solano 2017 ESL 0.5309 0.0933 0.6515 0.2635 1.3912 0.1683 1.3242 1.8024 0.3314
Sonoma 2017 ESL 1.1701 1.0375 1.2746 1.2371 0.9541 1.4736 0.4619 0.8225 1.2011
South Orange 2017 ESL 0.3041 0.7613 0.0411 0.1878 0.7526 0.4308 0.2868 0.0710 0.2914
Southwestern 2017 ESL -1.0477 -1.2222 -0.5906 -1.0481 -0.7484 -0.4063 -0.7841 -1.0883 -1.0209
State Center 2017 ESL 0.7896 0.9744 0.5153 0.8568 0.5654 0.7140 -0.3924 0.8217 0.7666
Ventura 2017 ESL -0.5331 -0.7345 -0.1156 -0.4642 -0.6914 -0.3080 -0.4683 -0.9849 -0.3733
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Victor Valley 2017 ESL 0.9346 0.9007 0.9575 0.9354 0.9180 0.9301 0.9213 0.6025 0.9445
West Hills 2017 ESL -0.5294 -0.5963 -0.3951 -0.5605 -0.3723 -0.4527 -0.7194 0.1098 -0.5324
West Kern 2017 ESL -0.1273 -0.4386 0.7923 -0.3393 0.7959 0.3049 -0.5511
West Valley-Mission 2017 ESL 0.8567 0.4520 0.9141 0.7655 1.0071 0.5320 1.3165 0.9420 0.7913
Yosemite 2017 ESL -0.4100 -0.4275 -0.3864 -0.4556 -0.2602 -0.6118 -0.1605 -0.8117 -0.3627
Yuba 2017 ESL 1.4132 1.2809 1.0904 1.1525 1.2599 1.3966 0.5791 0.3139 1.5162
Allan Hancock 2017 Non-ESL 0.1107 -0.0621 0.1780 -0.0747 0.2180 0.1418 0.0695 0.0063 0.1159
Antelope Valley 2017 Non-ESL -1.5173 -0.3701 -0.0284 -0.8074 0.3258 -1.4692 -1.0828 -0.1123 -1.2958
Barstow 2017 Non-ESL 0.9875 -1.2413 1.2335 0.9693 0.9140
Butte 2017 Non-ESL 0.2057 0.2780 0.0888 0.2197 0.1304 0.2860 -0.5363 0.3508 -0.0907
Cabrillo 2017 Non-ESL 0.3794 0.1537 0.4017 0.3058 0.3743 0.2893 0.5198 -0.2486 0.4050
Cerritos 2017 Non-ESL -1.2219 -0.0290 -0.7649 0.4298 -0.9294 -0.4538 -0.1574 -0.4068 -1.0731
Chabot-Las Positas 2017 Non-ESL 0.7476 0.1085 0.9713 0.0924 0.5665 0.9589 -0.5930 -0.7339 0.7991
Chaffey 2017 Non-ESL -0.0013 -0.0769 0.5958 -0.0332 0.2289 -0.0965 0.1762 -0.4403 0.0134
Citrus 2017 Non-ESL 0.2482 -0.2136 0.8861 0.0139 0.4298 0.2360 -0.1131 0.4766 0.1319
Coast 2017 Non-ESL 0.2531 -0.2975 0.2946 -0.1302 0.4018 0.2993 0.1500 0.2253 0.2588
Compton 2017 Non-ESL 0.4938 0.6570 0.2840 0.4524 -0.9485 0.5041 0.3247 -0.5918 0.4289
Contra Costa 2017 Non-ESL 0.5094 0.0076 0.3765 0.7478 0.2643 0.1117 0.9295 -0.0633 0.4754
Copper Mountain 2017 Non-ESL 0.4706 -0.1217 0.4497 0.0015 0.4352 0.2453 0.6369
Desert 2017 Non-ESL -0.4417 -0.3892 -0.5670 -0.4353 0.3184 -0.3793 -0.2182 0.1594 -0.4157
El Camino 2017 Non-ESL 0.7677 0.5701 -0.0817 0.7055 0.2071 0.8365 -0.4586 0.4974 0.6694
Feather River 2017 Non-ESL -0.9342
Foothill-Deanza 2017 Non-ESL 0.8913 1.2394 0.7921 0.9521 0.7875 0.7240 1.0040 0.4816 1.0232
Gavilan 2017 Non-ESL -0.6110 -0.6686 -0.5783 -0.8491 -0.3723 -0.5356 -0.6380 0.0632 -0.6385
Glendale 2017 Non-ESL 0.4938 0.7418 0.2858 0.5504 0.3497 0.5414 0.3045 0.1730 0.6073
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2017 Non-ESL 0.7528 0.8078 0.6683 0.8498 0.6569 0.6735 0.4239 1.0165 0.6348
Hartnell 2017 Non-ESL -0.2372 0.3667 -1.0003 -0.1546 -0.3030 0.6133 -1.0149 0.8636 -0.3318
Imperial 2017 Non-ESL -0.4200 -0.5119 0.4079 -0.5242 0.3885 -0.3904 -0.5887 -0.5692 -0.3186
Kern 2017 Non-ESL -0.3831 -0.3088 -0.4506 -0.3270 -0.2934 -0.3301 0.0963 0.3905 -0.3844
Lake Tahoe 2017 Non-ESL -1.4853 -0.9167 -1.6810 -0.9545 -1.6260 -1.6831 -1.3287 -0.8771 -1.4984
Lassen 2017 Non-ESL -1.2820 -0.6542 -0.9241 -1.0966 -0.3648 -1.1256 -0.2718
Long Beach 2017 Non-ESL 0.5931 0.3688 -0.0322 0.4861 0.1586 0.4203 0.6747 0.5232 0.2673
Los Angeles 2017 Non-ESL 0.6058 1.3444 0.1815 0.7669 0.0908 0.7275 -0.4416 0.4661 0.6303
Los Rios 2017 Non-ESL -0.0389 -0.3738 0.2509 -0.2154 0.1452 0.1116 -0.1733 -0.5166 -0.0078
Marin 2017 Non-ESL 0.1335 0.4218 0.0150 -0.4683 0.2492 0.0315 0.5941 0.2183 0.1154
Mendocino-Lake 2017 Non-ESL 1.2523 0.5732 0.7476 1.1363 0.6274 1.0972 1.2187 0.2853 1.2840
Merced 2017 Non-ESL -0.0146 0.5015 -0.6850 -0.3864 0.9339 0.2390 -0.1735 -0.9669 0.0951
Mira Costa 2017 Non-ESL 0.4221 -0.0322 0.4367 0.1805 0.4152 0.7139 0.1810 0.3338 0.4346
Monterey 2017 Non-ESL 1.3167 1.0018 1.1033 2.0249 0.6002 1.1127 1.3083 0.4336 1.3336
Mt. San Antonio 2017 Non-ESL -0.5675 -0.7231 -0.3781 -0.5762 -0.1330 -0.1392 -0.5902 0.7202 -0.6011
Mt. San Jacinto 2017 Non-ESL 0.2130 0.0905 0.3009 -0.0408 0.3884 0.3048 0.1391 0.4163 0.1389
Napa Valley 2017 Non-ESL 0.5584 0.7037 0.4972 0.7331 0.3709 0.3940 0.9409 0.2180 0.5777
North Orange 2017 Non-ESL 0.7663 1.0248 0.5849 1.4070 0.4314 0.5558 1.3228 0.8650 0.7567
Ohlone 2017 Non-ESL 0.1806 0.0969 0.1799 0.4025 -0.0133 0.7614 -0.1691 0.5456 0.1326
Palo Verde 2017 Non-ESL -0.4351 -0.1600 -0.5179 -0.4730 -0.1714 0.0306 -0.6856 -0.3503 -0.4255
Palomar 2017 Non-ESL 0.3659 0.2089 0.2393 0.8282 0.2173 0.4499 0.2534 0.5472 0.3252
Pasadena 2017 Non-ESL 1.7551 0.8184 0.5717 0.0890 0.7480 -0.1088 0.8816 0.5667 1.0687
Peralta 2017 Non-ESL 0.1617 -0.9469 0.3285 0.1698 0.1307 0.4953 -0.2447 0.5265 0.1132
Rancho Santiago 2017 Non-ESL 0.7058 -0.7629 1.2704 1.0325 -0.7449 -0.4932 0.9545 0.2669 0.7170
Redwoods 2017 Non-ESL 1.2099 0.3435 0.9365 0.5474 0.8422 1.0378 1.0594
Rio Hondo 2017 Non-ESL -0.3561 0.1896 -0.4685 -0.5164 0.6616 -0.8492 -0.0890 0.6234 -1.1269
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Riverside 2017 Non-ESL 0.1075 0.0372 1.1243 -0.0699 1.1000 -0.0228 0.3895 0.6175 0.0340
San Bernardino 2017 Non-ESL -0.6001 -0.5303 -0.8960 -0.5162 -0.4499 -0.5557 -0.6846 -0.4223 -0.5738
San Diego 2017 Non-ESL 0.6807 1.2708 0.5114 0.8441 0.5218 0.7632 0.1828 -0.2942 0.7569
San Francisco 2017 Non-ESL -1.2652 -0.8106 -1.2130 -1.3511 -0.8661 -0.6942 -1.3349 0.2230 -1.2730
San Joaquin Delta 2017 Non-ESL -0.6896 -0.6669 0.1581 -0.5976 0.3610 -0.6735 -0.3450 0.2646 -0.6831
San Jose-Evergreen 2017 Non-ESL -1.1092 -0.6877 -0.6189 -0.9035 0.1908 -0.5930 -0.3784 0.1143 -0.8213
San Luis Obispo 2017 Non-ESL -1.1166 -1.0986 -1.1223 -0.8495 -0.3612 -0.9899 -0.4627 -0.4347 -0.8671
San Mateo 2017 Non-ESL 0.1471 0.1493 0.1460 0.1675 0.1213 0.0693 0.4024 0.5576 0.0787
Santa Barbara 2017 Non-ESL 0.0417 -0.0284 0.0610 -0.0693 0.1235 0.8094 -0.2907 -0.0081 0.0492
Santa Clarita 2017 Non-ESL 0.0524 -0.1078 0.2874 -0.0823 0.3852 0.9638 -0.5648 0.3886 0.0419
Santa Monica 2017 Non-ESL 0.7952 0.6337 0.4144 0.4494 0.6628 0.8373 0.2227 0.2956 1.5402
Sequoias 2017 Non-ESL 0.0674 -0.0636 0.2960 -0.0870 0.4089 0.0000 0.2530 -0.2958 0.0961
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2017 Non-ESL 0.2459 0.0625 0.2670 0.0170 0.2974 -0.8381 0.3438 0.0165 0.2472
Sierra 2017 Non-ESL -1.4741 -1.7914 -1.0016 -0.8943 -0.1343 -1.0462 -0.3959 0.1125 -1.6480
Siskiyous 2017 Non-ESL 0.8481 0.7555 0.6792 0.5854 0.7872 -0.7595 0.8264 -0.2952 0.8639
Solano 2017 Non-ESL -0.0736 -0.2919 0.0149 -0.8771 0.1852 -0.0039 -0.2584 0.1092 -0.0921
Sonoma 2017 Non-ESL -0.3661 -1.0423 -0.0990 -0.5141 0.0806 -0.3601 -0.2078 -0.3619 -0.3340
South Orange 2017 Non-ESL 1.7748 1.4023 1.6875 0.2163 0.8507 1.6006 1.5494 1.0701 1.7787
Southwestern 2017 Non-ESL -0.1136 0.3434 -0.4190 0.4896 -0.5886 0.9551 -0.7921 0.3548 -0.1627
State Center 2017 Non-ESL -0.0463 -0.2142 0.7328 -0.2860 1.1024 -0.4641 0.6743 0.5247 -0.0924
Ventura 2017 Non-ESL 0.7675 0.0584 0.4708 0.0084 0.4387 0.7234 0.7284 0.4895 0.7688
Victor Valley 2017 Non-ESL -0.4617 -0.4311 0.0426 -0.7111 0.2616 -0.3394 -1.0734 0.4026 -0.5434
West Hills 2017 Non-ESL 0.6271 0.3641 1.1654 0.4524 1.0350 0.4657 0.6729 -0.5692 0.6356
West Kern 2017 Non-ESL 0.9721 0.6314 1.3646 0.7564 1.3045 0.7604 1.1361
West Valley-Mission 2017 Non-ESL -0.0708 -0.5236 -0.0157 -0.3329 0.1539 0.0348 -0.2834 0.1570 -0.1042
Yosemite 2017 Non-ESL 1.6696 0.0270 0.4474 -0.0122 0.6549 1.3799 -0.9848 0.1800 1.4346
Yuba 2017 Non-ESL 1.1253 1.4091 0.7017 1.6231 0.6098 0.5927 1.6326 0.2350 1.1796
Allan Hancock 2018 ESL 1.0475 0.9707 0.4245 0.8749 1.2775 0.4244 1.2311 0.5130 1.0780
Antelope Valley 2018 ESL -0.2047 -0.1440 -0.1912 -0.1800 -0.4001 -0.4754 0.4354 -0.4487 -0.1196
Barstow 2018 ESL -1.1407 -1.1296 -1.0279 -1.4198 -0.8726 -0.9765 -1.1623
Butte 2018 ESL -0.5458 -1.3033 -0.1373 -1.5772 0.5477 0.2350 -0.6127 -0.8081 -0.4339
Cabrillo 2018 ESL -0.8260 -0.6756 -0.9600 -0.7736 -0.8781 -0.8887 -0.6166 1.1234 -0.8835
Cerritos 2018 ESL 0.8130 0.8804 -0.1455 1.1355 -0.9510 0.2131 0.1400 -0.6174 1.0418
Chabot-Las Positas 2018 ESL -1.1723 -1.0710 -1.0830 -1.2486 -0.7753 -1.1505 -0.2582 0.3660 -1.2462
Chaffey 2018 ESL -0.4445 -0.4187 -0.5004 -0.4664 -0.3103 -0.4207 -0.7256 -0.8412 -0.3998
Citrus 2018 ESL -0.7823 -0.7380 -0.8867 -0.7858 -0.7524 -0.6029 -0.7537 -0.7572 -0.7814
Coast 2018 ESL -0.0594 0.5152 -0.1251 -0.1450 0.5267 1.1912 -0.2680 -0.5595 -0.0287
Compton 2018 ESL 0.1656 0.3441 -0.0413 -0.2573 -0.7831 0.1404 0.3000 0.1780 -0.2698
Contra Costa 2018 ESL -0.9869 -0.6595 -0.9416 -0.8751 -0.9610 -0.8615 -0.7702 -0.0283 -0.9252
Copper Mountain 2018 ESL 0.9979 1.0720 0.4215 1.0086 0.4481 -0.3442 0.8522
Desert 2018 ESL 0.4615 0.3776 0.7886 0.4295 0.7189 0.9230 0.0957 0.7948 0.4495
El Camino 2018 ESL 0.5367 0.5743 0.4434 0.5873 0.0189 0.4963 0.2545 0.0072 0.5490
Feather River 2018 ESL
Foothill-Deanza 2018 ESL -0.4347 -0.4180 -0.4406 -0.4411 -0.4140 -0.9247 -0.3358 -0.3361 -0.4483
Gavilan 2018 ESL 1.3622 1.2163 1.2683 1.2506 1.5129 0.7293 0.8951 0.4515 1.3780
Glendale 2018 ESL 0.4801 -0.0251 0.6272 -0.1590 0.7106 -0.4015 0.9936 1.0853 0.3881
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2018 ESL -0.5455 -0.7394 -0.3094 -0.4182 -0.3824 -0.6576 -0.0253 -0.5515 -0.3232
Hartnell 2018 ESL -1.5305 -1.5959 -1.0427 -1.5574 -1.0462 -1.1706 -1.1400 0.3148 -1.5200
Imperial 2018 ESL 0.9206 0.9583 -0.5943 0.9546 -0.3800 0.6695 0.8857 0.8145 0.9447
Kern 2018 ESL 0.9087 0.8896 0.9308 0.8616 1.0924 0.8380 0.0299 0.5035 0.9565
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Lake Tahoe 2018 ESL -0.7234 -0.6808 -0.1518 -0.6925 -0.2540 -0.5873 -0.0149 -1.0366 -0.5153
Lassen 2018 ESL -0.7286 -0.7737 -0.6103 -0.7949 -0.2046 -0.9174 -0.6802 -0.4811
Long Beach 2018 ESL 1.1709 1.1606 0.3367 1.3506 0.6947 -0.2859 0.7406 -0.5395 0.9533
Los Angeles 2018 ESL 0.1536 0.0316 0.5789 0.1260 0.4210 -0.1867 0.7965 -0.4542 0.2450
Los Rios 2018 ESL 0.6018 0.6894 0.5465 0.6187 0.5401 0.5038 1.9098 0.8569 0.5794
Marin 2018 ESL -1.0882 -0.8707 -0.3054 -1.1391 0.1937 -1.0733 -0.3554 -1.0139 -1.0209
Mendocino-Lake 2018 ESL -0.8956 -0.3681 -1.2303 -0.5727 -1.2520 -1.0173 -0.2967 0.9551 -0.9332
Merced 2018 ESL 1.2638 1.1171 1.2355 1.1899 0.6043 0.4563 0.9517 1.5341 1.2451
Mira Costa 2018 ESL -0.8590 -0.5978 -1.0644 -0.6038 -1.5993 -0.9285 -0.3019 -0.7402 -0.8275
Monterey 2018 ESL 0.7690 1.1461 0.3825 1.1278 0.2210 0.3291 1.1550 -0.2141 0.8746
Mt. San Antonio 2018 ESL 0.8293 1.0033 0.5855 0.8307 0.7485 0.2387 0.8488 -0.4832 0.8452
Mt. San Jacinto 2018 ESL 0.7543 0.0407 0.7343 0.7577 -0.3457 1.3640 0.7042 1.0693 0.7323
Napa Valley 2018 ESL -0.7107 -0.4511 -0.8566 -0.6141 -0.7444 -0.7983 -0.5856 -0.9682 -0.6535
North Orange 2018 ESL -0.0579 -0.1772 0.0523 -0.0840 0.1870 0.3820 -0.1531 0.1714 -0.0689
Ohlone 2018 ESL -0.2114 -0.1409 -0.2126 -0.1128 -0.6889 0.1835 -0.2553 0.0000 -0.2470
Palo Verde 2018 ESL 0.5962 0.7059 -0.1918 0.6271 0.0216 0.4194 0.6236 -0.0121 0.6227
Palomar 2018 ESL 0.6803 0.8285 0.5528 0.7546 0.5276 0.7343 0.5217 -0.1696 0.6669
Pasadena 2018 ESL 0.2102 -0.0516 0.5953 0.1785 0.5298 0.4952 0.0222 0.1442 0.2138
Peralta 2018 ESL -0.8497 -0.9208 -0.6723 -1.0733 0.7686 -0.1554 -0.8596 0.5235 -0.9235
Rancho Santiago 2018 ESL 0.3623 0.6660 -0.3996 0.3311 0.4960 0.6813 0.2640 0.3121 0.3634
Redwoods 2018 ESL 0.4626 -0.1006 0.5907 -0.4262 0.9818 0.3867 0.0618 -0.1987 0.0633
Rio Hondo 2018 ESL 0.3268 0.2771 0.4025 -0.0600 0.6827 0.5045 0.0782 0.3989 0.2999
Riverside 2018 ESL -0.6314 -0.6706 -0.4805 -0.7709 -0.0629 -0.5016 -0.5337 -1.5571 -0.5218
San Bernardino 2018 ESL 0.5788 0.4081 0.8088 0.5366 0.5016 0.5786 0.0941 1.2426 0.4767
San Diego 2018 ESL 0.1821 0.0445 0.3147 0.1549 0.4008 0.0613 0.2332 0.0084 0.1950
San Francisco 2018 ESL 0.5912 0.7704 0.5074 0.5123 1.0924 0.4248 0.9179 1.5592 0.4657
San Joaquin Delta 2018 ESL -0.2639 -0.3327 -0.2119 -0.3629 0.1488 -0.2103 -0.3961 -0.6889 -0.2202
San Jose-Evergreen 2018 ESL 0.3584 0.5793 0.2788 0.3293 0.6328 -0.4162 0.4499 0.1615 0.3949
San Luis Obispo 2018 ESL -0.3207 -0.3124 -0.2906 -0.3735 -0.1203 -0.0398 -0.4576 0.3148 -0.5088
San Mateo 2018 ESL -0.1479 -0.2352 -0.0311 -0.2303 0.2606 -0.1881 -0.0359 -0.1782 -0.1386
Santa Barbara 2018 ESL -0.4671 -0.4260 -0.5313 -0.4700 -0.4361 -0.5227 -0.4583 -0.6708 -0.4474
Santa Clarita 2018 ESL -0.6557 -0.7534 -0.4972 -0.7108 -0.5209 -0.4437 -0.9244 -0.4858 -0.6575
Santa Monica 2018 ESL 0.1546 0.1057 0.2628 0.1410 0.3138 0.1369 0.2307 -0.0978 0.1774
Sequoias 2018 ESL 0.6574 0.7229 0.2139 0.5535 1.2036 1.2461 0.3376 1.5538 0.5915
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2018 ESL 0.5024 0.7315 0.4150 0.6538 0.4417 -0.1519 1.2669 -0.8479 0.5440
Sierra 2018 ESL -0.6480 -0.3484 -0.7514 -0.5186 -0.6942 -0.5633 -0.5501 -0.4990 -0.6252
Siskiyous 2018 ESL 1.3526 1.3480 -0.2913 1.4307 -0.3316 -0.1652 1.3492 0.8056 1.3426
Solano 2018 ESL -0.1483 -0.7467 0.0501 -0.3051 0.4931 -0.2569 0.5162 0.3277 -0.1964
Sonoma 2018 ESL 0.1852 0.1650 0.2005 0.2524 0.0155 0.1879 0.1159 0.2197 0.1675
South Orange 2018 ESL 0.5809 0.9040 0.3740 0.4518 1.0458 -0.1316 0.6171 -0.4379 0.6336
Southwestern 2018 ESL -0.4798 -0.2761 -0.6023 -0.4441 -0.4174 -0.6402 0.2322 -0.9155 -0.3907
State Center 2018 ESL 0.1021 0.0938 0.1080 0.1279 0.0248 -0.0121 0.4331 0.7518 0.0596
Ventura 2018 ESL 0.3049 0.6121 -0.2820 0.4385 -0.6914 -1.1703 0.4849 1.0105 0.1582
Victor Valley 2018 ESL 1.1068 1.1361 0.9880 1.0795 1.2440 1.0982 1.1205 1.0799 1.1047
West Hills 2018 ESL -0.8554 -0.8957 -0.7356 -0.8911 -0.6531 -0.7166 -1.2401 -1.2074 -0.8178
West Kern 2018 ESL -0.2652 -0.2894 -0.1429 -0.3770 0.2653 0.0000 -0.5103
West Valley-Mission 2018 ESL -0.7804 0.1602 -1.0060 -0.8367 -0.6765 -0.3144 -1.6490 -0.8286 -0.7371
Yosemite 2018 ESL 0.9005 0.8687 0.9269 0.8898 0.9164 1.3811 0.3139 0.2934 0.9542
Yuba 2018 ESL -1.4269 -1.1111 -1.2130 -1.6764 -0.5626 -0.8719 -1.5839 -1.0201 -1.4293
Allan Hancock 2018 Non-ESL -0.4481 -0.5379 -0.4100 -0.6798 -0.2979 -0.4689 -0.4195 -0.4926 -0.4455
Antelope Valley 2018 Non-ESL 0.1366 0.2949 -0.2609 0.0534 -0.0075 -0.1329 1.5278 -0.4210 0.4269
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Barstow 2018 Non-ESL -0.5248 -1.3198 -0.0956 -1.0015 0.0447 -0.4937 -0.5273
Butte 2018 Non-ESL -0.1458 0.8074 -0.3185 0.3652 -0.1879 -0.2254 0.4749 -0.5262 -0.5120
Cabrillo 2018 Non-ESL 0.4669 1.2661 0.2436 1.1331 0.1524 0.1873 0.9509 -0.5167 0.5081
Cerritos 2018 Non-ESL -0.0427 0.9844 -0.9911 1.2885 -1.1666 -0.4960 0.3967 -0.2816 0.0102
Chabot-Las Positas 2018 Non-ESL 0.9418 0.7380 0.5712 0.6839 -0.0914 0.7608 0.9883 0.1522 0.8179
Chaffey 2018 Non-ESL 0.8329 0.7322 1.2219 0.7112 0.4590 0.7565 0.9530 1.1548 0.8166
Citrus 2018 Non-ESL 1.3486 0.9004 1.1616 1.0482 0.1215 1.3715 -0.7449 0.6902 1.2045
Coast 2018 Non-ESL 0.0899 1.1076 -0.0620 0.3935 -0.0433 0.1460 -0.0184 0.1039 0.0866
Compton 2018 Non-ESL 0.4923 0.7600 0.1835 0.3760 0.8623 0.4942 0.3959 1.6844 0.3887
Contra Costa 2018 Non-ESL -0.3501 0.2044 -0.3343 -0.6225 -0.1369 0.4532 -1.4484 0.5628 -0.3974
Copper Mountain 2018 Non-ESL 1.2710 0.9049 0.6447 1.2765 0.3242 1.4064 1.0990
Desert 2018 Non-ESL 0.3083 0.3304 -0.2706 0.2768 0.0067 0.3780 -0.5578 -0.1266 0.2916
El Camino 2018 Non-ESL 1.1281 1.0035 -0.3331 0.8443 0.5157 0.8070 -0.1544 0.4298 1.0701
Feather River 2018 Non-ESL
Foothill-Deanza 2018 Non-ESL 0.3817 0.6391 0.3130 0.3535 0.4239 -0.0629 0.8973 0.1232 0.4689
Gavilan 2018 Non-ESL -0.6249 -0.7011 -0.5847 -0.8267 -0.4120 -0.7202 -0.5886 -0.4372 -0.6212
Glendale 2018 Non-ESL -0.1396 -0.0455 -0.2127 -0.2073 0.0230 -0.1103 -0.2256 -0.0888 -0.1547
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2018 Non-ESL 0.4296 1.1059 0.1792 0.8947 0.1361 0.3003 1.0784 0.7866 0.3096
Hartnell 2018 Non-ESL 1.1463 0.5573 1.3016 0.8958 1.3287 0.8885 1.0676 -0.2242 1.0867
Imperial 2018 Non-ESL -0.0483 -0.0397 -0.0985 -0.1540 0.6171 -0.1260 0.6668 -0.5932 0.0339
Kern 2018 Non-ESL 0.1328 -0.3399 1.1268 -0.0122 1.2103 0.2010 -0.3748 -0.2157 0.1426
Lake Tahoe 2018 Non-ESL 0.3802 0.3598 0.3697 0.4808 -0.0998 -0.1460 0.5921 0.3070 0.3813
Lassen 2018 Non-ESL 0.0413 0.6259 -0.4546 0.4935 -0.6137 0.1479 -0.1661 -0.4647
Long Beach 2018 Non-ESL -0.1859 0.2989 -0.8222 0.0431 -0.9147 -0.3908 0.1578 -0.1319 -0.0939
Los Angeles 2018 Non-ESL 0.3620 -0.0129 0.4826 0.4018 0.2219 -0.6493 1.9081 -0.2358 0.5292
Los Rios 2018 Non-ESL -0.1654 0.1626 -0.1918 0.1794 -0.2387 -1.0488 1.0982 1.2528 -0.2447
Marin 2018 Non-ESL -0.2438 0.6651 -0.3391 -0.4303 -0.1955 -0.3370 0.6528 -0.8049 -0.1336
Mendocino-Lake 2018 Non-ESL 0.3982 0.3070 0.1865 0.2000 0.2658 0.2962 0.5477 -0.0439 0.4163
Merced 2018 Non-ESL 0.8436 0.9919 0.3398 0.6025 -0.0897 -0.2041 1.3423 0.4002 0.8669
Mira Costa 2018 Non-ESL 0.3672 1.2358 0.0567 1.3547 0.0052 0.7672 0.0633 0.0318 0.4205
Monterey 2018 Non-ESL -0.4727 0.0545 -0.4571 -0.6107 -0.2768 -0.9592 -0.4262 -0.4846 -0.4707
Mt. San Antonio 2018 Non-ESL -0.5540 -0.4277 -0.6750 -0.5395 -0.3820 0.5254 -0.6739 0.1640 -0.5621
Mt. San Jacinto 2018 Non-ESL 0.7025 0.5696 0.0490 0.4864 -0.0543 0.6209 0.6690 -0.3714 0.6774
Napa Valley 2018 Non-ESL 0.0770 0.9913 -0.1220 0.3458 -0.1657 0.0654 0.1024 -0.3786 0.1059
North Orange 2018 Non-ESL -0.3431 0.0451 -0.5036 -0.2239 -0.3684 -0.3511 -0.1276 -0.0608 -0.3639
Ohlone 2018 Non-ESL -1.4890 -1.7511 -1.3323 -1.6088 -1.2138 -0.5488 -1.6835 0.4654 -1.5787
Palo Verde 2018 Non-ESL 0.3052 0.5187 0.0390 0.2887 0.1823 0.4230 -0.1760 0.1066 0.3016
Palomar 2018 Non-ESL -0.1166 0.4152 -0.1914 0.0040 -0.1107 0.4483 -0.5419 -0.2749 -0.0858
Pasadena 2018 Non-ESL 0.3828 0.8056 -0.4542 -0.4594 0.6231 0.7765 -0.4672 0.1763 0.1691
Peralta 2018 Non-ESL -0.3728 -0.2177 -0.3857 -0.4018 -0.2638 -0.1610 -0.5802 0.3412 -0.4516
Rancho Santiago 2018 Non-ESL -0.1502 0.5514 -0.5229 -0.1680 0.0142 0.4932 -0.3134 -0.2169 -0.1421
Redwoods 2018 Non-ESL -0.5289 0.4597 -0.6639 0.1352 -0.5526 -0.6697 -0.3181 -0.6334 -0.5130
Rio Hondo 2018 Non-ESL 0.7077 0.9887 0.3541 0.9440 -0.0103 0.5975 0.6792 0.3781 0.3556
Riverside 2018 Non-ESL 0.5932 0.5922 0.0495 0.4637 0.6837 0.5572 0.6557 0.0447 0.5380
San Bernardino 2018 Non-ESL 0.7261 0.5930 1.3736 0.6145 0.6322 0.8060 0.5540 -0.5699 0.7243
San Diego 2018 Non-ESL 0.3326 0.8034 0.2115 0.4470 0.2240 0.3125 0.4046 -0.2964 0.3857
San Francisco 2018 Non-ESL 0.4768 0.5042 0.3965 0.1841 0.8192 -0.1039 0.7983 -0.7125 0.6320
San Joaquin Delta 2018 Non-ESL -0.8487 -0.0631 -0.9638 -0.3799 -0.2083 -1.1341 -0.0263 -0.5610 -0.6263
San Jose-Evergreen 2018 Non-ESL 1.2689 1.3564 0.1674 0.9259 0.0026 -0.1229 1.0217 -0.3310 1.0590
San Luis Obispo 2018 Non-ESL 0.0779 -0.0398 0.2597 -0.1888 0.7288 -0.7592 0.4095 -0.4117 0.1922
San Mateo 2018 Non-ESL -0.1419 -0.3183 -0.0870 -0.1048 -0.1882 -0.3413 0.6211 0.5204 -0.2408
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Santa Barbara 2018 Non-ESL -0.3449 -0.3726 -0.3369 -0.4982 -0.2247 0.1613 -0.4253 -0.2143 -0.3639
Santa Clarita 2018 Non-ESL 0.2952 0.3165 0.1672 0.3734 -0.4043 0.5703 0.0299 0.6005 0.2784
Santa Monica 2018 Non-ESL -0.1344 0.3260 -0.2124 -1.8058 0.2348 0.5915 -0.3525 -0.1016 -0.1563
Sequoias 2018 Non-ESL 0.4109 0.5592 -0.8073 0.4127 -0.4023 0.4962 0.1653 0.0691 0.3533
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2018 Non-ESL 1.5954 1.8976 1.3819 1.9104 1.2196 1.4048 1.4618 0.4114 1.6007
Sierra 2018 Non-ESL 0.8119 0.4845 0.7430 0.3494 0.1852 0.0419 1.0117 -0.2249 0.9717
Siskiyous 2018 Non-ESL 0.2670 0.3976 0.1789 -0.3087 0.9357 0.4711 -0.0663 -0.2952 0.2786
Solano 2018 Non-ESL -0.5438 -0.0112 -0.4162 -1.1795 -0.2351 -0.4835 -0.6312 -0.4304 -0.5544
Sonoma 2018 Non-ESL 0.6394 0.6303 0.4305 0.5936 0.0288 -0.0394 1.2117 -0.3096 0.7896
South Orange 2018 Non-ESL 0.4410 0.8441 0.2623 -0.0436 0.2820 0.7166 0.0703 1.0515 0.2294
Southwestern 2018 Non-ESL 0.4197 0.4504 -0.4415 0.3347 -0.3037 -0.6789 0.6444 -1.2332 0.5888
State Center 2018 Non-ESL 0.9086 0.7346 0.6155 0.7282 0.8237 0.3199 1.4558 -0.2482 0.8616
Ventura 2018 Non-ESL 0.6041 0.6418 0.0435 0.1959 0.2485 0.2294 1.1469 -0.2847 0.7977
Victor Valley 2018 Non-ESL -0.7854 0.0655 -0.5091 -0.4305 -0.2794 -0.8161 0.5426 -0.2430 -0.8069
West Hills 2018 Non-ESL 0.5049 0.6398 -0.2500 0.5394 0.0327 0.5081 0.3481 0.9487 0.4793
West Kern 2018 Non-ESL 0.8859 0.8683 0.7922 0.8705 0.7920 1.0082 0.7733
West Valley-Mission 2018 Non-ESL -0.5995 -0.6202 -0.5756 -0.9047 -0.2736 -0.5829 -0.5823 0.1525 -0.7029
Yosemite 2018 Non-ESL -1.3369 0.1959 -0.5754 -0.1813 -0.3346 0.1937 -0.6869 -0.2980 -1.0871
Yuba 2018 Non-ESL -0.2248 0.3673 -0.3776 -0.2723 -0.1512 -0.0708 -0.3837 -0.0336 -0.2367
Allan Hancock 2019 ESL -0.1366 -0.1740 0.6271 -0.2400 0.6576 -0.7390 0.2719 -0.7696 -0.0722
Antelope Valley 2019 ESL -0.1982 0.2773 -0.5948 -0.1947 -0.2244 -0.5836 0.5973 -0.9332 0.0353
Barstow 2019 ESL -0.4221 -0.2084 -0.5828 -0.6681 -0.3878 -0.6358 -0.1835
Butte 2019 ESL 1.3495 -0.6892 1.5885 1.3397 0.8552 0.2828 1.0903 -1.2122 1.2237
Cabrillo 2019 ESL 1.8746 1.7604 1.9051 1.7774 1.9507 1.9722 1.4529 0.6631 1.8356
Cerritos 2019 ESL -1.2460 -1.0502 -0.2520 -1.2135 0.5250 -0.8231 0.3733 -1.3413 -0.8334
Chabot-Las Positas 2019 ESL -0.5587 -0.6585 -0.3881 -0.4102 -1.0925 -0.8927 0.7356 0.7622 -0.9374
Chaffey 2019 ESL -1.0256 -0.9986 -1.0683 -1.0228 -1.0287 -1.0192 -1.0294 -1.2450 -0.9942
Citrus 2019 ESL -0.9013 -0.9421 -0.7866 -0.9144 -0.8343 -0.8611 0.2471 -0.4509 -0.9175
Coast 2019 ESL 0.5318 1.0988 0.4491 0.4367 0.7946 -0.0465 0.5018 0.1119 0.5534
Compton 2019 ESL -0.6648 -0.7050 -0.6059 -1.5692 -0.7831 -0.5853 -1.0772 -1.3795 -1.5585
Contra Costa 2019 ESL -0.7198 -0.3414 -0.7905 -0.7608 -0.3757 -0.7962 -0.4459 0.4958 -0.9005
Copper Mountain 2019 ESL -0.4773 0.4359 -0.9237 -0.2017 -0.4481 1.6553 -1.5646
Desert 2019 ESL -0.0475 -0.0140 -0.1811 0.0275 -0.8776 -0.0018 -0.0766 -0.3791 -0.0365
El Camino 2019 ESL -0.4774 -0.2550 -0.8681 -0.4590 -0.6319 -0.4340 -0.2925 -0.3378 -0.4675
Feather River 2019 ESL -0.6716
Foothill-Deanza 2019 ESL 1.5882 1.7113 1.5230 1.6108 1.5149 1.5421 1.5838 1.6356 1.5806
Gavilan 2019 ESL 0.4351 0.0461 1.1198 0.3372 0.7867 -1.1444 0.8690 0.8010 0.3941
Glendale 2019 ESL 0.0484 -0.0114 0.0662 -0.7041 0.3735 -0.0463 0.1062 0.0860 0.0418
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2019 ESL 0.8617 1.3660 0.3867 1.2069 0.1228 -0.1620 1.4046 -0.2969 1.3362
Hartnell 2019 ESL -0.1110 0.0808 -0.6488 -0.0457 -0.8853 -0.9620 0.7797 1.4378 -0.2775
Imperial 2019 ESL 0.2733 0.3434 -1.2199 0.2719 0.1900 0.4112 -0.4029 -0.0339 0.3930
Kern 2019 ESL 0.0145 0.1614 -0.3030 0.1059 -0.4003 -0.0986 0.8313 -0.1532 0.0369
Lake Tahoe 2019 ESL 0.5325 -0.3237 0.7590 0.0239 0.6954 -0.2795 0.7024 -0.0864 0.5658
Lassen 2019 ESL -0.7286 -0.7240 -0.7350 -0.7092 -0.7843 -0.3957 -0.7861 -0.4811
Long Beach 2019 ESL 0.4018 0.2602 0.2928 0.0546 1.0442 -0.6003 0.5806 -0.4647 0.4694
Los Angeles 2019 ESL -0.9195 -0.7682 -1.3810 -0.9310 0.9771 -0.9769 0.5097 -1.0705 -0.8819
Los Rios 2019 ESL -0.7789 -0.7831 -0.7697 -0.8177 -0.6428 -0.7675 -0.3691 -0.4039 -0.8037
Marin 2019 ESL -0.7162 0.2113 -0.7881 -0.4158 -1.0681 -0.8771 -0.0148 -1.1794 -0.5353
Mendocino-Lake 2019 ESL -0.0745 0.3426 -0.4338 0.2479 -0.5679 -0.2218 0.3404 0.0000 -0.0735
Merced 2019 ESL 1.1711 1.2558 0.0404 1.2134 -0.6930 -0.3600 1.2208 0.9677 1.1737
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Mira Costa 2019 ESL -0.4712 -0.4606 -0.3443 -0.3728 -0.7192 -0.8651 0.1389 -0.9060 -0.3757
Monterey 2019 ESL 0.0119 0.2980 -0.2348 0.0373 -0.0238 0.0562 -0.0380 0.0268 0.0098
Mt. San Antonio 2019 ESL 1.0954 0.8915 1.2957 1.1048 0.7437 1.0915 1.0461 2.0360 1.0704
Mt. San Jacinto 2019 ESL 0.3172 -0.8743 0.5515 0.2349 1.7283 -0.0496 0.3248 -0.1213 0.3383
Napa Valley 2019 ESL 0.6522 0.2176 0.9234 1.0337 -0.2863 1.4346 0.1632 -0.3227 0.7682
North Orange 2019 ESL -0.6978 -0.6386 -0.7490 -0.6912 -0.7527 -0.4683 -0.7403 -0.5047 -0.7058
Ohlone 2019 ESL 0.0690 0.4510 -0.0025 -0.0656 0.7419 -0.2400 0.1135 -0.3275 0.1430
Palo Verde 2019 ESL -1.0160 -1.1162 -0.2174 -1.0342 -0.6262 -0.0809 -1.2586 -0.3021 -1.0445
Palomar 2019 ESL 1.0036 1.1245 0.8730 0.9394 1.0413 1.1457 0.6700 -0.8101 1.0083
Pasadena 2019 ESL -0.8471 -1.0074 -0.4374 -0.8643 -0.1850 -1.1383 -0.6398 -0.5481 -0.8634
Peralta 2019 ESL -0.3369 0.1012 -0.5821 -0.4826 0.5287 -0.8051 0.0102 0.5139 -0.4608
Rancho Santiago 2019 ESL -1.0457 -0.3081 -0.9077 -1.1425 -0.3060 -1.1659 -0.9903 -1.2470 -1.0379
Redwoods 2019 ESL 1.2672 0.0035 1.3334 0.3682 1.1773 1.4867 -0.1911 -0.9934 1.2164
Rio Hondo 2019 ESL 0.3603 0.2313 0.6204 0.1051 0.0954 0.0608 0.6221 -0.0587 0.4207
Riverside 2019 ESL 0.8919 0.5434 1.1386 0.5740 1.6357 0.4856 0.9912 0.5190 0.9131
San Bernardino 2019 ESL 0.6394 0.9010 0.2115 0.9194 -0.9512 -0.1702 1.1634 0.7510 0.6123
San Diego 2019 ESL -0.3105 -0.2361 -0.3802 -0.2702 -0.6322 -0.5225 -0.2143 -0.2281 -0.3164
San Francisco 2019 ESL -0.5117 -0.1602 -0.6479 -0.5497 -0.1910 -0.6309 -0.1391 -0.0337 -0.5506
San Joaquin Delta 2019 ESL -1.2543 -1.2887 -1.2236 -1.2806 -1.0850 -1.0919 -1.1275 -0.7607 -1.2958
San Jose-Evergreen 2019 ESL 1.0233 1.1115 0.9809 1.0059 1.1621 0.9418 0.9694 0.8034 1.0524
San Luis Obispo 2019 ESL 0.0501 -0.3197 0.7391 -0.3868 1.0472 -0.2410 0.2194 -0.3422 0.1710
San Mateo 2019 ESL -1.0730 -1.0614 -1.0851 -1.0681 -1.0631 -1.0113 -1.2056 -0.8791 -1.1142
Santa Barbara 2019 ESL -0.4654 -0.4226 -0.5535 -0.4653 -0.4655 -0.5038 -0.4593 -0.7173 -0.4419
Santa Clarita 2019 ESL -0.2880 -0.3100 -0.2492 -0.3498 -0.1432 -0.3647 -0.1205 -0.8596 -0.2356
Santa Monica 2019 ESL -1.0766 -1.0875 -1.0473 -1.0725 -1.1059 -1.1297 -0.7822 -1.1856 -1.0646
Sequoias 2019 ESL -0.3162 0.3236 -0.7196 -0.4107 0.5664 0.4290 -0.5457 -0.3586 -0.3054
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2019 ESL -1.0681 -1.1811 -1.0128 -1.0134 -1.0757 -0.8840 -1.0446 -0.3990 -1.0773
Sierra 2019 ESL -1.3051 -1.4961 -1.1996 -1.4379 -1.1598 -1.1172 -1.2015 0.1361 -1.3086
Siskiyous 2019 ESL 0.0737 0.6675 -1.1308 0.4887 -1.1635 -1.1562 0.6541 1.0742 0.0524
Solano 2019 ESL -0.8861 -0.3733 -1.0174 -0.8460 -0.7749 -0.8629 0.2469 -0.3605 -0.8837
Sonoma 2019 ESL -1.0973 -0.8216 -1.4375 -1.0017 -1.2741 -0.6380 -1.1358 -0.0971 -1.2965
South Orange 2019 ESL 0.7077 0.3975 0.8335 0.7330 0.5051 0.4416 0.7081 -0.0396 0.7056
Southwestern 2019 ESL 0.6954 0.8651 0.3290 0.8332 0.2108 -0.3479 1.3246 0.2177 0.7707
State Center 2019 ESL -0.8234 -0.8409 -0.7622 -0.8309 -0.7664 -0.7811 0.5783 0.5070 -0.8830
Ventura 2019 ESL 1.2757 1.2548 1.1879 1.0660 1.9359 -0.0616 1.2495 -0.9849 1.3066
Victor Valley 2019 ESL 0.5825 0.6508 0.4089 0.6265 0.3314 0.6102 0.2988 0.7389 0.5750
West Hills 2019 ESL -0.3419 -0.1639 -0.5722 -0.2446 -0.6531 -0.6104 1.1953 1.4270 -0.3854
West Kern 2019 ESL -0.7424 -0.7778 -0.4935 -0.6912 -0.7959 -0.8538 -0.5715
West Valley-Mission 2019 ESL -0.8567 -1.1614 -0.6990 -0.8434 -0.8726 -1.0232 -0.0180 -0.6293 -0.9647
Yosemite 2019 ESL 1.3241 1.4262 1.1972 1.3256 1.2938 1.0388 1.4825 1.4735 1.2928
Yuba 2019 ESL -0.1042 1.1923 -0.8723 0.4939 -0.8940 -0.6239 0.9243 -0.0785 -0.1038
Allan Hancock 2019 Non-ESL -0.9640 -0.9452 -0.9654 -1.0277 -0.8995 -0.9855 -0.9331 -0.7496 -0.9741
Antelope Valley 2019 Non-ESL 0.2515 0.8878 -0.8277 0.6708 -0.6644 0.2080 0.3708 -0.6729 0.7125
Barstow 2019 Non-ESL -0.4958 0.5127 -0.5880 0.4146 -0.5166 -0.4091 -0.6093
Butte 2019 Non-ESL -0.8075 0.6452 -0.7904 0.0697 -0.6829 -0.7367 0.4878 -1.4033 -1.3139
Cabrillo 2019 Non-ESL -1.4760 -1.8061 -1.2813 -1.8185 -1.1997 -1.4183 -1.4812 -1.0529 -1.4811
Cerritos 2019 Non-ESL 0.0258 0.4629 -0.4363 -0.3974 0.3655 -1.1513 0.9756 -1.0327 0.2085
Chabot-Las Positas 2019 Non-ESL -0.0327 0.8015 -0.9169 0.5734 -0.8440 0.0233 -0.2270 -0.3133 0.0256
Chaffey 2019 Non-ESL 0.8091 0.8203 0.3281 0.7605 -0.0515 0.8528 0.7063 1.3376 0.7861
Citrus 2019 Non-ESL 0.5453 1.0877 -0.8131 0.7871 -0.7776 0.3233 0.0372 -0.4674 0.6788
Coast 2019 Non-ESL -0.5852 1.0127 -0.7257 -0.3783 -0.6417 -0.7468 -0.2478 -0.6085 -0.5788
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Compton 2019 Non-ESL 0.0647 0.3640 -0.2267 -1.5272 1.0347 0.0704 0.0047 0.0911 -1.5043
Contra Costa 2019 Non-ESL -0.5803 0.9317 -0.7678 -0.0183 -0.6452 -0.8558 0.0540 1.6252 -0.7528
Copper Mountain 2019 Non-ESL -0.8529 0.6197 -0.9995 0.2896 -0.9843 -0.5783 -1.0426
Desert 2019 Non-ESL 0.6046 0.7001 -1.1240 0.6475 -0.8726 0.7965 -1.4407 -0.8465 0.6295
El Camino 2019 Non-ESL 0.3004 1.0438 -1.0876 0.6379 -0.3165 -0.4293 0.7515 -1.0568 0.6209
Feather River 2019 Non-ESL 1.1253
Foothill-Deanza 2019 Non-ESL -1.0317 -0.9789 -1.0276 -1.1140 -0.8926 -1.0352 -0.9152 -0.8751 -1.0674
Gavilan 2019 Non-ESL -0.0823 0.1883 -0.1868 0.1572 -0.2534 -0.1083 -0.0725 -0.8467 -0.0318
Glendale 2019 Non-ESL -0.9895 -0.9439 -1.0083 -1.0792 -0.7566 -0.8547 -1.3608 -0.7308 -1.0537
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2019 Non-ESL -0.5683 0.1628 -0.7467 -0.3709 -0.6535 -0.5293 -0.1122 -0.3228 -0.5926
Hartnell 2019 Non-ESL 0.9025 0.7888 0.4939 0.8992 0.8696 0.5509 0.9885 -0.6920 0.9229
Imperial 2019 Non-ESL 0.0267 0.1816 -1.1534 -0.0530 0.5028 0.1458 -1.0573 -0.9887 0.1573
Kern 2019 Non-ESL 0.9922 0.9091 0.9300 0.9048 0.2486 0.9193 -0.5031 -0.7215 0.9617
Lake Tahoe 2019 Non-ESL 1.3592 1.5890 1.1753 1.1964 0.7831 1.2329 1.3501 1.2938 1.3575
Lassen 2019 Non-ESL 1.3487 1.5031 0.3196 1.5603 -0.1713 1.5919 -0.3523 1.0428
Long Beach 2019 Non-ESL 0.2110 0.5994 -0.9517 0.4489 -1.1651 -0.1749 0.7024 -0.8551 0.4225
Los Angeles 2019 Non-ESL -0.8518 -0.9491 -0.6866 -0.8804 -0.7146 -0.8430 0.2606 -0.6714 -0.8815
Los Rios 2019 Non-ESL 0.2680 0.9689 -0.5746 0.9806 -0.6072 -0.6188 1.0129 1.1995 0.1981
Marin 2019 Non-ESL -0.9916 0.8963 -0.9866 -1.3037 -0.8855 -0.7906 -0.9531 -1.0710 -0.9623
Mendocino-Lake 2019 Non-ESL -0.2866 0.4221 -0.3981 0.2161 -0.3392 -0.5992 0.7805 -0.8999 -0.2443
Merced 2019 Non-ESL 0.6820 -0.1984 1.5847 0.7808 -0.8009 0.2891 0.7953 1.2415 0.5956
Mira Costa 2019 Non-ESL -0.6888 0.7037 -0.8791 0.0797 -0.7889 -0.5293 -0.7052 -0.7260 -0.6795
Monterey 2019 Non-ESL -0.7665 0.9403 -0.8667 -0.2437 -0.8429 0.5021 -0.8510 -1.0050 -0.7579
Mt. San Antonio 2019 Non-ESL -0.8104 -0.5834 -1.0341 -0.7431 -1.0665 -1.4000 -0.6651 -1.6679 -0.7351
Mt. San Jacinto 2019 Non-ESL 1.0540 0.9727 -0.3373 0.9059 -0.4601 0.8228 1.0632 -0.9310 1.0634
Napa Valley 2019 Non-ESL -1.2017 -1.4983 -1.0733 -1.5165 -0.8523 -1.1832 -1.1982 -0.7917 -1.2225
North Orange 2019 Non-ESL -0.8687 -1.1142 -0.6859 -0.7302 -0.8624 -1.0875 0.5778 -0.7088 -0.8788
Ohlone 2019 Non-ESL -0.7495 0.2357 -0.8475 -0.8389 -0.5884 -1.2683 -0.3143 -1.0176 -0.6720
Palo Verde 2019 Non-ESL -0.2340 0.1678 -0.4810 -0.1175 -0.2893 -0.0540 -0.2645 -0.9899 -0.2107
Palomar 2019 Non-ESL -0.7515 0.7130 -0.7644 0.0474 -0.7166 -0.3663 -0.9552 -0.8708 -0.7128
Pasadena 2019 Non-ESL -0.4974 0.3768 -0.7239 -0.6254 0.3646 0.9148 -0.9783 -0.7098 0.3646
Peralta 2019 Non-ESL -0.8127 -0.3374 -0.8620 -0.8309 -0.7379 -0.6664 -0.8967 -0.7141 -0.8058
Rancho Santiago 2019 Non-ESL 1.0398 1.7934 -0.0224 1.0129 0.3206 1.7451 0.7040 -0.0894 1.0877
Redwoods 2019 Non-ESL -0.3731 0.9943 -0.7479 0.3447 -0.5126 -0.6149 -0.1288 -0.9583 -0.3128
Rio Hondo 2019 Non-ESL 0.7890 1.3089 0.3076 1.1001 -0.1708 1.5329 0.3580 -0.6853 1.6862
Riverside 2019 Non-ESL 0.8727 0.9603 -1.3419 0.8365 0.0278 0.8508 0.8971 -0.8326 0.8852
San Bernardino 2019 Non-ESL 0.8920 0.8581 0.9149 0.7900 0.4710 0.8651 0.9371 -0.7914 0.8923
San Diego 2019 Non-ESL -0.2807 -0.1027 -0.2998 -0.2384 -0.3137 -0.3284 -0.0043 -0.7117 -0.2255
San Francisco 2019 Non-ESL 1.3988 1.6022 1.1258 1.5909 0.8104 0.8857 1.3805 -0.6632 1.5084
San Joaquin Delta 2019 Non-ESL -0.3441 0.4484 -1.1155 0.1352 -0.6152 -0.8270 0.4684 -0.8849 -0.0950
San Jose-Evergreen 2019 Non-ESL 1.0514 0.1866 1.0281 1.4960 -1.4936 -0.3360 1.0187 -0.7192 1.1428
San Luis Obispo 2019 Non-ESL 0.9051 0.8057 1.0419 0.5866 0.5822 -0.7038 1.0610 -0.5425 0.9695
San Mateo 2019 Non-ESL -0.6544 -0.7076 -0.6365 -0.6700 -0.6345 -0.7162 -0.2904 -0.2016 -0.7053
Santa Barbara 2019 Non-ESL -0.6623 -0.7206 -0.6457 -0.7864 -0.5584 -0.4103 -0.5195 -0.8055 -0.6385
Santa Clarita 2019 Non-ESL 1.5418 1.1118 1.7233 1.1868 0.2362 0.5124 1.7866 0.4416 1.5260
Santa Monica 2019 Non-ESL -0.5737 0.8370 -0.7245 -0.1879 -0.5056 0.7626 -0.7477 -0.6574 -0.2183
Sequoias 2019 Non-ESL 0.7123 0.7592 -0.8198 0.6706 -0.5597 0.6321 0.9200 -0.9094 0.7403
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2019 Non-ESL -0.9272 -0.3699 -0.9753 -0.5822 -0.9171 0.5770 -1.0062 -0.3785 -0.9289
Sierra 2019 Non-ESL 0.6124 0.9497 0.3377 0.7385 -0.2293 -0.2985 1.2536 -0.6926 0.9386
Siskiyous 2019 Non-ESL -1.5705 -1.0338 -1.3376 -1.8129 -0.4406 1.1760 -1.4245 -0.2952 -1.5722
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Solano 2019 Non-ESL -0.6600 0.8082 -0.7068 -0.6391 -0.5251 -0.7070 -0.4284 -0.7581 -0.6489
Sonoma 2019 Non-ESL 0.0068 1.1235 -0.2373 0.9670 -0.5355 -0.5572 0.7201 -0.6348 0.1467
South Orange 2019 Non-ESL -0.6405 0.0356 -0.7807 0.1359 -0.4624 -0.8598 -0.2809 0.4127 -0.8581
Southwestern 2019 Non-ESL 1.2462 0.3167 -0.1298 0.2204 -0.0077 -1.0457 1.1365 -1.1111 1.3430
State Center 2019 Non-ESL 0.8386 0.8126 -0.0140 0.8329 0.0202 0.9589 0.2342 -0.7520 0.8447
Ventura 2019 Non-ESL -0.4063 0.7820 -0.6956 0.2524 -0.3637 -0.5602 -0.0867 -0.5979 -0.3097
Victor Valley 2019 Non-ESL -1.3586 0.3127 -1.0259 -0.3040 -0.8931 -1.4102 0.9229 -1.1593 -1.3024
West Hills 2019 Non-ESL 1.2415 1.2431 0.5170 1.2809 0.2887 1.0167 1.1944 -0.5218 1.2444
West Kern 2019 Non-ESL 0.7234 0.9003 0.3520 0.8454 0.3521 0.7496 0.6927
West Valley-Mission 2019 Non-ESL -0.4744 0.3286 -0.5506 -0.2133 -0.6305 -0.6630 -0.0428 -0.9625 -0.3914
Yosemite 2019 Non-ESL 0.2469 0.7484 -0.6770 0.5577 -0.4587 -0.7135 0.8969 -0.9794 0.6153
Yuba 2019 Non-ESL -0.7154 0.1312 -0.8219 -0.5765 -0.6454 -0.6380 -0.7224 -0.8896 -0.6904
Allan Hancock 2020 ESL -1.7674 -1.7834 1.3795 -1.7897 -0.1033 -1.6974 -1.4563 -1.5391 -1.7534
Antelope Valley 2020 ESL -0.9235 -0.3169 -1.1896 -0.9221 -0.9269 -1.0599 0.4200 -0.9063 -0.8782
Barstow 2020 ESL 0.7073 1.1076 0.2437 0.7934 -0.7110 0.1135 1.1623
Butte 2020 ESL -0.0430 -0.1979 0.0196 0.3600 -0.3747 -2.0112 0.9494
Cabrillo 2020 ESL 0.3565 0.6539 -0.0224 0.6106 -0.1547 -0.3011 1.0879 -1.3755 0.4283
Cerritos 2020 ESL -0.3201 -0.1117 -0.3158 -0.6542 0.7410 -1.5890 1.7265 0.6174 -0.5351
Chabot-Las Positas 2020 ESL 0.2739 -0.4848 0.8890 0.3471 -0.0352 -0.1660 1.1448 0.8118 -0.2332
Chaffey 2020 ESL -1.1422 -1.1811 -1.0081 -1.1286 -1.2084 -1.1516 -0.9281 -0.5636 -1.1924
Citrus 2020 ESL -0.9678 -0.9393 -1.0298 -0.9427 -1.0346 -1.1358 1.6803 -1.3697 -0.9489
Coast 2020 ESL 1.6418 0.5152 1.7244 1.7726 -0.2614 -1.3873 1.7713 1.9024 1.6142
Compton 2020 ESL -1.6745 -1.7091 -1.6025 -1.7263 -1.2408
Contra Costa 2020 ESL 0.8761 1.7453 -0.0252 1.2970 -0.5275 0.6265 0.7792 1.7566 0.0650
Copper Mountain 2020 ESL -0.3905 0.7186 -1.0314 0.9413 -1.2882 0.6720 -0.7505
Desert 2020 ESL -1.4972 -1.5196 -1.3727 -1.4658 -1.5218 -1.7070 -1.2328 -1.6997 -1.4873
El Camino 2020 ESL -1.8047 -1.9014 -1.5463 -1.8171 -1.5939 -1.8554 0.7788 -0.5965 -1.8101
Feather River 2020 ESL -0.6455
Foothill-Deanza 2020 ESL 0.9227 0.7262 1.0108 0.8914 1.0158 0.9527 0.9090 0.8290 0.9352
Gavilan 2020 ESL -0.0374 -0.0883 0.0798 0.1883 -1.1278 -1.4155 0.5663 -1.0340 0.0336
Glendale 2020 ESL -1.7448 -1.9063 -1.6053 -1.2546 -1.7788 -1.4860 -0.5675 -0.5302 -1.8026
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2020 ESL 0.2804 1.0276 -0.1740 1.0874 -0.5718 -0.3145 0.7547 -0.2404 0.5365
Hartnell 2020 ESL 0.8727 0.5496 1.6452 0.8707 0.8048 -0.0711 1.3761 0.6721 0.7660
Imperial 2020 ESL -1.8589 -1.8264 -0.7195 -1.8624 -0.9500 -2.0195 0.3041 -1.8501 -1.8235
Kern 2020 ESL -1.9236 -1.9322 -1.8643 -1.9416 -1.7781 -1.9411 1.1782 -1.9630 -1.9041
Lake Tahoe 2020 ESL 1.1421 -0.6362 1.5822 -0.0955 1.6449 -0.6488 1.5542 -0.6911 1.3245
Lassen 2020 ESL -0.7865 -0.7426 -0.8908 -0.7344 -1.0571 -0.6305 -0.8073 -0.5373
Long Beach 2020 ESL 1.0677 0.6135 0.8784 1.0641 0.9636 -0.8259 1.0428 -0.9348 1.0947
Los Angeles 2020 ESL -1.4900 -1.5664 -1.0791 -1.4846 1.1085 -1.3402 0.2143 -1.1334 -1.5219
Los Rios 2020 ESL -1.6886 -1.6695 -1.6850 -1.6605 -1.7656 -1.6912 -0.3049 -1.7627 -1.6746
Marin 2020 ESL -0.2511 1.5446 -1.3772 -0.1283 -0.4372 -0.7040 0.5035 -0.4345 -0.1821
Mendocino-Lake 2020 ESL 1.6962 1.7532 1.3922 1.7524 1.3236 1.4467 1.8393 -1.1673 1.7342
Merced 2020 ESL -0.4398 -0.1247 -1.7523 -0.2803 -1.7242 -1.8546 0.4027 -0.4484 -0.4371
Mira Costa 2020 ESL -0.4381 -1.0485 0.8008 -0.6038 0.3113 -0.8651 0.1811 -1.0717 -0.3133
Monterey 2020 ESL -1.9031 -1.7852 -1.8492 -1.8299 -1.8599 -1.9342 -1.6345 -1.6596 -1.8965
Mt. San Antonio 2020 ESL -0.6438 -0.8376 -0.3839 -0.6489 -0.4519 -1.8689 -0.4959 -0.4667 -0.6417
Mt. San Jacinto 2020 ESL 0.0516 -0.9719 0.3156 0.0662 -0.3457 -0.9424 0.0957 -0.5181 0.0815
Napa Valley 2020 ESL -1.5609 -1.7567 -1.3461 -1.5953 -1.1261 -1.3025 -1.5265 -0.9682 -1.5962
North Orange 2020 ESL -1.5477 -1.5475 -1.5402 -1.5402 -1.6012 -1.7950 -1.4770 -1.5426 -1.5447
Ohlone 2020 ESL 0.8032 1.2965 0.6729 0.7847 0.8214 -0.9177 1.0070 0.1637 0.9074
Palo Verde 2020 ESL -1.4910 -1.4016 -1.8034 -1.4779 -1.5980 -1.9350 -1.2858 -1.6799 -1.4689
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Palomar 2020 ESL 0.3400 0.0508 0.4903 0.0400 0.7741 0.4875 0.0685 -1.4884 0.3948
Pasadena 2020 ESL -1.5020 -1.3824 -1.4273 -1.5180 -0.5235 -1.2949 -1.5989 -1.5865 -1.4955
Peralta 2020 ESL 1.1653 1.7232 0.6105 0.9669 0.9285 -0.8356 1.6742 1.0772 0.7123
Rancho Santiago 2020 ESL -1.0550 -0.2320 -1.0164 -1.0409 -0.9820 -1.2908 -0.9665 -1.1599 -1.0502
Redwoods 2020 ESL -1.6695 -1.3709 -0.3643 -1.3695 -0.6803 0.4667 -1.7932
Rio Hondo 2020 ESL 1.0363 1.0169 0.9473 1.1108 -0.3817 0.4848 1.4539 0.0821 1.1645
Riverside 2020 ESL 1.1725 0.8556 1.3361 1.3407 0.3900 0.4379 1.5165 1.2457 1.1413
San Bernardino 2020 ESL -0.0370 -0.1506 0.1369 0.0075 -0.2248 -0.9530 1.1931 -0.3960 0.0132
San Diego 2020 ESL -1.8653 -1.8505 -1.8619 -1.8723 -1.7245 -1.7099 -1.9140 -1.8231 -1.8663
San Francisco 2020 ESL -1.5294 -1.7542 -1.4110 -1.4719 -1.7855 -1.4257 -1.5610 -1.4027 -1.4996
San Joaquin Delta 2020 ESL -1.0393 -0.9751 -1.0823 -0.9506 -1.3448 -1.2133 1.5889 -1.2280 -1.0144
San Jose-Evergreen 2020 ESL 1.2257 0.9452 1.3064 1.2564 0.8860 0.6608 1.2304 1.3287 1.1804
San Luis Obispo 2020 ESL -0.4659 -0.2468 -0.8123 -0.3070 -0.7195 -1.1714 0.0013 -0.8965 -0.3164
San Mateo 2020 ESL -1.2698 -1.2362 -1.3107 -1.2259 -1.4451 -1.2713 -1.2276 -1.2837 -1.2547
Santa Barbara 2020 ESL -0.5359 -0.4464 -1.1645 -0.5295 -0.6027 -0.5227 -0.5379 -0.7638 -0.5138
Santa Clarita 2020 ESL -0.3141 -0.4257 -0.1429 -0.3333 -0.2660 -0.2814 -0.3270 -0.9717 -0.2541
Santa Monica 2020 ESL -1.3694 -1.3480 -1.4106 -1.3739 -1.2911 -1.3350 -1.4711 -1.2143 -1.3810
Sequoias 2020 ESL -0.6407 0.6140 -1.4197 -0.6651 -0.1770 0.0204 -0.7893 -1.3148 -0.5873
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2020 ESL -1.4476 -1.3825 -1.4489 -1.4841 -1.4177 -1.3884 -1.1558 -0.9975 -1.4436
Sierra 2020 ESL -0.6834 -0.6626 -0.6758 -0.5691 -0.7187 -0.9999 1.5995 0.5897 -0.7077
Siskiyous 2020 ESL -1.2033 -0.4602 -1.1278 -0.7690 -1.1100 -1.1861 -0.5256 0.6266 -1.2215
Solano 2020 ESL -1.2491 -1.1200 -1.2429 -1.1372 -1.3032 -1.1818 0.2020 -1.1470 -1.1659
Sonoma 2020 ESL -1.0138 -1.3350 -0.4064 -0.9957 -1.0090 -0.3292 -1.2952 -1.3333 -0.8841
South Orange 2020 ESL 0.8547 0.3252 1.0898 1.0178 0.0520 0.4092 0.8642 -0.2609 0.8808
Southwestern 2020 ESL 0.4859 1.0504 -0.2919 0.9026 -0.5192 -0.3011 1.0011 0.7938 0.4202
State Center 2020 ESL -1.5895 -1.5483 -1.5676 -1.5874 -1.5264 -1.5815 1.4573 -1.8008 -1.5342
Ventura 2020 ESL 0.9691 0.7804 1.2156 1.0770 -0.2074 0.5543 0.8523 -0.6780 0.9839
Victor Valley 2020 ESL -1.2724 -1.0806 -1.6103 -1.2590 -1.3309 -1.2673 -1.2450 -1.1026 -1.2753
West Hills 2020 ESL 0.1284 0.4300 -0.3133 0.2821 -0.4234 0.2103 -0.3499 0.8625 0.1019
West Kern 2020 ESL -1.2410 -0.9949 -1.7014 -1.0809 -1.6448 -1.4637 -0.9186
West Valley-Mission 2020 ESL -1.0603 -1.2300 -0.9280 -1.0170 -1.1263 -1.2221 -0.1393 -1.2273 -0.9452
Yosemite 2020 ESL 0.2634 0.1334 0.4054 0.3088 0.1172 -0.0322 0.5407 0.7617 0.2076
Yuba 2020 ESL -0.5246 -0.6238 -0.3135 0.0599 -1.1425 -1.0330 0.7402 -0.7062 -0.4777
Allan Hancock 2020 Non-ESL -1.0374 -0.8612 -1.1003 -0.6334 -1.2492 -1.0068 -1.0749 -1.0974 -1.0335
Antelope Valley 2020 Non-ESL 0.6962 1.2905 -1.1158 1.6293 -1.5805 0.7030 0.3412 -0.9374 1.3064
Barstow 2020 Non-ESL -1.2706 0.8268 -1.3692 0.2900 -1.3539 -1.1104 -1.4413
Butte 2020 Non-ESL -1.3819 0.6268 -1.2312 1.4698 -1.4163 -1.4247 1.5216
Cabrillo 2020 Non-ESL -1.0110 0.0006 -1.1658 -0.2952 -1.2086 -0.9647 -1.0270 -0.6675 -1.0170
Cerritos 2020 Non-ESL 1.8184 0.6071 0.5864 0.1890 0.6452 -0.3381 1.0830 -0.6728 1.8251
Chabot-Las Positas 2020 Non-ESL -0.3283 0.5759 -1.1029 0.8357 -1.4921 -0.7181 1.4130 -1.2262 -0.0795
Chaffey 2020 Non-ESL 0.6087 0.7869 -1.0918 0.8405 -1.9571 0.6142 0.5822 -0.3074 0.6353
Citrus 2020 Non-ESL -0.5326 0.1750 -1.3995 0.2622 -1.5868 -1.6506 1.9164 -1.8387 -0.0735
Coast 2020 Non-ESL -1.6452 -0.9051 -1.5246 -1.5028 -1.6179 -1.5133 -1.7560 -1.6467 -1.6415
Compton 2020 Non-ESL -2.0001 -1.9580 -1.8180 -2.0104 -1.5882
Contra Costa 2020 Non-ESL -1.4527 0.8467 -1.3867 -0.2301 -1.5393 -1.4914 -0.8593 -0.1146 -1.3156
Copper Mountain 2020 Non-ESL -1.3760 0.8136 -1.5265 0.3246 -1.4925 -1.2803 -1.3921
Desert 2020 Non-ESL 1.4586 1.3977 0.5946 1.4750 -1.3682 1.3037 0.3993 -1.3494 1.4520
El Camino 2020 Non-ESL -1.1628 -0.6796 -0.1128 0.2538 -1.7659 -1.7948 1.3441 -1.4622 -0.8105
Feather River 2020 Non-ESL -1.0241
Foothill-Deanza 2020 Non-ESL -1.4884 -1.3917 -1.4875 -1.4091 -1.6035 -1.3688 -1.4766 -1.5302 -1.4412
Gavilan 2020 Non-ESL -0.6462 -0.3765 -0.7410 0.0289 -1.0876 -0.6860 -0.6304 -1.1348 -0.5992
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Glendale 2020 Non-ESL -1.3258 -1.4328 -1.2161 -1.2267 -1.5314 -1.4430 -0.8516 -1.4283 -1.2210
Grossmont-Cuyamaca 2020 Non-ESL -1.7952 -1.7338 -1.6540 -1.7921 -1.7031 -1.8017 0.9350 -1.5028 -1.7489
Hartnell 2020 Non-ESL 0.0597 0.7417 -1.0127 0.4320 -0.2812 0.4232 -0.3198 -1.5576 0.2589
Imperial 2020 Non-ESL 1.9227 1.8736 1.6879 1.9796 0.7885 1.9022 1.6544 -0.1858 1.8316
Kern 2020 Non-ESL 1.2729 1.4576 0.5608 1.3990 -1.7849 1.3259 -1.2229 -1.4468 1.2947
Lake Tahoe 2020 Non-ESL 0.6360 0.4807 0.6772 0.9687 -0.5257 0.7186 0.5699 0.9649 0.6253
Lassen 2020 Non-ESL -0.5649 0.3752 -0.9384 0.2369 -1.1436 0.3473 -1.4394 -1.1636
Long Beach 2020 Non-ESL 1.4915 1.1010 -0.4294 1.2976 0.0656 1.7934 0.6471 -1.4591 1.5448
Los Angeles 2020 Non-ESL -1.6087 -0.9686 -1.6744 -1.5872 -1.5735 -1.1847 -0.3243 -1.5222 -1.5895
Los Rios 2020 Non-ESL -1.3471 1.2790 -1.5296 0.8623 -1.4756 -0.8038 -0.3768 -1.2084 -1.2922
Marin 2020 Non-ESL -1.1075 0.4826 -0.9893 0.0253 -1.2880 -1.1087 0.3395 -0.5594 -1.1957
Mendocino-Lake 2020 Non-ESL -1.7615 1.1129 -1.8391 0.8322 -1.8811 -1.7107 -1.2050 -1.3607 -1.7491
Merced 2020 Non-ESL 0.7805 0.7412 0.5455 1.1437 -1.5369 1.4973 0.1655 0.9786 0.7322
Mira Costa 2020 Non-ESL -1.6995 -0.8857 -1.4985 -1.1758 -1.5384 -1.6083 -1.5451 -1.5763 -1.7117
Monterey 2020 Non-ESL -1.2388 0.4239 -1.2394 -0.4431 -1.3363 -1.2595 -1.2144 -1.0968 -1.2378
Mt. San Antonio 2020 Non-ESL 1.4448 1.3757 1.4744 1.5472 -0.5440 1.5923 1.3195 -0.7267 1.4798
Mt. San Jacinto 2020 Non-ESL 0.2522 0.7193 -1.7732 0.9631 -1.7145 -0.3505 0.5542 -1.2419 0.3827
Napa Valley 2020 Non-ESL -1.2532 -0.8778 -1.2652 -1.0029 -1.4016 -1.2237 -1.2744 -1.2506 -1.2476
North Orange 2020 Non-ESL -1.3733 -1.1858 -1.3603 -1.3198 -1.2918 -1.1489 -1.6759 -1.5940 -1.3527
Ohlone 2020 Non-ESL 0.1133 1.3376 -0.0893 0.4540 -0.1644 -0.8410 0.6024 -1.4318 0.2569
Palo Verde 2020 Non-ESL 0.8940 1.3594 0.2420 1.5693 -0.5089 1.4495 -0.8259 -1.0813 0.9151
Palomar 2020 Non-ESL -1.3232 1.1204 -1.3136 0.9584 -1.3971 -1.7981 -0.7831 -1.3795 -1.2824
Pasadena 2020 Non-ESL -1.1874 0.4408 -1.3048 -0.5791 -0.0076 0.7951 -1.1910 -1.6709 0.8419
Peralta 2020 Non-ESL -1.2521 -0.9488 -1.2617 -1.2245 -1.3387 -1.5682 -0.7498 -1.6146 -1.1784
Rancho Santiago 2020 Non-ESL -1.7504 -0.6526 -1.4987 -1.3910 -1.4159 -1.1006 -1.7071 -1.7732 -1.7059
Redwoods 2020 Non-ESL -1.0179 0.4675 -1.1036 0.9731 -1.4147 -1.3433 -0.5757
Rio Hondo 2020 Non-ESL -1.8158 -0.6301 -1.7143 -1.2460 -1.5474 -1.2501 -1.8730 -1.7306 -0.0262
Riverside 2020 Non-ESL 0.8385 0.7783 1.0056 1.0908 -1.7937 0.9725 0.5226 -1.5576 0.9294
San Bernardino 2020 Non-ESL 1.0648 1.1772 0.1820 1.2205 -1.8485 1.0051 1.1754 -0.7668 1.0602
San Diego 2020 Non-ESL -1.9095 -1.4475 -1.8812 -1.9052 -1.8793 -1.8869 -1.8374 -1.0968 -1.9233
San Francisco 2020 Non-ESL -0.7879 0.3669 -1.0213 -0.2082 -1.4993 -1.4864 0.0203 -1.1148 -0.4890
San Joaquin Delta 2020 Non-ESL 1.9190 1.7664 -0.3035 1.9620 -1.5531 1.2900 1.7217 -1.1009 1.9889
San Jose-Evergreen 2020 Non-ESL -0.4922 0.9800 -1.4940 -0.0675 -0.5996 -1.2448 0.5535 -1.2931 0.4369
San Luis Obispo 2020 Non-ESL 1.2621 1.4042 1.0158 1.7103 -1.7189 0.0300 1.0189 -0.7194 1.3410
San Mateo 2020 Non-ESL -1.4389 -1.3166 -1.4735 -1.4556 -1.4169 -1.2275 -1.9154 -1.8166 -1.3368
Santa Barbara 2020 Non-ESL -1.2078 -1.1396 -1.2255 -0.9281 -1.3945 -1.3029 -0.7184 -1.2390 -1.1996
Santa Clarita 2020 Non-ESL 0.2988 0.8753 -0.7030 0.8239 -1.7805 0.1353 0.3224 -2.0224 0.3522
Santa Monica 2020 Non-ESL -1.6578 0.5842 -1.4904 1.1521 -1.8007 0.2985 -1.3423 -1.5519 -1.3296
Sequoias 2020 Non-ESL 1.1049 1.0608 -0.9493 1.2360 -1.4692 1.1472 0.9639 -1.1581 1.1169
Shasta-Tehama-Trinity 2020 Non-ESL -1.2109 -0.1441 -1.3533 -0.0417 -1.4811 0.1587 -1.2472 -1.5634 -1.2024
Sierra 2020 Non-ESL -1.0696 0.7337 -1.5019 1.4566 -1.7329 -0.9499 -0.0037 -1.3674 -0.6261
Siskiyous 2020 Non-ESL -0.9004 1.2326 -1.1656 0.0390 -1.7576 1.0094 -0.9708 -0.1342 -0.9025
Solano 2020 Non-ESL -1.1283 1.3863 -1.2096 0.9757 -1.5233 -1.1913 -0.7816 -1.2399 -1.1151
Sonoma 2020 Non-ESL -1.8120 0.9393 -1.8101 1.0636 -1.6129 -1.3231 -1.6115 -0.9077 -1.8465
South Orange 2020 Non-ESL -1.0238 -0.1368 -1.1864 1.7047 -1.8190 -0.6180 -1.1951 -0.6551 -1.0158
Southwestern 2020 Non-ESL 0.1531 0.7353 -0.8219 0.6979 -0.7766 -0.9311 0.7824 0.8086 0.0148
State Center 2020 Non-ESL 0.7153 1.0017 -1.3455 1.0246 -1.4270 1.2613 -0.5413 -1.3946 0.7920
Ventura 2020 Non-ESL -1.7936 0.8248 -1.6282 1.5990 -1.8536 -1.6518 -1.7679 -1.4902 -1.6973
Victor Valley 2020 Non-ESL 0.6676 1.7206 -0.8604 1.9501 -1.2353 0.7530 -1.0496 -1.0343 0.8430
West Hills 2020 Non-ESL -0.5941 -0.1749 -1.6867 -0.2462 -1.8140 0.2098 -1.5840 -1.4231 -0.5569
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West Kern 2020 Non-ESL -0.3584 0.0371 -0.9191 -0.0599 -0.9603 -0.2742 -0.4240
West Valley-Mission 2020 Non-ESL -1.2308 -0.8134 -1.2352 -0.8040 -1.4294 -1.1733 -1.2439 -1.3903 -1.1840
Yosemite 2020 Non-ESL -0.0832 1.2651 -1.2867 1.6107 -1.6314 -0.8367 0.9216 -1.1387 0.3813
Yuba 2020 Non-ESL -1.4430 -0.4909 -1.3814 -0.6252 -1.6062 -1.5994 -1.0796 -1.3931 -1.4249
E.1










Z_stddev T-test P-value T-test Statistic
2016 Hispanic 0.0555 0.6737 1.1163 0.7880 0.0002 -3.8389
2018 Hispanic -0.1607 0.3693 0.9683 0.7765 0.0005 -3.5980
2016 Low-Income -0.2949 0.2140 1.0872 0.9441 0.0032 -2.9987
2017 White 0.0641 -0.3355 1.0897 0.7158 0.0116 2.5646
2019 White -0.1235 -0.4542 1.0096 0.5575 0.0174 2.4160
2019 Non-Hispanic -0.0884 -0.4114 0.9446 0.7245 0.0238 2.2863
2018 Ss of Color -0.2553 0.1105 0.9685 0.9664 0.0269 -2.2373
2017 Non-Hispanic 0.0623 -0.2739 0.9567 0.9363 0.0361 2.1167
2016 Ss of Color -0.0102 0.3813 1.1356 1.0691 0.0375 -2.1003
2018 Low-Income -0.3147 -0.0311 0.8114 0.8712 0.0466 -2.0074
2019 Higher-Income 0.0793 -0.2009 1.0987 0.9241 0.1023 1.6449
2016 White -0.0077 -0.2780 1.1887 0.8754 0.1280 1.5321
2018 Higher-Income -0.0859 0.1617 0.8851 1.0859 0.1387 -1.4896
2018 Overall (all Ss) -0.2184 0.0275 0.9457 1.0240 0.1394 -1.4867
2017 Hispanic 0.0639 0.2973 1.0231 0.9601 0.1631 -1.4020
2017 Higher-Income 0.2816 0.0539 1.1011 1.0093 0.2012 1.2844
2016 Overall (all Ss) -0.0410 0.1681 1.2025 0.9932 0.2573 -1.1375
2016 Non-Hispanic -0.0822 -0.2620 1.1373 0.9864 0.3127 1.0132
2017 Overall (all Ss) 0.0833 -0.0697 1.0232 0.9815 0.3614 0.9156
2019 Overall (all Ss) -0.1065 -0.2406 0.9958 0.8153 0.3815 0.8780
2018 Non-Hispanic -0.3002 -0.1878 0.9057 0.9185 0.4641 -0.7342
2019 Hispanic -0.0904 0.0175 0.9830 0.9124 0.4990 -0.6779
2016 Higher-Income 0.2138 0.1175 1.1184 1.0845 0.6007 0.5245
2017 Low-Income -0.0690 -0.1230 0.8927 0.9571 0.7286 0.3477
2019 Low-Income -0.1997 -0.2474 0.9531 0.7663 0.7426 0.3290
2017 Ss of Color 0.1296 0.1751 0.9659 0.9608 0.7804 -0.2793
2019 Ss of Color -0.0881 -0.0601 1.0694 0.9058 0.8669 -0.1679
2018 White -0.1542 -0.1709 0.9611 0.6910 0.9059 0.1184
     * These numbers represent the change in enrollment from the previous academic year to the listed year
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APPENDIX F: Timeline of the Removal of the 2019 Public Charge Rule
Date Action
January 20, 2021 President Joe Biden took office.
February 2, 2021 President Biden signed Executive Order 14,012: “Restoring Faith in
Our Legal Immigration Systems and Strengthening Integration and
Inclusion Efforts for New Americans,” which directed federal
agencies to review current public charge policy and provide
recommendations about changes needed to restore the “integrity” of
the U.S. immigration system within the next 60 days.
March 9, 2021 The Department of Justice dropped its defense of the 2019 public
charge rule, leading to the dismissal of pending immigration cases
related to the new public charge rule. U.S. Citizen and Immigration
Services immediately stopped applying the rule in their dealings with
immigrants, and the enforcement of the expanded public charge rule
was vacated in its entirety.
March 15, 2021 The 2019 public charge rule was officially removed from the Federal
Register, and statutes in line with the 1999 Field Guidance were
restored.
Adapted from the Immigration Law Resource Center (2021)
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